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Title
Abstract
Social Cognition as a Level of Analysis
Scope and Refutability of Theoretical Claims
Summary
References

Social-cognitive theories

Profile image of Galen V BodenhausenGalen V Bodenhausen

2015, Theory and Explanation in Social Psychology

Abstract

In this chapter, Gawronski and Bodenhausen endeavor to spell out some of the biggest theoretical challenges facing researchers who propose mentalistic accounts for observed patterns of behavior, and they offer some potential strategies for successfully tackling them.

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