Review of “Logic, Logic and Logic”
2000
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2003
In The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets, John Mayberry attacks the 2000-year-old problem of accounting for the foundations of mathematics. His account comes in three interrelated parts: determining exactly what one should (and should not) expect from a foundation; arguing that set theory can in fact provide such a foundation, and presenting a novel version of set theory (or at least a novel exposition of traditional set theory) which can fulfil this foundational role.
Int. J. Contemp. Math. Sciences, 2011
A relatively complete and subjective attitude towards the axiomatic set theory which was achieved by mathematician, such as Cantor-Zermelo and Fraenkel resulted in the presentation of ten Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms and proposed Cantor and Russell , s paradoxes. In this paper we have tried to remove some proposed paradoxes by defining an exclusive set which we call universal set.
This paper discusses the philosophical and social significations of sets in three logical systems; two-valued logic, many-valued logic, and fuzzy logic. Here is an attempt to infer these significations from the definition of sets; graphically represented by Venn diagrams or membership functions, and the basic operations on sets. This paper explains that each set is a reflection, either explicitly or implicitly, of human thinking's ways. Two-valued set as a representation of binary and strict thinking, many-valued set as a representation of multiple thinking, which is less strict than binary thinking, but also less open than fuzzy or open and freethinking, which is represented by fuzzy set. Unlike those who say that the one, but not the other, of these three logical systems can represent real world, and reflect human thinking’s ways, this paper detect that each one of these systems has more suitable scope than the other, and can reflect one way of thinking better than the other does. Therefore, each logical system has its importance and role in real life, and has scope that is more appropriate to represent it. Finally, it asserts that logical systems do not exhaust human beings' life.
Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 1996
4 Or, for that matter, in favor of connecting DEDEKIND or RIEMANN with the German and French authors who had contributed previously to the theory of classes (cf KNEALE 8~; KNEALE 1962, .
Synthese, 2004
Once Hilbert asserted that the axioms of a theory 'define' the primitive concepts of its language 'implicitly'. Thus when someone inquires about the meaning of the set-concept, the standard response reads that axiomatic set-theory defines it implicitly and that is the end of it. But can we explain this assertion in a manner that meets minimum standards of philosophical scrutiny? Is Jané (2001) wrong when he says that implicit definability is "an obscure notion"? Does an explanation of it presuppose any particular view on meaning? Is it not a scandal of the philosophy of mathematics that no answers to these questions are around? We submit affirmative answers to all questions. We argue that a Wittgensteinian conception of meaning looms large beneath Hilbert's conception of implicit definability. Within the specific framework of Horwich's recent Wittgensteinian theory of meaning called semantic deflationism, we explain an explicit conception of implicit definability, and then go on to argue that, indeed, set-theory, defines the set-concept implicitly according to this conception. We also defend Horwich's conception against a recent objection from the Neo-Fregeans Hale and Wright (2001). Further, we employ the philosophical resources gathered to dissolve all traditional worries about the coherence of the set-concept, raised by Frege, Russell and Max Black, and which recently have been defended vigorously by Hallett (1984) in his magisterial monograph Cantorian set-theory and limitation of size. Until this day, scandalously, these worries have been ignored too by philosophers of mathematics.
Outstanding contributions to logic, 2024
We compare Fregean theorizing about sets with the theorizing of an ontologically non-committal, natural-deduction based, inferentialist. The latter uses free Core logic, and confers meanings on logico-mathematical expressions by means of rules for introducing them in conclusions and eliminating them from major premises. Those expressions (such as the set-abstraction operator) that form singular terms have their rules framed so as to deal with canonical identity statements as their conclusions or major premises. We extend this treatment to pasigraphs as well, in the case of set theory. These are defined expressions (such as 'subset of', or 'power set of') that are treated as basic in the lingua franca of informal set theory. Employing pasigraphs in accordance with their own natural-deduction rules enables one to 'atomicize' rigorous mathematical reasoning. This study will address (3), by venturing beyond logic to set theory. In seeking to provide a natural and free logic of sets, we shall also have some things to say about
The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2008
The two expressions ‘The cumulative hierarchy’ and ‘The iterative conception of sets’ are usually taken to be synonymous. However, the second is more general than the first, in that there are recursive procedures that generate some ill-founded sets in addition to well-founded sets. The interesting question is whether or not the arguments in favour of the more restrictive version – the cumulative hierarchy – were all along arguments for the more general version.

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