The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt
2000, Social Science Research Network
Abstract
We provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Our evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. We find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity. FINANCIAL ECONOMICS HAS MADE significant progress in explaining the incentives that lead large public corporations to choose particular financing policies. Increasingly, the profession is moving beyond an examination of the basic leverage choice to more detailed aspects of the financing decision. In this article, we extend this literature by employing data from a large sample of firms to examine hypotheses about the determinants of the maturity structure of the firm's debt. We group the hypotheses that have been offered to explain corporate debt maturity into three categories: contracting-cost hypotheses, signaling hypotheses, and tax hypotheses. Our evidence supports the contracting-cost hypotheses. Consistent with Myers (1977), firms with more growth options in their investment opportunity sets have less long-term debt in their capital structure. Large firms and regulated firms have more long-term debt. The evidence on signaling hypotheses is mixed. We find limited evidence that firms use debt maturity to signal information to the market. However, our evidence is consistent with a pooling equilibrium in which firms with larger potential information asymmetries (measured by the amount of growth options in their investment opportunity sets) issue more short-term debt. Our evidence also suggests a nonmonotonic relation between credit standing and debt maturity as predicted by Diamond (1993). We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity. We develop the hypotheses in Section I and describe our data in Section II. In Section III, we test hypotheses about variation in debt maturity structure, and in Section IV, we examine the robustness of our results. We present our conclusions in Section V.
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