hubert marraud
580 California St., Suite 400
San Francisco, CA, 94104
Abstract
The concept of strength or weight of an argument appears frequently in argumentation theory. Its function is to explain how reasons or arguments interact to support their outcomes. Most approaches, however, use it as little more than a metaphor. This talk aims to be a contribution to the study of the concept of argument strength. I will argue first that weighing is irreducible to defeasibility, and then that we can find two types of non-rhetorical concepts of strength in the literature of argumentation theory. On the one hand, we have a comparative concept, linked to the weighing of pairs or groups of opposing arguments, and on the other hand, a scalar concept, linked to modal qualifiers. Lack of awareness of the differences between these two senses makes many discussions of the strength of arguments somewhat confusing. This paper aims to explain these differences in detail to avoid confusion and fruitless or even counterproductive discussions.
References (13)
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- 3 The presence of modal qualifiers is not essential to form scales, as the following example shows: "Given Jean's alcoholism, this is a tale which in realistic terms seems to demand a wholly down-beat ending although that would doubtless feel too depressing. In trying to side step, Barrett supplies an unexpected moral resolution that leaves rather too many questions in its wake to satisfy fully. So Glassland is not a masterpiece, but it is a striking work admirably acted with Reynor confirming again his high standing among our young actors." (Stimpson 2015). Here the connector 'but' presents "Glassland is a a striking work" as a weaker conclusion that "Glassland is a masterpiece" from the features of the film highlighted by Stimpson.
- Marraud, Hubert (2020a). Holism of Reasons and its Consequences for Argumentation Theory. In C. Dutilh Novaes et al., Reasons to Dissent. Proceedings of the 3rd ECA Conference, 167-180. London: College Publications. ISBN 978-1-84890-333-3
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- i Paper presented at the IX Biennial Conference on Argumentation held at Wake Forest University. I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to participate, and especially Professor Frans van Eemeren. This work has benefitted from the support granted by Research Project "Argumentative practices and the pragmatics of reasons 2", PID2022-136423NB-I00, funded by MCIN/ AEI / 10.13039/501100011033 and by "ERDF A way of making Europe".