Converging European Transitions

European Law Journal, 2011

Despite its economic importance and successive Treaty reforms, the EU does not always succeed in asserting itself as a leading actor on the international stage. Both internal and external factors influence the EU's participation in international economic governance institutions. They constitute a definite handicap concerning the EU's potential role as a real normative power. At the same time, as indispensable reforms of global economic governance are in the offing, the EU seems to be giving up any claims for better representation within competent organisations and forums, such as the International Monetary Fund. Nowadays, the EU 1 is a principal actor on the global economic stage. It is the world's largest exporter of goods and merchandise, as well as the world leader in trade in services. The euro, adopted by 17 Member States of the Union, has become the second currency of the world. 2 Notwithstanding its primacy, however, the Union, and in particular the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), is not able to impose itself politically on the international diplomatic stage and continues to be considered as a 'political dwarf.' 3 One of the symptoms of the Union's inability to translate its economic weight into political influence relates to its unsatisfactory presence in supranational fora oriented towards cooperation in matters of economic regulation, whether or not these fora have legal personality. In fact, the terms of reference used here are intentionally broad to compensate for the weak institutional structure that characterises the global system of economic governance. The latter is based on a decentralised global legal framework that relies on the intervention of classical multilateral institutions-the typical United Nations (UN) institutions established under the Bretton Woods system: among others, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)-as well as multilateral or regional organisations that exercise * Alan Hervé, PhD Candidate, Teaching Assistant (law), College of Europe-Natolin Campus (Warsaw). 1 Taking account of the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon took effect on 1 December 2009, the term 'Community' has disappeared from official terminology in favour of the 'European Union', which is the only organ with legal personality. For the sake of coherence, we will continue to apply the term 'Community' where it refers to the presence of the Union at international fora prior to December 2009. (Editor's Note: This translation retains the references to the French version of the official reports of the European courts because this is the version used by the author of the paper.)

Special issue "Governance, Development and the South: contesting EU policies", 2010

This introductory article to the special issue on European Union, development policies and governance discusses how notions of (‘good’) governance came to dominate development discourses and policies since the mid-1990s. The article argues that governance was part of the so-called Post-Washington Consensus, which understands governance reform as part of the creation of market societies. Despite the fact that academics have commonly emphasised that governance concerns the rules that regulate the public sphere, the dominant understanding of (good) governance in policy circles revolves around technical and managerial connotations. The second part of the article introduces some important features of EU development policy, and argues that this is essentially neo-liberal in nature and that it favours a technocratic approach to governance reform. The EU’s main instrument in relations with developing countries is the Country Strategy Paper, which includes a set of governance indicators for the assessment of the political situation in partner countries. In addition, the European Union has developed a ‘governance profile’, which consists of nine components.

This introduction offers a common analytical framework for the papers in the special issue that explore the economic and political crises of the EU from the perspective of the governance problems of market integration. These crises, we argue, can all be linked to the deficiencies in the management of the developmental consequences of market integration among economies at different levels of development. The deeper is economic integration and the more diverse are the starting endowments of participating actors, the less predictable are the developmental effects of integration, and the larger is the need for mechanisms that could help to anticipate and manage them in time. While economic integration offers new developmental opportunities for the less developed economies, the capacities of both national and supranational public actors to manage the developmental problems in Europe are inadequate. Weak EU capacities to get in synch the requirements of deepening economic integration and managing its developmental consequences, we argue, can be attributed to the asymmetry of European polity, where policymakers whose primary accountability lies at the national level govern the transnational market. Actors in charge of governing the common market have strong incentives to externalize the developmental consequences of integration and they have limited room for making the common market a common good.

2013

This dissertation revolves around the enigmatic role of development policy in the European Union (EU), and its place and purpose in relation to the EU's trade policy and to the Union at large. In particular, it looks at the preconditions that direct the EU's work for the international development objectives of poverty eradication and sustainable development. In this regard, there has been considerable debate on policy coherence for development, or in other words, on how the EU policies in the field of trade work in favour of, or against, development goals. In fact, the EU has made binding commitments in the EU treaties and in international conventions to advance coherence from a development perspective. However, what actually constitutes policy coherence for development in the EU, and how it is defined and promoted have largely remained unstudied to date. In addition, the question of the power to establish common standards for policy coherence deserves a closer look, both within the EU and in global governance at large. This contribution aims to fill this research gap by tracing the key developmentand trade-related processes and analysing their outcomes. These include the first joint policy statement by the European Commission, the European Council and the Parliament, entitled the European Consensus on Development (2005-), as well as those elements of the EU trade policy that were officially declared to manifest policy coherence for development. Regarding the latter, the EU position in relation to the WTO Doha Development Round, as well as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), is a case in point. The dissertation addresses these issues in the broader historical, international and institutional settings before the Lisbon Treaty (2009), but also draws lessons for the present. The primary data consist of official EU documents and 34 semi-structured interviews with development and trade actors involved in these processes. Drawing on two analytical frameworks-power in global governance (Barnett & Duvall 2005) and normative power Europe (Manners 2002, 2006)-I examine the formation of the policy coherence for development principle in the EU's development-and trade-related texts, discourse production and social practices that define, naturalise and reproduce certain norms while dismissing others (cf. Fairclough 1992, 2003). My findings indicate that the EU's contribution to policy coherence for development is affected by intra-and inter-institutional tensions, as well as by ambiguity surrounding the role and purpose of development policy in the Union. In particular, I demonstrate how the proactive role of the Commission in the policy initiation was triggered primarily by the changes in the security and

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2015

Recognising the declining weight of its members in the world economy, the OECD, formerly known as a 'club of rich, industrialised nations', is undergoing unprecedented organizational reform, including a more inclusive membership logic, engagement with new global players, and outreach to developing countries, all with a view to guaranteeing its continued relevance as a central actor in the task of global policy provision. Using the concepts of global public goods, clubs and models of multilateralism, this article critically evaluates the successes and limits of the OECD's reform, arguing it is adopting a cautious approach to expansion-globalization ' à la carte'. Meaningful reform towards greater inclusion is apparent in the way research on non-members has been mainstreamed, and in its increased work with both emerging powers and developing countries. Limits to reform are found in institutional rigidities including its over-representation of Europe and under-representation of Asia and other continents, reflected through staff profiles and membership. These biases may in turn reduce its attractiveness as a global forum to new players, particularly, China. Policy Implications • Shifts in the world economy towards the east and the south pose significant challenges to international organizations, which must ensure processes of global governance fully involve key actors, in the quest for functional and legitimate global policy. * * * '…the OECD is changing. It is becoming more inclusive, more sensitive to diversity and the many paths that have led to growth and development…the Organization's new global strategy is increasing its relevance and responsiveness to the needs of the international community.' (OECD, 2009a) 'Nor will anyone in the West have the courage to state another obvious truth: after having failed in its core mission, the OECD has clearly become a 'sunset' organisation. Its disappearance will have no impact on the developing world.'(Mahbubani, 2008: 69). The OECD has adopted a bold new mantra in recent years: to guarantee its global nature and relevance in the architecture of international organizations (OECD, 2006). Organizational changes toward this aim have accelerated. Enlargement to Chile, Israel and Slovenia in 2010, bringing membership to thirty-three countries, with planned imminent or short-term enlargement to Estonia and Russia, is rendering the organization's traditional bent towards Western countries more diverse in political and economic terms. Deeper cooperation with important emerging economies-Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa-has been formalised through its 'enhanced engagement' programme, with a view to their possible future membership (OECD, 2005a). No longer is OECD research and analysis of non-members conducted 'at the margins' by its development-related bodies, since this work has been mainstreamed throughout the organization. Regional programmes have been set up throughout the