A Unified Vision of Revelation, Incarnation, and Reality

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014

In this essay I discuss several questions related to the manner in which concepts generally, and religious concepts in particular, are formed. Are some concepts necessary in the sense that, considering the physical makeup of the natural world and our own biochemical , perceptual, and cognitive nature, these concepts had to emerge by necessity? If we put considerations of divine revelations aside, I ask regarding religious concepts, what would be the proper way of looking at how they came to be formed? What role does causality play in the formation of empirical and religious concepts, if at all? One of my aims in discussing these and other related questions is to revisit Hilary Putnam's justificatory basis for rejecting the intelligibility of speaking of absolute conceptions of the world. Although I support his position on this issue, I show some of the hermeneutical problems in his reliance on Wittgenstein's views concerning language games and worldviews. I also revisit Wittgenstein's own views about concept formation to discuss the similarities and differences between how religious concepts and empirical concepts are formed. My aim here is to show that the idea of an absolute conception of the world rests on confusing the regulative role that concepts play in our lives for a causative role.

Theological Studies, 1988

R ICHARD RORTY commends a philosophical style which "says things like 'try thinking of it this way' or 'try to ignore apparently traditional questions; substitute the following new and possibly more interesting questions.' It does not pretend to have a better candidate for doing the same old things which we did when we spoke the old way. Rather, it suggests that we might want to stop doing those things and do something else." 1 Rorty's advice is echoed in the writings of current philosophers of every stripe as they follow the course beyond modernity charted earlier by Wittgenstein and Heidegger. 2 In this paper I shall try to put this good advice to theological use. But I shall not espouse the hermeneutical, neopragmatist, or deconstructionist programs with which it is associated. The linguistic turn maps as slippery a path for postmodern theology as the subjective turn did for modern theology. 3 Following Rorty's advice in part, however, I shall argue here that Christian theology should turn from the agenda defined for it by philosophers since the Enlightenment and substitute a fresh agenda-not one posed by postmodern philosophy but one at least in part suggested by the conversation with major world religions now gathering momentum. I shall argue that this fresh agenda is likely to prove more congenial to the interests of Christian affirmation particularly as these are served by what is misleadingly called "philosophical theology" or "natural theology." After a brief sketch of the contours of the new conversation, I shall present an analysis of the logical structure of arguments in philosophical theology. I shall then field an interpretation of the contemporary theological scene viewed in the perspective of the history of the debate about such arguments which philosophical criticism 1

Religious Dualism: Some Logical and Philosophical Difficulties

In our study we intend to clarify the significance of the phrase "religious dualism" and to find in which situations it can be used appropriately. In this regard, we took into consideration first the meaning of such phrases as "dualism", "religious dualism", "cosmogonic dualism", then the idea of religious dualist invariants (Ugo Bianchi) and that of absolute dualism (Mircea Eliade, J. Martin Velasco). We presented some apparent dualisms (discussed by Ioan Petru Culianu). The concept of radical or absolute dualism involves many logical and philosophical difficulties: a) it leads to confusion among such terms as opposition, contradiction and contrariety; it may appear as a contradictio in terminis, b) in a cosmogonic order, it indicates the suspension of the original process of creation; the relation between the two original principles becomes completely unintelligible. Consequently, we consider that we cannot speak about a really original cosmogonic dualism (in other words, no religion can be completely dualist). We also introduced the idea of unilateral dualism (being inspired by one of Constantin Noica's philosophical studies), an idea which can be used in the interpretation of some cosmogonic myths and stories. Defining the concepts of "dualism" and "religious dualism" It is generally accepted that religious dualism, the cosmological one, involves the cooperation of two principles or primordial forces in the process of world creation. In our opinion, this is a highly debatable point. However, in order to

Loke, A.T.E. The Law of Non-contradiction and Global Philosophy of Religion. SOPHIA (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01001-5

This article focuses on the applications of philosophical logic in the discipline of philosophy of religion of both 'Eastern' and 'Western' traditions, in which the problem of apparent ontological contradictions can be found. A number of philosophers have proposed using the work of those non-classical logicians who countenance the violation of the law of non-contradiction (LNC) to address this problem. I discuss (1) whether classical or non-classical account of logic is universal in applying to all true theories, and (2) whether there might be extra-logical considerations which affect what is the correct account of logic for the doctrines in question. With regard to Jc Beall's application of non-classical (FDE) logic to the doctrine of the Incarnation, I argue using the evidence from the writings of church fathers that the meaning of negation found in the core claims of the doctrine of the Incarnation should not be interpreted in accordance with Beall's FDE account, and that this extra-logical consideration refutes Beall's project. Moreover, the FDE's acceptance of the possibility of statements that are both true and false is contrary to what is allowed by the definition of negation in classical logic; therefore (contrary to Beall), Beall is in fact using a different definition of negation compared with the definition used by the classical account. I develop this point in interaction with contemporary philosophy of religion literature and explain its implications and significance for this discipline.

First International Conference on Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, 2012

The Indian Journal of Theology, 1981

Religious traditions other than the Christian constitute part of the Indian-Christian existential as well as hermeneutical context. Both the questions posed and possibilities offered by extra-Christian religions of the world cannot but become the essential data for our theological reflection today. If our theology is to do with the day to day faith experience and praxis of our communities of faith it cannot but be a responsive theology formulated in conscipus response to the richness of other religious traditions, not simply on a theoretical level but in the concrete hopes and aspirations of Indians as well. However, one wonders whether thousands of Indian-Christians may not find it difficult to say with Fielding's parson Thwackum, When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion but the Protestant religion ; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England.l (Of course, for some others it may be another Protestant or a Roman or Orthodox tradition.) Even when other religious traditions and their truth claims are taken into consideration, often our interest seems to turn around the nature of the missiological and apologetic approaches of the Church to non-Christian faiths. Serious attempts to rethink and reformulate the central Christian faith affirmations are few and_far between. The Christian claim for the finality of Christ is one such central construct that needs to be examined and reconstrued as we encounter corresponding claims for universality in several other religions. This paper is a tentative attempt to do so. Its primary concern is meta-theological and formal, though a brief indication of the structure of a responsive Christo logy in the context of world religions is also attempted. In the first part, it attempts to grapple with the phenomenon of religious pluralism and multiple truth claim~ ; part 2 describes

2025

This series of documents by Rodney Greenfield presents a comprehensive theodicy, which seeks to reconcile the existence of a good, all-powerful God with the reality of evil and suffering. The central argument is built on a 'cosmic conflict worldview,' meticulously reconstructed from ancient narratives. It posits that the origin of evil, particularly natural evil and suffering, is not from God but from a primordial, pre-Adamic rebellion of powerful spiritual beings. This initial conflict introduced corruption and disorder into the cosmos, a situation that was later compounded by the fall of humanity. The series is composed of several interconnected works. The foundational 'Worldview' document details this cosmic backstory, while the main 'Theodicy' volume applies this framework to explain the persistence of suffering and God's ultimate redemptive solution in Christ. Specialized documents explore related topics such as animal suffering, divine hiddenness, the origin of life (abiogenesis), and a review of medical studies on prayer. By integrating insights from theology, philosophy, and science, this work aims to offer an intellectually coherent and existentially satisfying alternative to purely materialistic explanations, providing a robust framework for meaning and hope amidst life's deepest challenges.

Hunt Publishing Center Philippines, 2017

ACTS Academy, 2007

If I have only one apple and you give me one more apple, the only rational doxastic attitude to have toward the proposition (p), "Layla has two apples now," is that p is true. On the other hand, to the proposition (q), "Prophet Muhammad designated a successor," I believe there can be more than one rational doxastic attitude toward q. And, that when it comes to religious disagreements, this is almost always the case. So, in this paper, I advance an alternative epistemology to what has come to be know as the Uniqueness Thesis. Uniqueness is the view that for any proposition, p, and any body of evidence, E, exactly one doxastic attitude is the rational one to have toward p based on E. My view, which I call the Pluralist Thesis, and which I defend in this paper, is that for any proposition p and any body of evidence, E, there can be more than one rational doxastic attitude toward p on the basis of E.