Whither “Naturalization of Morality”?

Science & Education, 2009

The nature of moral values has occupied philosophers and educationalists for centuries and a variety of claims have been made about their origin and status. One tradition suggests they may be thoughts in the mind of God; another that they are eternal truths to be reached by rational reflection (much like the truths of mathematics) or alternatively through intuition; another that they are social conventions; and another (from the logical positivists) that they are not verifiable facts but simply the expression of emotional likes and dislikes. Standard introductory texts (e.g., Bowie 2004; Vardy and Grosch 1999) on the subject of ethics rarely mention Darwin or Darwinism (Mepham 2005 is a useful exception) possibly mindful of the fact that the relationship of evolutionary biology to moral questions has had a troublesome history. The effect of this has been that whole generations of moral philosophers have given the biological sciences a wide berth and consequently often remain poorly informed about recent advances in evolutionary thought and the neurosciences. On the other hand, scientists have developed interesting models of the evolution of the moral sentiments and are using new imaging techniques to explore the centres of the brain associated with emotion and motivation, but many have been fearful of committing the naturalistic fallacy and so have steered clear of extrapolating their findings to ethical questions. No one after all wants to be seen to be committing an elementary logical blunder. But in the last 20 years, evolutionary biologists have regained the confidence to explore the implications of evolution for the study of ethics (de Waal 1996; Wilson 1998; Wright 1994; Greene 2003). This paper is designed to encourage those entrusted with the teaching of ethics to be open to the potential of Darwinism as a source of ideas on the origins and status of ethical thought and behaviour. It is also hoped that it will illustrate for science educators the enormous explanatory power inherent in Darwinian thought.

Zygon?, 2000

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology, developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2014

This book, through its essays, captures this interdisciplinary nature of research into morality, treated both as a social fact, as well as man's individual disposition. The Slovak philosopher and ethicist Vasil Gluchman, as the book's scientific editor, divided the book into two parts, the first, entitled Different Concepts of Morality presents, in accordance with its title, various and sometimes even controversial stances related to the understanding of key issues of morality. The second part of the book titled New Trends in Understanding Morality consists primarily of the author's attempts to explain the sources of morality formulated not only by ethics, but also by the biological sciences. In this short presentation it is clear that both the scientific editor as well as the individual authors, did not set themselves the objective of writing another book on moral philosophy, but instead focused themselves on the key issues which determine the status and direction of contemporary research into morality. In the introduction, Vasil Gluchman stressed, that no ethical theories can be formulated which can be applied eternally. Each age is characterized by its particular morality, and hence ethics must constantly adapt to existing realities. The first chapter of the book is Jeremy Bendik-Keymer's essay titled The Moral and the Ethical: What Conscience Teaches us about Morality. The problem of conscience, by reference to individually molded sensitivity, is placed within the psychology of morality. The author tries to prove that only molded conscience allows us to establish and maintain social relationships. The author carries out his reasoning using human rights as an example. History has shaped human conscience and thus, after the Holocaust, following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, human conscience has been completely reshaped. Thus conscience becomes a fundamental category of humanism, because it was shaped in interpersonal relations, and therefore morality must also be relational (p. 17). Therefore, a person functioning in society becomes a moral being, and consequently the author answers the question of whether morality is innate, or is the result of the influence of society. Such a solution adopted by the author is heralded by the motto "Even though you are far from my eyes, you are in my heart" which constitutes an introduction to his article. Howard M. Ducharme from the University of Akron in his article A Critical Evaluation of a Classic Moral Scientist: Are there any Moral Facts to Discover? compares ethical tradition

Beytülhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, 2022

In this study, I will approach morality from a naturalistic perspective and defend that morality is a product of evolutionary processes shared by both human and non-human animals rather than that of human culture. My natural- istic approach is based on simpler components instead of high-level cognitive capabilities such as cognition. Rationality , judgment, and free will are indeed pre- sented as necessary for morality in classical definitions of morality. However, I will put forward that the roots of morality can be understood as the biological disposition in the evolutionary process. Moreover, in this paper, I will propose that morality is not a phenomenon that ought to be restricted to humans. I think morality is not a phenomenon that is exclusively human; rather, morality can be expanded to non-human animals. To defend this claim, I will indicate that mo- rality has a natural content and that this content does not have a structure that can only be justified on a rational basis, but that this normative structure can be established through biological/evolutionary mechanisms and can be explained in this way.

Handbook of personality, 2019

Morality covers the gamut of life-every action is governed by values-whether those we have chosen or those we have implicitly absorbed. Our morality is shaped by multiple factors: what we inherit, where we habitually put our attention, what actions we choose, and the perceptual sensitivities and capacities we develop from how we were raised. All these shape our values and character. As a result, the study of moral development requires a transdisciplinary and transmethodological approach. Disciplinary contributions from evolutionary systems theory, clinical studies, and developmental and personality research each provide insight into the moral development of humanity. Method-ologies of study must also be broad and address both a universalist and an individual-difference approach. The former seeks to find basic patterns across humanity-individuals and societies whereas the latter takes into account the diversity of influences on the development of an individual's moral dispositions. In this chapter , contributions from multiple disciplines and methods are included in an examination of the development of moral values.

We propose an objective and justifiable ethics that is contingent on the truth of evolutionary theory. We do not argue for the truth of this position, which depends on the empirical question of whether moral functions form a natural class, but for its cogency and possibility. The position we propose combines the advantages of Kantian objectivity with the explanatory and motivational advantages of moral naturalism. It avoids problems with the epistemological inaccessibility of transcendent values, while avoiding the relativism or subjectivism often associated with moral naturalism. Our position emerges out of criticisms of the contemporary sociobiological views of morality found in the writings of Richard Alexander, Michael Ruse, and Robert Richards.

2007

It should be obvious that, within the confi nes of a short response, we cannot possibly answer the question that constitutes the title of our reply. Nonetheless, each of our commentators touched upon issues that bear directly on this question, so we've chosen it as a framework within which to refl ect upon their many stimulating comments. Naturalism in moral philosophy is associated with diverse views that do not make up a happy family. At the turn of the twentieth century, G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica outlined a (purportedly fallacious) metaethical view that came to be known as "moral naturalism." According to Moore, this particular form of naturalism is committed to the view that moral properties are natural properties and can therefore be defi ned as such. Defi nitions provide analyses in terms of necessary and suffi cient conditions; that is, they are analytic. Such analytic defi nitions do not leave open any questions about the relationship between the defi nition and what is defi ned. However, Moore claimed, all attempts to defi ne the moral do allow for such open questions. Therefore, moral naturalism is false. In addition, the term is also used to denote a claim that natural facts can vindicate, justify, or ground moral facts in a strong sense. Now, the view we outline is, by our lights, ethically naturalistic. However, we believe neither in the reducibility of the moral to the descriptive nor in the vindication of the moral by the descriptive. We do, of course, believe that moral norms, ends, and values are amenable to rational discussion. But the strong sense of vindication-the demonstrative sort that Hume correctly saw as not in the offi ng-is something we reject. Thus, given the multifarious uses of the term "ethical naturalism" or "moral naturalism," it is not surprising that our commentators (naturalists themselves) would hold some beliefs different than our own. For example, Michael Ruse believes (as J. L. Mackie did) that ethics requires a strong form of rationally compelling, objective categoricity, and

Business, Science, and Ethics

Abstract: “Ought” cannot be derived from “is,” so why should facts about human nature be of interest to business ethicists? In this ar- ticle, we discuss why the nature of human nature is relevant to anyone wishing to create a ...

Understanding morality and ethics, 2021

This is an attempt to describe, in as complete a fashion as possible, the evolutionary basics of the everyday moral and ethical landscape. I describe morality by its parts, from which we can derive the following structure of evolutionary ethics including some meta-ethics. We may continue to derive further moral philosophy from this highly fruitful and empirically consistent paradigm. I introduce the idea of "the Healing Principle": the near-universal, biological pressure to thrive, survive and reproduce. This pressure - instrumental normativity - unifies morality and makes it intelligible in an elegant and parsimonious way, as it supplies the normative pressure for cooperative, fair, competitive, kin-selected/inclusive, and patriarchal/sexual normativities. Emotionally it translates into a pressure to seek pleasure. In fact, it is normative in all the three domains of psychological, biological, and social/moral well being. Normativity is should-ness or the pressure to achieve goals. Morality, and the need for moral values, principles, and virtues, are generated when we achieve our instrumental goals (thriving, surviving and/or reproducing) jointly or collectively. Goodness is defined as maximising the well being of all concerned individuals including the self, by putting the right conditions in place; or maximising the well being of the group in general; or maximising the achievement of sacred values. Edition 2 of the e-book: https://orangebud.co.uk/web_book_2.html - less waffle, more clarity, more philosophically advanced.

Biology and Subjectivity: Philosophical Contributions to Non-­‐reductive Neuroscience, 2016

Many modern ideas about the nature of morality are strongly influenced by the kind of historical or genealogical approach that began to emerge in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the most famous proponent of this was Charles Darwin. In his Descent of Man (published in the 1870s) Darwin displays what can be called a 'reductionist' attitude to human morality: instead of providing us with insight into ultimate meaning and value, our faculty of moral judgement is simply a product, or by-product, of how our ancestors happened to have evolved in the struggle for survival. In the course of Chapters 4 and 5 of the Descent of Man, which are about the evolution of our moral sensibilities, Darwin uses a highly significant phrase-the 'so-called moral sense'. 1 His reductionist approach sees conscience, and other so-called 'higher' impulses, as merely one or more of many natural feelings that have developed under selection pressure. Altruism and self-sacrifice, for instance (to take an example he discusses), may have arisen because tribes in which this trait is prominent 'would be victorious over most other tribes, and this would be natural selection'. 2 The crucial point Darwin is making here is about the purely natural origin of our moral feelings; they are in this respect just like any other ingrained drives and inclinations-part of our natural, animal inheritance. Indeed, he implies that the difference between moral and non-moral feelings is rather like the difference between human dispositions and those occurring in other primates: the difference may be considerable, but in Darwin's view it is 'certainly … one of degree, and not of kind.' 3 There is nothing special, nothing specially exalted, about morality or about the conscience or moral sense that supposedly detects