Timeline Collapse Metaphor Map

Manuscrito, 2024

Process aspects are prevalent in many domains of reality, and consciousness is no exception. Nevertheless, while the processual approach implicitly underlies the theories of consciousness, an explicit statement of the question is scarcely found in the literature. This paper tries to bridge this gap. Here, I argue that conscious experience fulfils all the requirements for a processual analysis: it is complex, functionally/causally determined, and has a temporal basis. Then, I revisit an old concept, self-transformative processes, which refers to processes that change themselves. These processes are very common. A stretched bow is the classical Heraclitean example. However, it is easy to misunderstand what selftransformativeness is. To provide a well-formed description, I

Philosophers' Imprint

Why does time seem to fly by when we are absorbed? The case of listening to music is of particular interest, given that listening to music itself requires experiencing time. In this paper, I argue that neither the prevailing psychological model nor some initially appealing alternative explanations can account for the experience of time flying by in cases where, like listening to music, the activity we are absorbed in itself requires experiencing time. I then put forward a novel view on which the fragmentation of felt time is what best explains these cases. More specifically, I develop a view on which attentive engagement fragments felt time such that we experience the activity we are engaged in as if it is located in a temporally isolated branch or fragment of the main timeline. Time then seems to pass only in this branch, creating the sensation — upon integration — that less time has passed in the main timeline. In support of this proposal, I draw upon ideas in the empirical litera...

Frontiers in Psychology, 2014

Proceedings of the Bial Foundation's 13th Symposium on The Mystery of Time, 2022

Through my contribution in this symposium on subjective time, I wish to bring attention to the body. The physiological processes of the body are a necessary prerequisite for understanding how we, as humans, perceive time on the scale of seconds to minutes. My talk will proceed as follows: (1) First I will introduce the standard cognitive model of time perception and I will speak about some empirical research that tested that model. (2) Then I will try to explain why, when it comes to investigating the perception of time, so many research models exist. To put it humorously, I like to say that when we gather five researchers who work on the topic of time, such as here at the Bial symposium, we may very well end up listening to the presentation of six different models. (3) Then I will discuss my line of research on embodied time, i.e. arguing how the corporal processes govern our sense of time. I will present current and historical evidence that shows how body signals inform us about the passage of time. (4) Finally, I will talk about altered states of onsciousness such as those induced through meditation, flotation-REST, and psychedelics. In such specific cases, the bodily self and subjective time are modulated in unison, in peak states of consciousness potentially culminating in timelessness and (body) selflessness. Research on altered states of consciousness can help us understand the nature of consciousness and, in particular, of time consciousness.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1992

When scientific advances contradict "common sense" intuitions, the familiar ideas often linger on, not just outliving their usefulness but even confusing the scientists whose discoveries ought to have overthrown them. We shall diagnose a ubiquitous error of thinking that arises from just such a misplaced allegiance to familiar images, and illustrate it with examples drawn from recent work in psychology and neuroscience. While this is a "theoretical" paper, it is addressed especially to those who think, mistakenly, that they have no theories and no need for theories. We shall show how uncontroversial facts about the spatial and temporal properties of information-bearing events in the brain require us to abandon a family of entrenched intuitions about "the stream of consciousness" and its relation to events occurring in the brain.

University of Vienna Theses, 2021

This thesis investigates how time structures consciousness and consequently how consciousness structures time. This broad question will be examined across three sections and three experiments. I. The first section introduces phenomenological methods and includes an experiment using a standardized task to compare two of the most established methods—Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) and micro-phenomenology. DES involves interviewing participants about experience that occurs directly preceding random beeps. Micro-phenomenology involves interviewing participants by creating an evocation state of a past experience. Here we examine both methods using a mental imagery elicitation task. As a result, DES and micro-phenomenology reveal different aspects of experience. Temporal scope is a major factor for these differing aspects. How then can altering temporal scope reveal new facets of experience? II. The second section establishes a new method: dynamic Descriptive Experience Sampling (dDES). This method adds a more direct temporal dimension to DES. Instead of asking about just one moment before the beep, here we ask about two moments, as well as the temporal relation between these moments. Results include a variety of such temporal relations, which can then be grouped into categories (e.g. transformation, overlapping). Temporal experience is different for each participant. For example, for some participants, experiential elements carry across multiple moments. For others, elements most often switch from moment to moment. Results often buck phenomenological assumptions, like the continuity hypothesis, that our streams of thought are unbroken and without gaps. How can this method be useful to the rest of cognitive science? III. The third section applies our findings to broader philosophical concerns and includes an experiment testing dDES with an established psychological study—the Libet task, investigating free will. This task involves participants freely choosing when to press a button. Neuroactivation precedes the reported time of free decision. What are participants’ experiences like over time courses that correspond to this neural activity? Results include findings that may challenge phenomenological assumptions of the Libet setup, for example the assumption that there is nothing leading up to a decision before its reporting. The first section surveys the scope of existing methods. The second section introduces a new method to investigate temporal experience. The third section shows the applicability of our new method and helps assess its validity. We then address further philosophical concerns, including existing models of temporal consciousness. The data presented here cement the need for new models.

Journal of Physiology-Paris, 2013

Please cite this article as: Tordjman, S., Time and temporality: role of rhythmicity in psychic organization, Journal of Physiology -Paris (2013), doi: http://dx.

In this paper I provide an account of what Russell called 'Temporal Presence' -the way that items can be experienced as happening 'now' or 'as present'. I argue that for items to be Temporally Present in experience is for us to be unable to discern a difference in the temporal location of an experience and the content of that experience.

2010

This paper distinguishes scientific and psychological time, and suggests how cycles of mentality define units of psychological time. This explanation explains the elasticity of psychological time and gives a broad account of the relationship between consciousness (mental activity) and time.