Why do business losses cause conflict?
2018, Journal of strategic contracting and negotiation
https://doi.org/10.1177/2055563620925060Abstract
Evidence suggests that conflicts between contracting parties are more prone to occur when a party has suffered a significant loss. It is argued that the phenomenon is difficult to understand within conventional contract theory, which assumes full rationality, while behavioral theories based on the concepts of motivated reasoning and reciprocity provide interesting explanations. Thus, losses can trigger motivated, self-serving perceptions and beliefs, which in turn are likely to induce negative reciprocity as well as counter-productive acts aimed at bolstering self-image. These explanations are demonstrated to be well supported by experiments.
References (49)
- Alloy LB and Abramson LY (1979) Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 108(4): 441.
- Babcock L and Furgeson J (2013) Bounded rationality in the settlement process: Empirical evidence on the causes of settlement failure in litigation. In: Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts. Edward Elgar, p.360. Babcock L and Loewenstein G (1997) Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(1):109-126.
- Babcock L, Loewenstein G, Issacharoff S, et al. (1995) Biased judgments of fairness in bargaining. American Economic Review 85(5): 1337-1343.
- Barberis NC (2013) Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review and assessment. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(1):173-196.
- Bartling B and Schmidt KM (2015) Reference points, social norms, and fairness in contract renegotiations. Journal of the European Economic Association 13(1): 98-129.
- Bénabou R and Tirole J (2009) Over my dead body: Bargaining and the price of dignity. American Economic Review 99(2): 459-465.
- Bénabou R and Tirole J (2016) Mindful economics: The production, consumption, and value of beliefs. Journal of Economic Perspectives 30(3):141-164.
- Caplin A and Leahy JV (2019) Wishful Thinking. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Charness G and Ellman M (2014) Let's talk: How communication affects contract design. Journal of the European Economic Association 14(4): 943-974.
- Dana J, Weber RA and Kuang JX (2007) Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory 33(1): 67-80.
- Dohmen T, Falk A, Huffman D, et al. (2009) Homo reciprocans: Survey evidence on behavioural outcomes. Economic Journal 119(536): 592-612.
- Eil D and Rao JM (2011) The good news-bad news effect: Asymmetric processing of objective information about yourself. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3(2): 114-138.
- Ellingsen T, Johannesson M, Lilja J, et al. (2009) Trust and truth. Economic Journal 119(534): 252-276.
- Fehr E and Schmidt KM (2000) Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity -Evidence and Economic Applications. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 403, University of Zurich, IEER Working Paper No. 75. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract¼255223
- Fehr E, Hart O and Zehnder C (2011) Contracts as reference points -experimental evidence. American Economic Review 101(2): 493-525.
- Fehr E, Hart O and Zehnder C (2015) How do informal agreements and revision shape contractual reference points? 13(1): 1-28.
- Feldman Y, Schurr A and Teichman D (2013) Reference points and contractual choices: An experimental examination. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 10(3): 512-541.
- Friedberg E and Neuville J-P (1999) Inside partnership: Trust, opportunism and cooperation in the European automobile industry. In Grandori A (ed.) Interfirm Networks: Organization and Industrial Competitive- ness. London: Routledge, pp.67-88.
- Furlong M and Young J (1996) Talking about blame. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy 17(4): 191-200.
- Gneezy U (2005) Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Review 95(1): 384-394.
- Hart O (2009) Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(1): 267-300.
- Hart O and Moore J (1988) Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica 56(4): 755-785.
- Hart O and Moore J (2008) Contracts as reference points. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(1): 1-48.
- Holmstrom B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10(1) (Spring, 1979): 74-91.
- Kadefors A (2005) Fairness in interorganizational project relations: Norms and strategies. Construction Management and Economics 23(8): 871-878.
- Kahneman D and Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2): 263-292.
- Kahneman D, Knetsch JL and Thaler RH (1986) Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. American Economic Review 76(4): 728-774.
- Kennan J and Wilson R (1990) Theories of bargaining delays. Science 249(4973): 1124-1128.
- Kern MC and Chugh D (2009) Bounded ethicality: The perils of loss framing. Psychological Science 20(3): 378-384.
- Kern T, Willcocks LP and Van Heck E (2002) The winner's curse in IT outsourcing: Strategies for avoiding relational trauma. California Management Review 44(2): 47-69.
- Konow J (2000) Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions. American Economic Review 90(4): 1072-1091.
- Korn CW, Sharot T, Walter H, et al. (2014) Depression is related to an absence of optimistically biased belief updating about future life events. Psychological Medicine 44(3): 579-592.
- Kunda Z (1990) The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin 108(3): 480.
- Li K and Cheung SO (2019) Unveiling cognitive biases in construction project dispute resolution through the lenses of third-party neutrals. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 145(11).
- Lundquist T, Ellingsen T, Gribbe E, et al. (2009) The aversion to lying. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70(1-2): 81-92.
- Malle BF, Guglielmo S and Monroe AE (2014) A theory of blame. Psychological Inquiry 25(2): 147-186.
- Masten S (1988) Equity, opportunism and the design of contractual relations. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144: 180-195.
- Mazar N, Amir O and Ariely D (2008) The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept mainte- nance. Journal of Marketing Research 45(6): 633-644.
- Mijovic ´-Prelec D and Prelec D (2010) Self-deception as self-signalling: A model and experimental evidence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365(1538): 227-240.
- Nash J (1951) Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics 54(2): 286-295.
- Rabin M (1993) Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review 83(5): 1281-1302.
- Shavell S (1984) The design of contracts and remedies for breach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 99(1): 121-148.
- Shavell S (1989) Sharing of information prior to settlement or litigation. Rand Journal of Economics 20(2): 183-195.
- Spier KE (2007) Litigation. In: Polinsky AM and Shavell S (eds) Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.259-342.
- Sullivan SP (2016) Why wait to settle? An experimental test of the asymmetric-information hypothesis. Journal of Law and Economics 59(3): 497-525.
- Weber C and Go ¨bel M (2010) Reciprocity and interorganizational governance -a multicase analysis of exchange systems. Scandinavian Journal of Management 26(2): 134-150.
- Wickelgren AL (2013) Law and economics of settlement. In: Arlen J (ed.) Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp.330-359.
- Williamson OE (1985) Assessing contract. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 1(1): 177.
- Zehnder C (2008) Contracts as reference points -experimental evidence. American Law Amp Economics Association Papers (41): 1.
- Zhang L, Fenn P and Fu Y (2019) To insist or to concede? Contractors' behavioural strategies when handling disputed claims. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 26(3): 424-443.