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Outline

IS THE ANT COLONY A CONSCIOUS ORGANISM?

2023, Griot

https://doi.org/10.31977/GRIRFI.V23I1.3220

Abstract

The similarity between the interaction pattern of neurons in the human brain and the ant colony makes the latter an object of the hypothesis of being a structure capable of having a consciousness. In this article, Thomas Nagel's definition of consciousness as something that is to be for an organism becomes fundamental for the examination of it as a possible experiential subject. The ant colony, if considered an organism, could be a subject capable of having internal experiences. Therefore, in this article, I developed based on Panpsychism, criteria for colony analysis, presenting which characteristics it must meet in order to be qualified as conscious. I do not argue that the ant colony is a genuine organism, but that, if it is, it will have some kind of conscious experience. In dealing with this question, I examine whether the colony is a biological individual, and then, whether it is possible for the ants' minds to underlie the colony's mind. I conclude that, based on how the parts interact with the whole, there may be more than one resolution to the problem, that is, the colony's consciousness depends on the way how its components are physically and phenomenally integrated.

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