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The Strategy of Affect: Emotions in Human Cooperation

Profile image of Daniel FesslerDaniel Fessler

2003

Abstract
sparkles

AI

The paper explores the role of emotions, particularly envy and jealousy, in human cooperation. It argues that these emotions, while often perceived as negative, can influence cooperative behaviors in economic settings and may provide strategic advantages in social interactions. The work discusses the complexities of emotion-driven actions and highlights the distinction between envy and jealousy, pointing out their implications for understanding human behavior in cooperative contexts.

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