Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Outline

Title
Abstract
Introduction
Methods
Discussion
References
All Topics
Psychology
Cognitive Psychology

Voting Systems for Environmental Decisions

Profile image of Tara MartinTara Martin

2014, Conservation Biology

https://doi.org/10.1111/COBI.12209
visibility

…

description

11 pages

link

1 file

Abstract

Voting systems aggregate preferences efficiently and are often used for deciding conservation priorities. Desirable characteristics of voting systems include transitivity, completeness, and Pareto optimality, among others. Voting systems that are common and potentially useful for environmental decision making include simple majority, approval, and preferential voting. Unfortunately, no voting system can guarantee an outcome, while also satisfying a range of very reasonable performance criteria. Furthermore, voting methods may be manipulated by decision makers and strategic voters if they have knowledge of the voting patterns and alliances of others in the voting populations. The difficult properties of voting systems arise in routine decision making when there are multiple criteria and management alternatives. Because each method has flaws, we do not endorse one method. Instead, we urge organizers to be transparent about the properties of proposed voting systems and to offer participants the opportunity to approve the voting system as part of the ground rules for operation of a group.

Related papers

Sorting out a consensus: analysis in support of multiparty decisions
Clinton Andrews

Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 1992

One way to tailor analysis to the special information needs of multiparty decisionmaking processes is discussed. A scenario-based multiattribute trade-off analysis framework is described that parallels the stages in negotiated decisionmaking, focusing on the key task of evaluating trade-offs among choices en route to a consensus decision. Sorting techniques with carefully managed normative content are employed to reveal overlapping preferences regarding choices among alternatives in spite of widely divergent views about fundamental issues. The same techniques are also shown to be useful for closing gaps in negotiating positions. These concepts are illustrated with data from a recent energy and environmental planning application.

View PDFchevron_right
Representative Group Decision-Making in Forest Management: A Compromise Approach
Marta Pardos

Forests

The correct aggregation of stakeholders’ preferences is a vital aspect of solving problems associated with natural resources. In fact, there is no one solution that permits the incorporation of those preferences into techniques that, in turn, address multiple objectives in the management of those resources. In this context, this work aims to assign, analyse, and compare the weights of importance to groups of stakeholders (representativity) starting from different approaches and methodologies: pairwise comparison matrices (using a subjective approach) and the voting power notion (when an objective approach is deployed). For the latter, a variant of the extended goal programming model is employed. The results show different weight values and, therefore, scenarios, in which the social groups defined acquire diverse importance. It is also observed that there are scenarios determined by different values of the control parameter, in which the results of the two above-mentioned approaches ...

View PDFchevron_right
Structuring the decision process
Marcus Selart (ORCID:0000-0001-7504-0873)

This chapter includes a discussion of leadership decisions and stress. Many leaders are daily exposed to stress when they must make decisions, and there are often social reasons for this. Social standards suggest that a leader must be proactive and make decisions and not flee the situation. Conflict often creates stress in decision-making situations. It is important for leaders to understand that it is not stress in itself that leads to bad decisions, rather, bad decisions may be the result of time pressure in the sense that leaders have not been able to gather enough relevant information. Thus, it is worthwhile for leaders to be able to prioritize properly in order to cope with stressful situations. In some situations, a leader chooses to delegate the decisions to his/her team and then it is important to guard against «groupthink», a phenomenon where members of a team put consensus before anything else as a result of the peer pressure. A number of methods are presented that enable leaders to avoid this phenomenon. Often leaders are involved in decision-making situations where they are forced to navigate between objectives that are in strong conflict with each other. We are talking about «decision dilemmas». These are characterized by the existence of a conflict between the top leadership's desire to control the activities and their wish to give autonomy and independence to the various units. It is important for leaders to be able to strike a balance in different dilemma situations and understand how to best manage conflicts when they arise. Working with structured group processes The basic idea of structured group processes is that a panel of experts can make more realistic predictions than a group of laymen. It is common that these processes are referred to as the Delphi technique. The number of respondents is usually between 30 − 40 participants. However, it is suggested by Wright and Goodwin (2008) that 5−20 participants should be used. It is important that the participants are guaranteed anonymity. All participants receive comprehensive feedback from the whole group so that each member has the opportunity to adjust their own assessments. Often a special research group that plans exercises, tests questions, and analyzes the results is created. It is common that a group of experts initially responds to a well-designed questionnaire. Here, they give their views on when a number of events of strategic importance will appear in the future, if at all. After this first round is finished, the results are summarized for each event, in quartiles for the whole group. Then it

View PDFchevron_right
Collective decision procedures and cooperative rationality
Andrei Trandafira

The aim of this paper is to set up and justify a general framework of collective decision making which permits to give an account of cooperative rationality in this context. This enterprise is committed both to methodological individualism and to action as an essential feature of rational agents. Thus, the task is to model collective decision starting from individual actions, which are rational insofar the means employed successfully further the ends of each and every actor. An individual preference will be taken to consist in a commitment towards raising the probability that some future states of affairs will obtain, depending upon the ability of the agent to do so. Group preferences will be defined as a two layered structure of individual preferences. The base layer preference structure will be formed by a convergent set of preferences that some individuals share. This base layer forms the first level of (implicit) consensus that allows for the possibility of collective decision making; which will concern the upper layer of preferences of the group members, layer formed by divergent sets of preferences, which further specify the base layer. For this collective decision making process to start it is needed a second level of consensus, concerning the procedure which will decide which set of preferences from the upper layer will be selected. Afterwards, the formal structure of the collective decision procedure will be constructed in such a way as to allow for contextual rationale for choosing different specific procedures in different situation, based on the specific base layer. Then, the general conditions that such a procedure must meet for it to be selected will be put forward. Then, the essential property that any procedure must exhibit, if we are to make sense of the idea of cooperative rationality in this context, will be formulated. This is the property of expressive fidelity, which requires that the set of input alternatives map (voting options) into one-to-one correspondence the set of possible preferences and that every input bit (every vote) modifies the final output (the alternative selected) in the direction specified by the associated preference. Finally, in the last three sections of the paper, some well known topics (strategic voting, arrovian framework, Condorcet and Borda rules) will be analyzed using the new framework.

View PDFchevron_right
Decision-making frameworks for controversial public decision processes: A comparative analysis with a case study
Vasco Gonçalves

2012

View PDFchevron_right
Collective Decision Making on Locally Undesirable Land Uses
Joni Charles

Journal of Environmental Systems, 1997

We use "fuzzy" analysis to give more language flexibility to outcomes of collective decision making about locally undesirable land uses (LULUs). We briefly review methods of collective decision making on LULUs for examples of decision environments which use public participation and expert opinion to moderate the conflicts found on this type of issue. We then present the strengths and weaknesses of one such decision environment, the Public Value Forum (PVF), where the traditional analytical and diagnostic tools of multiattribute utility theory and value free analysis are used. Using a scenario of stakeholders deciding on the appropriate use for a hazardous waste facility, we contrast the outcomes of the PVF with those that could be obtained if fuzzy analysis were used. Fuzzy analysis can provide a more transparent outcome of the decision process than die PVF because its use of linguistic variables offers decision makers final expressions of preferences over alter native choices that go beyond that of reject or accept.

View PDFchevron_right
Group Decisions in Value Management
Christiono Utomo

Makara Journal of Technology, 2015

This research deals with a technique to expedite group decision making during the selection of technical solutions for value management process. Selection of a solution from a set of alternatives is facilitated by evaluating using multicriteria decision making techniques. During the process, every possible solution is rated on criteria of function and cost. Function deals more with quality than with quantity, and cost can be calculated based on the theoretical time value of money. Decision-making techniques based on satisfying games are applied to determine the relative function and cost of solutions and hence their relative value. The functions were determined by function analysis system technique. Analytical hierarchy process was applied to decision making and life-cycle cost analysis were used to calculate cost. Cooperative decision making was shown to consist of identifying agreement options, analyzing, and forming coalitions. The objective was attained using the satisfying game model as a basis for two main preferences. The model will improve the value of decision regarding design. It further emphasizes the importance of performance evaluation in the design process and value analysis. The result of the implementation, when applied to the selection of a building wall system, demonstrates a process of selecting the most valuable technical solution as the best-fit option for all decision makers. This work is relevant to group decision making and negotiation, as it aims to provide a framework to support negotiation in design activity. Abstrak Keputusan Kelompok dan Koalisi pada Manajemen Nilai. Penelitian ini berkaitan dengan penyusunan model untuk mempercepat pengambilan keputusan kelompok selama pemilihan solusi teknis dan membangun sistem alternatif untuk proses manajemen nilai. Pemilihan solusi dari serangkaian alternatif dilakukan menggunakan teknik pengambilan keputusan multikriteria dengan kriteria fungsi dan biaya. Proses hirarki analitis diterapkan untuk pengambilan keputusan, dan analisis fungsi serta analisis biaya siklus hidup digunakan untuk menentukan nilai bagi solusi terbaik. Pengambilan keputusan kelompok disusun secara kooperatif melalui identifikasi pilihan, analisis, dan pembentukan koalisi. Model ini akan meningkatkan nilai keputusan pada proses desain. Hasil pelaksanaan, yang diterapkan pada pemilihan sistem dinding bangunan, menunjukkan proses pemilihan solusi teknis sebagai pilihan terbaik untuk semua pengambil keputusan. Riset ini relevan dengan pengambilan keputusan kelompok dan negosiasi, karena bertujuan menyediakan kerangka kerja untuk mendukung negosiasi dalam kegiatan desain

View PDFchevron_right
El reto economico de abrir la caja negra de la toma de decisiones politicas
Claude Menard

HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), 2015

View PDFchevron_right
Decision-Making in Committees
Alex Michalos

Philosophical Foundations of Quality of Life, 2017

This paper has two aims, one fairly general and the other fairly specific. The general aim is to provide a basis for logical and empirical investigations of a particular type of group-decision procedure. The type is distinguished by the fact that inequalities in the "weight" of individual voters and their votes are permitted. For reasons which will become clear shortly, if such procedures are practicable at all, they would seem to be so only for small groups, say, of two to fifteen people. Since most committees contain less than fifteen members, if such procedures are practicable at all, they should be practicable for committees. Hence, our discussion is oriented toward decision-making in committees. The more specific aim of this paper is to introduce and critically evaluate certain prima facie plausible solutions to the problem of selecting an acceptable group-decision procedure. We begin with a precise statement of the problem in section "The Problem". In section "Criteria of Adequacy" five informal necessary conditions of adequacy for proposed solutions are introduced. Section "Weighting Voters" introduces the notion of "weights of influence" and defines seven fundamental types of distributions. This is followed by a presentation of six more or less plausible "voting schemes" that involve the application of various "weights of influence." In sections "Objections and Replies: Weighting Voters" and "Objections and Replies: Weighted Voting" the constructive work of sections

View PDFchevron_right
Evaluation of the Multicriteria Approval Method for Timber Harvesting Group Decision Support
Annika Kangas, Teijo Palander

Silva Fennica

2005. Evaluation of the multicriteria approval method for timber-harvesting group decision support. Silva Fennica 39(2): 249-264.

View PDFchevron_right

References (66)

  1. Armbruster, W., and W. Boge. 1983. Efficient, anonymous, and neutral group decisions. Econimetrica 51:1389-1405.
  2. Arrow, K. 1951. Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York.
  3. Black, D. 1958. The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press, London, United Kingdom.
  4. Brams, S. J. 2004. Approval voting. In Rowley, C. and F. Schneider (eds.) The encyclopedia of public choice. Kluwer, Dordrecht 344- 346. DOI: 10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_34.
  5. Brams, S. J., and M. R. Sanver. 2006. Critical strategies under approval voting: who gets ruled in and ruled out. Electoral Studies 25:287- 305.
  6. Brown, L. E., et al. 2010. Priority water research questions as deter- mined by UK practitioners and policy makers. Science of the Total Environment 409:256-266.
  7. Burgman, M. A. 2005. Risks and decisions for conservation and envi- ronmental management. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  8. Burgman M. A., A. Carr, L. Godden, R. Gregory, M. McBride, L. Flander, and L. A. Maguire. 2011. Redefining expertise and improv- ing ecological judgment. Conservation Letters 4:81-87.
  9. Chakravarty, S., and T. R. Kaplan. 2010. Vote or shout. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 10(1): Article 42. Available from www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art42.
  10. Chee, Y. E. 2004. An ecological perspective on the valuation of ecosys- tem services. Biological Conservation 120:549-565.
  11. Cooke, R. M. 1991. Experts in uncertainty: opinion and subjective prob- ability in science. Oxford University Press, New York.
  12. Craven, J. 1992. Social choice: a framework for collective decision and individual judgments. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  13. Dicks, L. V., D. A. Showler, and W.J. Sutherland. 2010. Bee conserva- tion: evidence for the effects of interventions. Pelagic Publications, Exeter.
  14. Dodgson, C. L. 1876. A method of taking votes on more than two issues. Reprinted in Black, D. 1958. The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press, London, United Kingdom.
  15. Elkind, E., P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. 2011. Homogeneity and mono- tonicity of distance-rationalizable voting rules. Pages 821-828 in K. Tumer, P. Yolum, L. Sonenberg, and P. Stone, editors. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Taipei, Taiwan.
  16. Fishburn, P. C. 1977. Condorcet social choice functions. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 33:469-489.
  17. Fishburn, P. C., and S. J. Brams. 1983. Paradoxes of preferential voting. Mathematics Magazine 56:207-214.
  18. French, S. 1986. Decision theory: an introduction to the mathematics of rationality. Ellis Horwood, Chichester, United Kingdom.
  19. Gehrlein, W. V. 1983. Condorcet's paradox. Theory and Decision 15:161-197.
  20. Ghanbarpour, M. R., K. W. Hipel, and K. C. Abbaspour. 2005. Pri- oritizing long-term watershed management strategies using group decision analysis. International Journal of Water Resources Devel- opment 21:297-309.
  21. Gibbard, A. 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41:587-601.
  22. Gavish, B., and J. H. Gerdes. 1997. Voting mechanisms and their im- plications in a GDSS environment. Annals of Operations Research 71:41-74.
  23. Gregory, R. S., and R. L. Keeney. 2002. Making smarter environmental management decisions. Journal of the American Water Resources Association 38:1601-1612.
  24. Hämäläinen, R., E. Kettunen, M. Marttunun, and H. Ehtamo. 2001. Eval- uating a framework for multi-stakeholder decision support in water resources management. Group Decisions and Negotiation 10:331- 353.
  25. Hiltunen, V., J. Kangas, and J. Pykalainen. 2008. Voting methods in strategic forest planning-experiences from Metsahallitus. Forest Policy and Economics 10:117-127.
  26. Hodge, J. K., and R. E. Klima. 2005. The mathematics of voting and elections: a hands-on approach. American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI.
  27. Hwang C. L., and M. Lin. 1987. Group decision-making: mathematical models. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
  28. Jones, B., B. Radcliff, C. Taber, and R. Timpone. 1995. Condorcet winners and the paradox of voting: probability calculations for weak preference orders. American Political Science Review 89:137- 144.
  29. Kangas, J., and A. Kangas. 2002. Multiple criteria decision support methods in forest management. Pages 37-70 in T. Pukkala, editor. Multi-objective forest management, chapter 3. Kluwer, Netherlands.
  30. Kangas, A., S. Laukkanen, and J. Kangas. 2006. Social choice theory and its applications in sustainable forest management-a review. Forest Policy and Economics 9:77-92.
  31. Keeney, R. 1992. Value-focused thinking: a path to creative decision making. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
  32. Kemeny, J. 1959. Mathematics without numbers. Daedalus 88:577-591.
  33. Kerr, N. L., and R. S. Tindale. 2004. Small group decision making and performance. Annual Review of Psychology 55:623-656.
  34. Kijazi, M. H., and S. Kant. 2010. Forest stakeholders' value prefer- ences in Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. Forest Policy and Economics 12:357-369.
  35. Klahr, D. 1966. A computer simulation of the paradox of voting. Amer- ican Political Science Review 60:384-390.
  36. Laukkanen, S., T. Palander, J. Kangas, and A. Kangas. 2005. Evaluation of the multicriteria approval method for timber-harvesting group decision support. Silva Fenn 39:249-264.
  37. Leal, C. P., R. A. Quinones, and C. Chavez. 2010. What factors affect the decision making process when setting TACs?: The case of Chilean fisheries. Marine Policy 34:1183-1195.
  38. Lehtinen, A. 2008. The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting. European Journal of Political Economy 24:688-704.
  39. Lepelley, D., and F. Valognes. 2003. Voting rules, manipulability and social homogeneity. Public Choice 116:165-184.
  40. McNeill, J., and N. J. Turland. 2010. The conservation of Aca- cia with Acacia penninervis as conserved type. Taxon 59:613- 616.
  41. Maguire, L. A. 2004. What can decision analysis do for invasive species management? Risk Analysis 24:859-868.
  42. Marcot, B. G., P. A. Hohenlohe, S. Morey, R. Holmes, R. Molina, M. C. Turley, M. H. Huff, and J. A. Laurence. 2006. Characterizing species at risk II: Using Bayesian Belief Networks as decision sup- port tools to determine species conservation categories under the Northwest Forest Plan. Ecology and Society:11:12. Available from http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art12/
  43. Mendoza, G. A., and R. Prabhu. 2009. Evaluating multi-stakeholder perceptions of project impacts: a participatory value based Conservation Biology Volume 00, No. 0, 2014 multi-criteria approach. International Journal of Sustainable Devel- opment and World Ecology 16:177-190.
  44. Morgan, M. G., and M. Henrion. 1990. Uncertainty: a guide to dealing with uncertainty in quantitative risk and policy analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  45. Morton, S. R., et al. 2009. The big ecological questions inhibiting effec- tive environmental management in Australia. Austral Ecology 34:1- 9.
  46. Nanson, E. J. 1883. Methods of election. Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria 19:197-240.
  47. Nurmi, H. 2012. On the relevance of theoretical results to voting sys- tem choice. Pages 255-274 in D.S. Felsenthal, and M. Machover, editors. Electoral systems. Studies in choice and welfare, chapter 10. Springer, Berlin.
  48. Patterson, J., M. E. Meek, J. E. Strawson, and R. G. Liteplo. 2007. En- gaging expert peers in the development of risk assessments. Risk Analysis 27:1609-1621.
  49. Phillips, S. J., A. Archer, R. L. Pressey, D. Torkornoo, D. Apple- gate, D. Johnson, and M. W. Watts. 2010. Voting power and target-based site prioritization. Biological Conservation 143:1989- 1997.
  50. Poundstone, W. 2008. Gaming the vote: why elections aren't fair (and what we can do about it). Hill and Wang, New York.
  51. Richelson, J. T. 1981. A comparative analysis of social choice functions IV. Behavioral Science 26:346-353.
  52. Riker, W. 1982. Liberalism against Populism: a confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. W. H. Freeman, San Francisco.
  53. Risse, M. 2001. Arrow's theorem, indeterminacy, and multiplicity re- considered. Ethics 111:706-734.
  54. Saari, D. G. 2001. Decisions and elections: explaining the unexpected. University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
  55. Saaty, T. L. 1980. The analytic hierarchy process. McGraw Hill, New York.
  56. Satterthwaite, M. 1975. Strategy proofness and Arrow's conditions. Jour- nal of Economic Theory 10:187-217.
  57. Sen, A. 1999. The possibility of social choice. American Economic Re- view 89:349-378.
  58. Slovic, P. 1999. Trust, emotion, sex, politics, and science: surveying the risk-assessment battlefield. Risk Analysis 19:689-701.
  59. Sutherland, W. J. et al. 2009. One hundred questions of importance to the conservation of global biological diversity. Conservation Biology 23:557-567.
  60. Tangian, A. S. 2000. Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society. Social Welfare and Choice 17:337-365.
  61. Taylor, A. D. 1995. Mathematics and politics: strategy, voting, power and proof. Springer-Verlag, New York.
  62. Thomas, C. W., A. B. Soule, and T. B. Davis. 2010. Special interest capture of regulatory agencies: a ten-year analysis of voting behavior on regional fishery management councils. Policy Studies Journal 38:447-464.
  63. Tisdell, C., C. Wilson, and H. S. Nantha. 2006. Public choice of species for the 'Ark': Phylogenetic similarity and preferred wildlife species for survival. Journal for Nature Conservation 14:97-105.
  64. Vignola, R., T. L. McDaniels, and R. W. Scholz. 2012. Negotiation analysis for mechanisms to deliver ecosystem services: The case of soil conservation in Costa Rica. Ecological Economics 75:22- 31.
  65. Williams, P. D. 2006. The greening of the Queensland electorate? Aus- tralian Journal of Political Science 41:325-337.
  66. Zendehdel, K., M. Rademaker, B. De Baets, and G. Van Huylen- broeck. 2010. Environmental decision making with conflicting so- cial groups: a case study of the Lar rangeland in Iran. Journal of Arid Environments 74:394-402.

Related papers

Applying voting theory in participatory decision support for sustainable timber harvesting
Teijo Palander

Canadian Journal of Forest Research, 2004

Several multi-criteria decision support methods have been introduced to sustainable management of natural resources, but different methods suit different planning situations. One way to support decision-making is to apply voting theory. In this study, a multi-criteria decision-support method based on voting theory, called multicriteria approval (MA), is applied to wood supply chain management in a forest area owned by the state of Finland. The area is called Leikko and is located in the rural municipality of Pieksämäki. MA seems to have some promising features in relation to participatory decision support. The most essential advantages are its ease and comprehensibility. MA is also able to deal with ordinal and imprecise information. Since the method does not demand much preference information from interest groups, the inquiries may be conducted using the Internet. In the case study, nine timber-harvesting alternatives were devised for the forest area. The study involved seven interest groups, whose representatives defined seven criteria by which the alternatives were compared. The purpose was to find a consensus or compromise solution for a practical harvesting schedule. Two different versions of MA were tested and compared from the participatory decision-support aspect. Usability and ease of method, the comprehensibility of the inquiries, and the congruence of the results were examined. Résumé : Plusieurs méthodes multicritères d'aide à la décision ont été employées en gestion durable des ressources naturelles, mais chaque méthode convient à un cadre particulier de planification. Une des façons de renforcer les processus décisionnels consiste à utiliser la théorie du scrutin. Dans cette étude, nous avons appliqué une méthode multicritère d'aide à la décision fondée sur la théorie du scrutin au système de gestion de la chaîne d'approvisionnement caractérisant une forêt publique de Finlande. Cette méthode est appelée approbation multicritère (AM). La zone d'étude se nomme Leikko et elle est située dans la municipalité rurale de Pieksämäki. L'AM semble comporter des caractéristiques prometteuses pour une gestion participative. Cette méthode a des avantages-clés : elle est facile à comprendre et à utiliser. L'AM est aussi capable de prendre en compte de l'information imprécise et ordinale. Comme la méthode n'exige pas beaucoup d'informations sur les préférences des groupes d'intérêt, les requêtes aux participants peuvent être effectuées par Internet. Dans notre étude de cas, neuf options de récolte ont été envisagées sur le territoire forestier. L'étude impliquait sept groupes d'intérêt dont les représentants ont arrêté sept critères permettant de comparer les options de récolte. Notre but était de trouver une solution pratique à la programmation des coupes par voie de consensus ou de compromis. Deux variantes d'AM ont été testées et comparées sous l'angle de la gestion participative. La simplicité et la facilité d'utilisation de la méthode, tout comme l'intelligibilité des requêtes et la congruence des résultats ont été examinées. [Traduit par la Rédaction] Laukkanen et al. 1524

View PDFchevron_right
Complementary use of voting methods and interactive utility analysis in participatory strategic forest planning: experiences gained from western Finland
Pekka Leskinen

Canadian Journal of Forest Research, 2007

This paper introduces the concept of complementary use of voting methods and interactive utility analysis (IUA) in strategic natural resource planning in western Finland as organized by Metsähallitus. The voting and IUA methods were used by three working groups, the aim in using these methods being to support the working groups in formulating their decision proposals for Metsähallitus. Ordinal preference information was collected by using the voting methods, whereas the IUA method defined the participants' preferences by using the interval scale. In all the three working groups, four out of seven alternatives shared the first place in ranking when applying the voting methods, and one alternative was priorized over the other alternatives when using the IUA method. The stakeholders' feedback indicated that the methods used were not too difficult to use and understand. The IUA method was especially efficient in promoting the participants' learning process, which as a consequence made formulation of the decision proposal easier for them. It was also noticed that the standard versions of the voting methods do not necessarily fulfill the needs of decision support in strategic natural resource planning as such. Instead, complementary use with more profound methods (e.g., IUA) may be needed.

View PDFchevron_right
A Multicriteria Group Decision Model to Support Watershed Committees in Brazil
Vanessa Silva

Water Resources Management, 2010

The involvement of multiple decision makers in water resources management can be very complex, involving the possibilities of conflicts amongst the stakeholders and the influence of powerful members over the preference of others. The inherent characteristic of decisions also increases this complexity due to many alternatives being involved and there being multiple criteria. Some of these criteria conflict with each other and the consequences of which will have great impact on those involved and on third parties. Therefore, a group decision support system model based on multicriteria analysis can be a powerful tool to support this kind of management. This study presents a tool to support the committee responsible for the management of the watersheds in Brazil in order to promote decentralization and the participation of all involved in the water resources management. The tool provides a ranking of alternatives for the environmental recuperation of the watershed through the use of the multicriteria method PROMETHEE II. For each decision maker, the alternatives were ranked and then the individual rankings were combined into a global ranking which contained the preferences of the whole group.

View PDFchevron_right
Voting Systems and Multi-Criteria Optimization Models in Participative Decision Making
Ordan Chukaliev

The paper presents overview of several voting systems from the Social Choice Theory and possibilities for their combining with the multi-criteria optimization methods (and AHP-analytic hierarchy process in particular) to aid the decision making processes in assemblies of water users associations in Serbia and Macedonia. Preferential and non-preferential voting systems are applied along with the AHP within unique SCT+AHP participatory decision making framework to assess five annual action plans for given fiscal

View PDFchevron_right
Weighting social preferences in participatory multi-criteria evaluations: a case study on sustainable natural resource management
Gonzalo Gamboa

2012

View PDFchevron_right

Related topics

  • Decision Making
  • Conservation Biology
  • Conservation of Natural Resources

    • Cited by

    The Delphi technique in ecology and biological conservation: applications and guidelines
    Maarten Van Opstal

    Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 2015

    Many areas of science, including conservation and environmental management, regularly require engaging stakeholders or experts to produce consensus or technical inputs. The Delphi technique is an iterative and anonymous participatory method used for gathering and evaluating such expert-based knowledge. 2) We outline the methodology of the Delphi technique and provide a taxonomy of its main variants. In addition, we refine the technique by providing suggestions to address common limitations (e.g. time consumption, attrition rate) in order to make the method more suitable for application in ecology and conservation. 3) A comprehensive search for studies that have applied the Delphi technique in conservation and environmental management resulted in 36 papers. The Delphi technique has been applied to a range of issues, including developing decision support systems and predicting ecological impacts of climate change. 4) The papers reviewed suggest that the Delphi technique is an efficient, inclusive, systematic and structured approach that can be used to address complex issues. A major strength compared to other group-based techniques is the reduced influence of social pressures among respondents. 5) The Delphi technique is relatively little used and seems undervalued. Given its wide range of possible applications it could be applied more widely in evaluating evidence and providing expert judgments.

    View PDFchevron_right
    580 California St., Suite 400
    San Francisco, CA, 94104
    © 2025 Academia. All rights reserved