The Turing Test - A Challenge for A.I. and Robots
2025, The Turing Test - A Challenge for A.I. and Robots
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Abstract
The Turing Test, proposed by Alan Turing, evaluates a machine's ability to exhibit human-like intelligence by having a human interact with both a robot and another human without knowing which is which.
Related papers
Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics, 2006
This document is a draft of an article for the Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd Edition (Elsevier, forthcoming). This article describes the Turing Test for determining whether a computer can think. It begins with a description of an "imitation game" for discriminating between a man and a woman, discusses variations of the Test, standards for passing the Test, and experiments with real Turing-like tests (including Eliza and the Loebner competition). It then considers what a 1 computer must be able to do in order to pass a Turing Test, including whether written linguistic behavior is a reasonable replacement for "cognition", what counts as understanding natural language, the role of world knowledge in understanding natural language, and the philosophical implications of passing a Turing Test, including whether passing is a sufficient demonstration of cognition, briefly discussing two counterexamples: a table-lookup program and the Chinese Room Argument.
Minds and Machines, 2020
2014
Fundamental artificial intelligence is founded on Turing's imitation game. This can be implemented in two different ways: a simultaneous comparison 3-participant test, and a 2-participant viva voce test. In the former, the human interrogator questions two hidden interlocutors in parallel deciding which is the human and which is the machine. In the latter test, the judge interrogates one hidden entity and decides whether it is a human or a machine. The results from an original experiment conducted at Bletchley Park in June 2012 implementing both tests side-by-side showed the simultaneous comparison was a stronger test for artificial intelligence.
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1995
Passing the Turing Test is not a sensible goal for Artificial Intelligence. Adherence to Turing's vision from 1950 is now actively harmful to our field. We review problems with Turing's idea, and suggest that, ironically, the very cognitive science that he tried to create must reject his research goal.
AI Magazine, 2016
The Turing test, as originally conceived, focused on language and reasoning; problems of perception and action were conspicuously absent. To serve as a benchmark for motivating and monitoring progress in AI research, this article proposes an extension to that original proposal that incorporates all four of these aspects of intelligence. Some initial suggestions are made regarding how best to structure such a test and how to measure progress. The proposed test also provides an opportunity to bring these four important areas of AI research back into sync after each has regrettably diverged into a fairly independent area of research of its own.
Isonomia, 2014
The article deals with some ideas by Turing concerning the background and the birth of the well-known Turing Test, showing the evolution of the main question proposed by Turing on thinking machine. The notions he used, especially that one of imitation, are not so much exactly defined and shaped, but for this very reason they have had a deep impact in artificial intelligence and cognitive science research from an epistemological point of view. Then, it is suggested that the fundamental concept involved in Turing's imitation game, conceived as a test for detecting the presence of intelligence in an artificial entity, is the concept of interaction, that Turing adopts in a wider, more intuitive and more fruitful sense than the one that is proper to the current research in interactive computing.
Minds and Machines, 2000
On a literal reading of `Computing Machinery and Intelligence', Alan Turing presented not one, but two, practical tests to replace the question `Can machines think?' He presented them as equivalent. I show here that the first test described in that much-discussed paper is in fact not equivalent to the second one, which has since become known as `the Turing Test'. The two tests can yield different results; it is the first, neglected test that provides the more appropriate indication of intelligence. This is because the features of intelligence upon which it relies are resourcefulness and a critical attitude to one's habitual responses; thus the test's applicablity is not restricted to any particular species, nor does it presume any particular capacities. This is more appropriate because the question under consideration is what would count as machine intelligence. The first test realizes a possibility that philosophers have overlooked: a test that uses a human's linguistic performance in setting an empirical test of intelligence, but does not make behavioral similarity to that performance the criterion of intelligence. Consequently, the first test is immune to many of the philosophical criticisms on the basis of which the (so-called) `Turing Test' has been dismissed.

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