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Title
Abstract
Key Takeaways
Introduction
Experimental Games in the Field
Modeling Human Behavior: Conclusion and Review
References

Behavioral Game Theory and Sociology

Profile image of Herbert GintisHerbert Gintis

2004

Abstract

Behavioral game theory assumes rational choice theory, but considers the content of the preference function that the agent maximizes as the subject of empirical investigation. Many behavioral experiments indicate that subjects in experimental games behave in an other-regarding manner broadly consistent with the notion that they have internalized social values that strongly affect what they choose to optimize. The paper shows that behavioral game theory vindicates a variant of rational actor sociology in modeling cooperation and ...

Key takeaways
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  1. Behavioral game theory expands rational choice theory by incorporating other-regarding preferences and social values.
  2. Strong reciprocity and inequality aversion are key behaviors influencing cooperation in social dilemmas.
  3. Empirical studies reveal significant variation in cooperative behaviors across different cultural contexts.
  4. Experiments demonstrate the importance of internalized norms in shaping altruistic behaviors and decision-making.
  5. The findings challenge traditional notions of rationality, suggesting that human behavior is socially programmable.

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The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

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