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Title
Abstract
Introduction
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
Main Results
Conclusion
Additional Results
References
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Sociology
Criminology

Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico

Profile image of Omar García-PonceOmar García-Ponce

2013, American Political Science Review

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000178
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Abstract

To what extent, and under what conditions, does access to arms fuel violent crime? To answer this question, we exploit a unique natural experiment: the 2004 expiration of the U.S. Federal Assault Weapons Ban exerted a spillover on gun supply in Mexican municipios near Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, but not near California, which retained a pre-existing state-level ban. We find first that Mexican municipios located closer to the non-California border states experienced differential increases in homicides, gun-related homicides, and crime gun seizures after 2004. Second, the magnitude of this effect is contingent on political factors related to Mexico's democratic transition. Killings increased disproportionately in municipios where local elections had become more competitive prior to 2004, with the largest differentials emerging in high narco-trafficking areas. Our findings suggest that competition undermined informal agreements between drug cartels and entrenched local governme...

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    Carlos Vidotti

    Population Health Metrics

    Background Brazil leads the world in number of firearm deaths and ranks sixth by country in rate of firearm deaths per 100,000 people. This study aims to analyze trends in and burden of mortality by firearms, according to age and sex, for Brazil, and the association between these deaths and indicators of possession and carrying of weapons using data from the global burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors study (GBD) 2017. Methods We used GBD 2017 estimates of mortality due to physical violence and self-harm from firearms for Brazil to analyze the association between deaths by firearms and explanatory variables. Results Deaths from firearms increased in Brazil from 25,819 in 1990 to 48,493 in 2017. Firearm mortality rates were higher among men and in the 20–24 age group; the rate was 20 times higher than for women in the same age group. Homicide rates increased during the study period, while mortality rates for suicides and accidental deaths decreased. The group of Brazilian f...

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    Crime and the Economy in Mexican States: Heterogeneous Panel Estimates (1993-2012)
    Xingwei Hu

    IMF Working Papers, 2015

    This paper studies the transmission of crime shocks to the economy in a sample of 32 Mexican states over the period from 1993 to 2012. The paper uses a panel structural VAR approach which accounts for the heterogeneity of the dynamic state level responses in GDP, FDI and international migration flows, and measures the transmission via the impulse response of homicide rates. The approach also allows the study of the pattern of economic responses among states. In particular, the percentage of GDP devoted to new construction and the perception of public security are characteristics that are shown to be associated with the sign and magnitude of the responses of economic variables to crime shocks.

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    Illicit Small Arms Prices: Introducing Two New Datasets
    Topher L. McDougal

    Defence and Peace Economics, 2020

    The SADO-WP Series is intended to disseminate works in progress on the scope, scale, causes, and consequences of the manufacture, trade, and use of small arms. The Series prioritizes timely publication over flawless presentation. Neither SADO nor its affiliates necessarily endorse the findings, interpretations, conclusions, or opinions expressed in this paper.

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