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Title
Abstract
Introduction
Semantical Analysis of Verificationist Knowability
Conclusion
References
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Philosophy
Epistemology

TR-2010008: Knowability from a Logical Point of View

Profile image of Sergei ArtemovSergei Artemov

2010

Abstract

The well-known Church-Fitch paradox shows that the verificationist knowability principle all truths are knowable, yields an unacceptable omniscience property. Our semantic analysis establishes that the knowability principle fails because it misses the stability assumption ‘the proposition in question does not change from true to false in the process of discovery,’ hidden in the verificationist approach. Once stability is made explicit, the resulting stable knowability principle accurately represents verificationist knowability, does not yield the omniscience property, and can be offered as a resolution of the knowability paradox. Two more principles are considered: total knowability stating that it is possible to know whether a proposition holds or not, and monotonic knowability stemming from the intrinsically intuitionistic reading of knowability. The study of these four principles yields a “knowability diamond” describing their logical strength. These results are obtained within a...

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