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Outline

Title
Abstract
Type-Theoretical Analysis
Future Tenses
He Then Raises the Question
Questions and Answers
Conclusion
Summary of Attitudes
Seeking, Finding and Looking for
References
All Topics
Philosophy
Logic

Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic

Profile image of Pavel MaternaPavel MaternaProfile image of Bjørn JespersenBjørn JespersenProfile image of Marie DužíMarie Duží

2010

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8812-3
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565 pages

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Abstract
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Transparent Intensional Logic, developed over the last few decades, presents a new approach to understanding semantics and its implications for philosophy, linguistics, and computer science. The paper advocates for a top-down strategy in semantic analysis, unifying concepts such as referential transparency, compositionality, and hyperintensional individuation. Rejecting traditional views like semantic actualism, the theory emphasizes a clarified understanding of meanings independent of possible worlds.

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  322. Zouhar, M. 2007. Rigidná designácia. Metafyzická téma vo filosofii jazyka. (Rigid Designation: A Metaphysical Topic in the Philosophy of Language.) Bratislava: Infopress.
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  324. Name Index A Aczel, P., 195
  325. Adams, R.M., 181
  326. Allo, P., 510, 513, 529
  327. Almog, J., 423
  328. Aloni, M., 306
  329. Anderson, C.A., 13, 151, 187, 433
  330. Aristotle, 24, 368, 379
  331. B Barber, A., 385
  332. Barendregt, H., 55
  333. Bar-Hillel, Y., 511-512
  334. Barwise, J., 121
  335. Bealer, G., 6, 8, 39, 71, 101, 190-200, 296, 301-302, 306-309, 421, 433
  336. Beeson, M.J., 262-263
  337. Benacerraf, P., 292-296
  338. Benthem, J. van, 532
  339. Berg, J., 310
  340. Bergmann, G., 381
  341. Berkovski, S., 371, 376
  342. Bethke, I., 261
  343. Betti, A., 133
  344. Bird, A., 414
  345. Bochvar, D.A., 84
  346. Bolzano, B., 106, 148-149, 276, 508
  347. Brasoveanu, A., 347
  348. Brown, J.R., 472
  349. C Cameron, R.P., 372
  350. Carnap, R., 4-5, 8, 13, 16, 61, 101, 151, 170-171, 368, 441, 511-512, 519
  351. Castañeda, H.-N., 317-319
  352. Chierchia, G., 8
  353. Chisholm, R., 31, 415
  354. Chomsky, N., 222
  355. Church, A., 2-4, 10, 13, 16, 39-42, 62, 101, 150-152, 154, 202, 368, 421, 433, 488
  356. Cleland, C.E., 102
  357. Cmorej, P., 58, 65, 67, 69-71, 73-77
  358. Cocchiarella, N.B., 101, 375-376
  359. Cohen, M.R., 506, 527
  360. Cresswell, M.J., 5, 7-9, 41, 101-102, 152, 398 D Davidson, D., 12, 192, 228, 421
  361. Davies, M., 184, 418-419
  362. DeRosset, L., 372, 376
  363. Donnellan, K., 281
  364. Dretske, F., 5, 383, 411-412
  365. Dummett, M., 6, 8, 98, 180-181, 186
  366. Duží, M., 9, 73, 86, 118, 144, 146, 156, 223, 235, 257, 336-337, 425, 437, 456, 458, 485, 494-495, 500, 511, 517, 526
  367. E Eijck, J. van, 347
  368. Einheuser, I., 180, 185-186
  369. Einstein, A., 413
  370. Elgot-Drapkin, J.J., 460
  371. Evans, G., 66, 184
  372. F Fagin, R., 461
  373. Farrell, R., 376
  374. Fasli, M., 463
  375. Feferman, S., 261
  376. Fitch, F., 351
  377. Fitting, M., 462
  378. Fletcher, P., 98
  379. Floridi, L., 508
  380. Fodor, J.A., 98
  381. Foley, R., 435
  382. Forbes, G., 376-378, 385-386
  383. Frege, G., 3, 10-19, 24, 39, 56, 60, 100-101, 110-111, 133, 141, 149-150, 162-163, 192, 228, 280-282, 289, 309, 312, 418, 421, 427, 430, 452, 509
  384. Friedman, J., 202
  385. G Gahér, F., 485
  386. Gamut, L.T.F., 17, 95, 138, 187, 200, 208, 229, 395, 422, 427, 485
  387. Gärdenfors, P., 512
  388. Gaskin, R., 101, 192
  389. Geach, P.T., 74, 336-337, 404
  390. Genesereth, M.R., 453
  391. Groenendijk, J., 352-353
  392. Carrara, M., 406, 410, 469
  393. Guenthner, F., 178
  394. Gumb, R.D., 261
  395. H Hajiþová, E., 351
  396. Hales, S., 423
  397. Hamm, F., 16, 102
  398. Hanson, N.R., 377
  399. Harrah, D., 351
  400. Hart, W.D., 454
  401. Hindley, J.R., 3
  402. Hintikka, J., 5, 30, 61, 139, 342-343, 345, 383, 434, 451, 453, 464, 509, 511
  403. Hintikka, M.B., 61
  404. Hodes, H.T., 418
  405. Horák, A., 155
  406. Horwich, P., 139
  407. Hughes, J., 410
  408. Humberstone, L., 184, 418
  409. J Jackendoff, R., 139
  410. Jespersen, B., 96, 101, 154, 181, 190, 286, 301, 347, 359, 385, 406, 410, 453, 485, 494
  411. Johnson-Laird, P.N., 98
  412. K Kamp, H., 346-347
  413. Kapitan, T., 317-319
  414. Kaplan, D., 4, 7-8, 13, 60, 102, 316, 318, 368, 489, 495
  415. Kaufmann, W., 532
  416. King, J.C., 423
  417. Kirkham, R.L., 15
  418. Kleene, S.C., 156
  419. Kline, M., 81
  420. Klop, J.V., 261
  421. Kozen, D., 340
  422. KĜetínský, J., 348
  423. Kripke, S., 5, 7-8, 29, 116, 180, 191, 288, 293-294, 298-307, 341, 367-376, 461, 512
  424. Kroes, P., 406
  425. KuchyĖka, P., 228, 477
  426. L Lambalgen, M. van, 16, 102
  427. Lambert, K., 261
  428. Lange, M., 414-415
  429. Leibniz, G.W., 12, 25, 32, 103, 123, 125, 202-203, 236, 260, 272, 274, 368-369, 386-389, 391, 398, 421
  430. Leonard, H.S., 352
  431. Levesque, H.J., 462
  432. Lewis, C.I., 5
  433. Lewis, D., 7, 12, 61, 101, 190, 381, 453
  434. Linsky, B., 103 àukasiewicz, J., 84
  435. M MacPherson, B., 451
  436. Manna, Z., 214
  437. Marcus, R.B., 383-385
  438. Martin-Löf, P., 6, 9, 189, 462
  439. Materna, P., 4, 7, 97, 144-156, 165-166, 235, 313, 316, 318, 337, 351, 355, 358-359, 412, 425, 500, 517, 526
  440. Mates, B., 41, 286, 430, 432-433
  441. McGinn, C., 190-194
  442. Meijers, A., 406
  443. Mitchell, J.C., 3
  444. Mitchell, S.D., 411
  445. Moffett, M.A., 432, 469
  446. Moggi, E., 261
  447. Montague, R., 5-10, 12, 16, 18, 38, 42, 49, 54-55, 60, 81, 95, 102, 138, 187, 197, 200-201, 237, 260, 316, 421, 461-462, 485
  448. Moore, J., 385
  449. Moschovakis, Y.N., 2, 102, 124, 152
  450. Müller, J., 531
  451. Muskens, R., 2, 12, 15, 71, 121-122, 200, 202-203, 347
  452. N Nagel, E., 506, 527
  453. Neale, S., 319-320, 335, 337-338, 340
  454. Nilsson, N.J., 453
  455. Nortmann, U., 367, 373
  456. P Pala, K., 535
  457. Partee, B., 124, 229, 386, 398, 400, 402
  458. Patton, T.E., 179-181, 186
  459. Penco, C., 430
  460. Peregrin, J., 328
  461. Petrželka, J., 165
  462. Pietroski, P., 139
  463. Pitt, D., 385
  464. Plantinga, A., 181-183, 384
  465. Pnueli, A., 214
  466. Pollock, J.L., 459
  467. Predelli, S., 385-386
  468. Priest, G., 19, 377, 451
  469. Primiero, G., 2
  470. Prior, A.N., 213-214
  471. Q Quine, W.V.O., 23, 97, 102, 184, 298, 319, 384, 433, 495
  472. R Raclavský, J., 485
  473. Ranta, A., 6
  474. Reintges, C., 96
  475. Rescher, N., 99, 369, 453, 461-462
  476. Reyle, U., 347
  477. Richard, M., 8, 421
  478. Rohrbaugh, G., 372, 376
  479. Rotstein, C., 398
  480. Russell, B., 3, 10, 27-28, 95, 100, 149, 159, 165, 185, 191-192, 280-281, 283, 300-301, 337-339, 452, 521
  481. S Saarinen, E., 4
  482. Sacchi, E., 469
  483. Sandu, G., 30, 139, 340-343, 345, 434
  484. Sartre, J.-P., 368-369
  485. Saul, J., 385-394
  486. Schiffer, S., 282, 463
  487. Schönfinkel, M., 204, 250, 278
  488. Schopenhauer, A., 95
  489. Scott, D., 261, 461
  490. Segerberg, K., 418
  491. Seldin, J.P., 3
  492. Sellars, W.S., 319
  493. Sequoiah-Grayson, S., 510-512, 537
  494. Sgall, P., 351
  495. Sierszulska, A., 12, 421
  496. Simchen, O., 368, 380
  497. Soames, S., 310
  498. Spencer, C., 385, 389
  499. Stalnaker, R., 359, 382, 441
  500. Stephanou, Y., 379
  501. Stokhof, M., 352-353
  502. Strawson, P.F., 115, 118, 277, 282
  503. Sullivan, A., 428, 431
  504. Sundholm, G., 100, 508
  505. Svoboda, A., 535
  506. Szabó, Z., 138
  507. T Thijsse, E., 460
  508. Thomason, R., 347, 463
  509. Thrush, M., 451
  510. Tichý, P., 2-3, 8-23, 36, 38-39, 43, 55-61, 66, 72, 91, 95-103, 109, 111, 123, 126, 133-134, 138, 149, 151, 177, 178, 182, 184, 188-191, 195, 197, 204, 208, 218, 222, 226-228, 233, 237, 249, 264-265, 273, 278, 288, 300-310, 318, 336, 351-355, 359, 362, 365-366, 370-371, 379, 381-382, 416, 421, 432, 474
  511. Tiuryn, J., 340
  512. Turner, R., 463
  513. W Wagner, S., 510
  514. Warren, D., 202
  515. Wassermann, R., 459
  516. Whitehead, A.N., 165
  517. Winter, Y., 398
  518. Wittgenstein, L., 102, 516
  519. Woods, W.A., 98
  520. Y Yagisawa, T., 124
  521. Z Zalta, E., 12, 103, 177, 452-453
  522. Zimmermann, T.E., 188, 390
  523. Zouhar, M., 116, 191, 301, 316

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