Editorial: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe
2022, Eastern Journal of European Studies
https://doi.org/10.47743/EJES-2022-SI01…
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Abstract
Instead of writing a whole study on the importance, specificity, uniqueness of the subject matter of this Special Issue: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe, I am going to recommend the issue with a longer quotation, from an essay written by István Bibó, during WWII: …the nations in this region lacked what was self-evidently, clearly, circumscribable, and graspable present in both the reality and the consciousnesses of West European communities-the reality of their own national and state frameworks, their capital cities, their being politically and economically accustomed to one another, a single social elite, etc. The political rise and decline of a country in Western and Northern Europe-its acquiring or losing a role as a major power or its establishing or losing a colonial empire-could remain episodic, distant adventures, pleasant or sad memories, and could be suffered without major shocks because there was something that could not be taken away or questioned. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, the national frameworks were something to be fashioned, restored, fought for, and be anxious about not only because of the overpower of the state framework of existing dynasties, but also because of the indifference of certain quarters of its population and the fickleness of national consciousness. This is the situation that gave rise to a characteristic feature of the unbalanced Central-East European political mentality: existential anxiety for the community. East European nations were always overshadowed by alien, rootless state powers either bearing European forms or wielding unbearable pressure, whether they were called emperor, tsar, or sultan, who deprived them of their sons either by offering the most talented ones a career or sending the most upright ones to the gallows or jails. The mismatches between historical and ethnic borders soon brought bad blood among the peoples themselves, and given the opportunity, they tried out on one another what they had learned from the emperors, tsars, or sultans. They all got to know the feeling when alien powers endangered, seized, or ruled their sacred places of national
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