RECENT WORK Recent Work : Dispositions

Analysis, 2011

Controversy about dispositions ranges over the following four domains: (i) the semantics of disposition ascriptions; (ii) the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties; (iii) the metaphysical status of dispositions, i.e. their fundamentality, naturalness and intrinsicness; and (iv) the various dispositional analyses of philosophical notions like causation, laws, modality, counterfactuals, chance, knowledge, freedom, belief, desire and colour. While the proper order of investigation among these areas is itself a matter of dispute (Heil 2003: 51), the semantics of disposition ascriptions is the de facto point of entry. The traditional approach to disposition ascriptions found, for instance, in Ryle (2000) and Goodman (1983), evaluates ascriptions of conventional dispositional predicates by appeal to a corresponding subjunctive conditional. The approach may be broken down into two distinct steps (Lewis 1997). In the first, a conventional dispositional predicate, D, is associated with characteristic stimulation conditions, C, and manifestation conditions, M such that an object x has D iff x is disposed to M in C. In the second, this overtly dispositional locution is analysed in terms of a subjunctive conditional: if x were in C, x would M. Taking the two steps together one might, for example, first associate '.. . is fragile' with the disposition to break when struck, and then analyse an object's disposition to break when struck as its being such that if it were struck, it would break. This orthodoxy about disposition ascriptions influenced the dominant views in the related areas (ii)-(iv) mentioned above as well. The special connection between dispositions and subjunctive conditionals suggested a criterion for distinguishing dispositional from categorical properties: the former but not the latter were necessarily tied to the truth of certain subjunctive conditionals (Prior 1982). Further, if, as it was hoped, subjunctive conditionals could be given truth conditions in purely categorical terms, dispositions could be eliminated from fundamental ontology and replaced with purely categorical properties, or perhaps categorical properties together with laws of nature (Armstrong 1996: 15-18). Finally, it was a working assumption, hardly worth mentioning, that dispositional analyses of various philosophical concepts should be judged by appeal to the relevant subjunctive conditionals.

Debating Dispositions, 2009

Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of realityi.e., dispositions -are properties, that may exist in the natural world and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend a fresh version of the intentional understanding of dispositions. I start by distinguishing two questions about properties, respectively addressing their identity conditions and their individuation conditions. I, then, define categorical and dispositional properties in terms of their qualitative character, and examine their identity and individuation conditions. I conclude that the attribution of intentions is a conceptual tool: it was introduced in order to help specifying the conditions of individuation of a disposition; however, such attribution does not affect the identity of a disposition. Nominalists believe that there are no properties, but only particulars. Realists, instead, believe that, among the denizens of reality, some are properties. Among the Realists, some are Dispositional Realists: they believe that, among the properties, some are dispositions. Roughly, allegedly these are entities with an irreducibly modal character and that may be instantiated by objects in the natural (i.e., spatio-temporal) world. Other Realists deny the existence of dispositional properties, thereby denying Dispositional Realism. In this paper, I will assume Realism. My aim will be to provide a fresh understanding of Dispositional Realism, which gives some merit to the view according to which dispositions have intentions.

In this paper, I discuss philosophical issues concerning ceteris paribus laws, also known as scientific laws with exceptions. In order to be true, these generalizations must be preceded by clauses that rule out all unwanted interference. This kind of law is commonplace in the natural and human sciences, and its comprehension involves semantic (defining its truth conditions), epistemological (defining its testing e application conditions) as well as metaphysical issues (defining its nature). In dealing with the subject, Lange (1993) famously formulated a dilemma about these laws: either they are false (since they allow exceptions in many cases) or they are undetermined (since the attempt to determine the content of ceteris paribus conditions leads to trivialization). Dispositional realism proposes a response to Lange's dilemma by postulating dispositional properties (causal powers) that would be enough to elucidate the truth conditions and the metaphysical nature of laws. However, dispositional realism has been charged-especially from authors from the empiricist tradition-of making the dispositions obscure and of not defining clearly the identity of dispositional properties. Thus, the problem of indeterminacy of the ceteris paribus laws would persist in the undetermined character of dispositions. My goal is to propose an amendment to dispositional realism through a double strategy: (i) against the thesis that dispositions are indeterminate, I propose to conceive the identity of properties as a structure of relations that can be perfectly represented by scientific models; (ii) against the objection that dispositions are not explanatory, I argue for the idea that the postulation of dispositional properties provides explanatory gains in terms of unification.

2012

Is there much of a connection between dispositions and ethics? It would seem not if one judges by the dearth of papers and books on such a topic (the Smith et. al. 1989 symposium is a rare exception). Dispositions have become a central issue in philosophy but the focus of attention has been on all the metaphysical issues they raise (Mumford 1998, Molnar 2003, Kistler and Gnassounou eds 2007, Bird 2007, Handfield ed. 2009, Marmadoro ed. 2010, for example). Are they real properties? What is their causal role? How do they relate to categorical properties? These are worthy debates and they are ongoing. We need not await a definitive solution, however, before considering the role of dispositions in other areas.

2020

Discussions about dispositional and categorical properties have become commonplace in metaphysics. Unfortunately, dispositionality and categoricity are disputed notions: usual characterizations are piecemeal and not widely applicable, thus threatening to make agreements and disagreements on the matter merely verbal—and also making it arduous to map a logical space of positions about dispositional and categorical properties in which all parties can comfortably fit. This paper offers a prescription for this important difficulty, or at least an inkling thereof. This will be achieved by comparing pairs of positions and exploring their background metaphysics to discover where alleged agreements and disagreements concerning dispositionality and categoricity really lie; more specifically, the Pure Powers view (according to which properties are just dispositional) and the Powerful Qualities view (according to which properties are also categorical) will be under scrutiny. Over this backgroun...