Recent work. modality without possible worlds

Ars Disputandi

This book consists of a collection of writings by Alvin Plantinga, arranged so as to give an overview of his views on modal metaphysics. All parts of this book have been published before, from 1969 to 1993. Most come from journal articles or collections of essays; some come from Plantinga's earlier books. The book seems to be intended for use in graduate courses or by those who are not interested in working through Plantinga's entire corpus. [2] Matthew Davidson has written a very useful and fairly lucid summary of each of the chapters by Plantinga. Indeed, given Plantinga's byzantine,`Chisholming' style, Davidson has provided many with a great service. For he not only states Plantinga's views on various issues, but also gives Plantinga's main reasons for holding them. However, as Davidson seems to be an acolyte of Plantinga, you will not nd much critique of the doctrines being presented. Davidson does note though that Plantinga has changed or modi ed his views somewhat: e.g. on whether or not`actualism' implies`serious actualism'. [20; but cf. 167 70; 178 82; 198 9] Again, Davidson does not worry much about whether allowing properties like`being identical to Socrates' commits us to ontological pro igacy. [Cf. 58] Again, he only mentions the issue, whether giving proper names their own Fregean senses and individual essences invites some absurdities: e.g., if Cain is by de nition the one who killed Abel, it will be necessarily false that Cain did not kill Abel. [16] In any case, given this book's function as an introductory text, the Introduction would be more useful had Davidson given the page numbers where Plantinga makes his various claims. [3] As Plantinga has written nothing new in this book, and many have already commented on his views, method etc. I shall not present a large critique of what he says. Still I offer a summary of the doctrines that the book contains. These include: modality de re and de dicto; haecceity; possible worlds; transworld identity; actualism; proper names; propositions. [4] As for modality de re and de dicto, Plantinga argues that, despite antiessentialists like Quine and Kneale, traditional Aristotelian necessity de re is respectable logically and ontologically. He rst argues that their objections are not decisive. [29 35] He then shows how to transform de re necessity into de dicto necessity. [36 7; 47] He goes on to discuss how to avoid the inference from φ is essential to s' to`s exists'. [41] [5] As for haecceity, Plantinga rst critiques Searle's theory of proper names,

2020

The aim of the present book is to argue that even impossible things happen. By taking David Lewis’s Modal realism (hen- ceforth as “Mr”) seriously, i claim that besides infinitely many concrete ways things could have been, there exist ways things could not have been. i call them concrete impossible worlds.

Modality: A History (Oxford Philosophical Concepts), 2024

Hippos, usually, don’t fly. But can they, or must they stay strolling on earth? Numbers don’t bark, nor can they bark. God cannot create a stone he cannot lift. We cannot change the past, but is our future necessary? – Our language is saturated with modal verbs and notions, and we can hardly think without employing the notions of necessity and possibility. But what are necessity and possibility? (We are not (necessarily) trying to philosophize before noon, but simply attempt to account for our use of words so intimately familiar to us). What do we really mean when we pronounce these magical words: ‘possible,’ ‘necessary,’ ‘necessarily,’ ‘impossible,’ ‘can,’ ‘must’ and their like? It is not that we are not familiar with the claim that a proposition is necessary just in case it is true in all possible-worlds, and possible just in case it is true in at least one possible-world. But, as we are sure you will understand, we cannot explain possibility by employing the notion of possible-worlds, on a pain of obvious circularity. Think for a moment of a creature, highly intelligent, who has no modal notions: what would she gain if you tell her that a “proposition is possible just in case it is true in some possible world”? We are also familiar with the suggestion that conceivability is a guide for possibility, but – regardless of the numerous other problems this, indeed interesting, suggestion must address – it would seem bizarre if one were to explain possibility through conceivability. Think again about our highly intelligent creature who is not familiar with modal terms: what would she gain were we to tell her that to be possible is to be conceiv-able?

Tim de Mey and Markku Keinänen (eds.) Problems from Armstrong, 2008

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2018

An intuitive objection to modal realism is that merely possible worlds and their inhabitants seem to be irrelevant to an analysis of modality. Kripke originally phrased the objection in terms of being concerned about one’s modal properties without being concerned about the properties one’s other-worldly counterparts have. The author assesses this objection in a variety of forms, and then provides his own formulation that does not beg the question against the modal realist. Finally, the author considers two potential answers to the objection so understood and concludes that only one of them has a chance of succeeding.

The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2008

Despite the otherwise-dominant trends towards physicalism and naturalism in philosophy, it has become increasingly common for metaphysicians to accept the existence either of modal facts and properties, or of Lewisian possible worlds. This paper raises the historical question: why did these heavyweight realist views come into prominence? The answer is that they have arisen in response to the demand to find truthmakers for our modal statements. But this demand presupposes that modal statements are descriptive claims in need of truthmakers. This presupposition was, however, rejected by many earlier analytic philosophers, including the logical positivists, Wittgenstein, Ryle and Sellars, all of whom denied that (at least certain kinds of) modal statement were descriptive at all. Yet the non-descriptivist approach has largely fallen out of discussion and out of philosophical consciousness. In this paper I examine why non-descriptivist views first came into and then fell out of favor, and consider what the prospects are for reviving this more deflationary approach to modality.

The five articles in this volume were presented at the Issues on the (Im)Possible II, a conference organized by the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences and Slovak Metaphysical Society. As usual, the primary goal of the conference was to address questions regarding modality (broadly construed). We are happy to say that the conference fulfilled the expectations. This editorial has two sections. The first section sets the papers in a contemporary context of modal metaphysics and epistemology, while the second one provides an overview of the papers themselves.

Mind, 2014

The Philosophical Review, 1976

2015