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Title
Abstract
Figures
Introduction
Discussion
Method
Results
1 Descriptive Results
Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusion
References

Towards a Model of Online Auction Deception

Profile image of Dan StoneDan Stone

2006, Proceedings of the ECAIS

Abstract

The phenomenal growth of e-commerce and online auctions is exceeded only by the corresponding growth in e-commerce and online auction fraud. Herein, we report two pilot studies that use eBay data, and the Bell & Whaley (1991) taxonomy of cheating, to investigate the nature and frequency of online auction deception. Study one (n = 24) categorizes a one-week sample of online transactions into deception strategies in two general classes (i.e., hiding versus showing) and three strategic domains (i.e., product, seller, and transaction characteristics).

Figures (5)

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