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Outline

A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle

1978, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics

https://doi.org/10.1137/0135023

Abstract

Voting rules on many alternatives may be broadly divided into two classes: those that use a scheme of "weighting" the alternatives to determine their overall order of desirability, and those that use binary comparison t o ascertain whether there is an alternative (called a Condorcet alternative) that is able t o defeat every other alternative by a simple majority. The first approach is identified with Borda, the second with Condorcet. In this paper it is shown that the basic desirable property of weighting systems - namely "consistency" under aggregationcan be achieved without sacrificing the common-sense property of choosing a Condorcet alternative whenever one exists. In fact, these two properties, together with the requirement of "neutrality" on alternatives, essentially determine a unique rule known in the literature as Kerneny's rule.