Majority Requirements and Minority Representation

Minnesota Law Review, 2013

† 10 6. See ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER UNABRIDGED EDITION 274 (1960) (noting that one's individual expression of partnership is associated with the individual's statement of voting behavior); see also MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED 149-50 (2008) (stating that voting for the same party in successive elections causes more fervent partisan commitment). 7. See generally Gary N. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478, 478-97 (1996) (arguing that the vote-denominated incumbency advantage can be decomposed into direct and indirect effects). 8. See generally Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 951-71 (2001) (asserting that endorsements have obvious heuristic values). 9. Cf. Arthur H. Miller et al., Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 521, 521-24 (1986) (stating that personality characteristics of the candidates provides an understanding of voter behavior). 10.

Why does the demographic composition of the Polish parliament resemble the top of the stratification system rather than its whole? Empirical evidence suggests that when descriptive representation is enhanced —a condition in which the composition of the legislature more accurately mirrors the demographics and experiences of the citizenry—the disadvantaged improve their substantive representation (Mansbridge 1999; Swers 2002; Tate 2003). In examining factors that enhance descriptive representation, such as social structures that influence who runs for office (Fox and Lawless 2004; Norris and Lovenduski 1993) and parties as gatekeepers keeping out particular demographic types of candidates (Kunovich and Paxton 2005), few consider the role of the voter. When voters vote based on the individual characteristics of the candidates, that is, demographic cues voting, it is theoretically possible that the disadvantaged can “vote in” their own descriptive representation. In this chapter, I demo...

2012

There are a variety of factors that can influence how a minority group is able to influence a majority group. Although mostly studied separately, these factors are firmly related and all contribute towards the end result. Consistency can be seen as the most primary and uncontroversial factor influencing minority influence (Moscovici and Faucheux, 1972; see Gardikiotis, 2011; Kerr, 2002; Rashotte, 2006). Consistent minorities are perceived by others to be certain, confident and committed to their position, and are therefore more likely to persuade; conversely, erratic minorities may be perceived as unreliable and consequently be excluded (Gardikiotis, 2011). Other factors can be explained by Nemeth’s (1986; see Gardikiotis, 2011) cognitive-processing theory of minority influence. Such factors include: activeness, authenticity, persuasiveness and strategy type (Nemeth, 2010; Kerr, 2002; Clark, 1998; Baron and Bellman, 2007; Gardikiotis, 2011). Other factors can be explained by Crano’s...

A practice to measure descriptive representation of Mozambique, Sweden, USA, and Taiwan.

2021

And so the world watches America-the only great power in history made up of people from every corner of the planet, comprising every race and faith and cultural practice-to see if our experiment in democracy can work. To see if we can do what no other nation has ever done. To see if we can actually live up to the meaning of our creed. The jury's still out." (Obama, 2020, p. xvi).

faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu

The Journal of Politics, 2003

One of the most intractable problems associated with studying representation in the U.S. House of Representatives involves the measurement of district-level constituency opinion. In measuring constituency opinion in House districts, scholars have relied on a number of alternative approaches, including the use of demographic variables, small-sample estimates of public opinion, presidential election results, referenda data, and "bottom-up" simulated opinion. In this article we develop an innovative "top-down" simulation of House district opinion that provides more reliable and valid measures of House district ideology. We model state-level ideology (as measured by Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) as a function of various demographic and political variables found at both the state and House district levels, and then use the estimates from the state-level model to generate predicted ideology scores for each House district during the 1980s and 1990s. Our findings suggest that the top-down simulated measure is a valid indicator of House district ideology that can be used in a number of research venues. Representation is particularly important to democratic theory. According to Eulau et al. (1959), representation is what makes democratic legislatures both legitimate and authoritative decision-making institutions. Likewise, Key (1961) notes, the representation of public opinion is widely regarded as one of the distinguishing characteristics of democracy. Dahl (1989) further contends that the primary justification for democratic governments is found in their ability to provide an orderly and peaceful process for representation to occur. Considering the important role that representation plays in democracies, the study of representation has occupied a central place in the field of political science and has long captivated the interest of both theorists and empirical analysts. Although scholars have explored a range of representational behaviors, the focus of much of this research has been on what Eulau and Karps (1978) have referred to as policy responsiveness, which we define as the degree to which legislators reflect in their roll-call behavior the policy views of their constituents. The concept of policy representation requires at least some level of congruence between the policy views of constituents and the policy behavior of repre

Public Opinion Quarterly

According to cognitive research, members of a social majority are better at estimating the consensus than minority members, since the latter tend to overestimate the popularity of their opinion. These differences have been explained using the framework of the motivational reasoning model. The purpose of the current study is twofold: to verify that majority members indeed provide more accurate public consensus estimations and to test the effect of political orientation on this relation. Following the motivational reasoning model, it is suggested that proponents of right-wing ideology will overestimate support for their group, especially when in the minority, since they have a stronger reaction to political threat. The research involved three case studies. In the first, data from 33 surveys conducted over a period of 10 years (N=15,129) were analyzed using multi-level analysis. The results showed that a) majority members are more accurate in gauging consensual opinions than minority members; b) the gap in accuracy between majority and minority members increases with the size of the majority; and c) those holding right-wing attitudes tend to overestimate their group size, more so when in the minority or when support for their opinion declines. The second case study analyzed data on four different issues, using a within-subject approach (N=450). The findings were similar, with the exception of a non- significant effect for majority size. Lastly, in the third case study, the causal mechanism suggested was supported by an experimental setting (N=388). The results are discussed in light of the motivational reasoning model regarding information processing and ideology.

Politics and Governance, 2014

Ever since the Supreme Court instituted the one person, one vote principle in congressional election s based on its decision in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), intrastate deviations from equal district populations have become smaller and smaller after each decennial reapportionment. Relying on equal total population as the standard to meet the Court's principle, though, has raised some constitutional and practical questions stemming from, most basically, not every person has the right to vote. Specifically, there is considerable deviation between the current redistricting practices and a literal interpretation of this constitutional principle. This study systematically analyzes the differences between districts' total populations and their voting age populations (VAPs). Further, we consider how congressional reapportionments since 1972 would change if, instead of states' total populations, the standard for reapportioning seats were based on the VAP or the voting eligible population (VEP). Overall, the results indicate that the debate surrounding the appropriate apportionment and redistricting standard is not jus t normative, it also has notable practical consequences.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1998

S. (1998). Beyond conflict and discrepancy: Cognitive bias in minority and majority influence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 620-633.