Corporate taxes, strategic default, and the cost of debt

Bankruptcy, 2016

Regulators have sought since the 2008 financial crisis to further strengthen the financial system. Yet a core source of weakness and a powerful additional instrument for strengthening the financial system persists unchanged and absent from the regulatory agenda — namely the relentless impact of the corporate tax on the choice between risky debt and safer equity. The tax penalty for equity and the concomitant boost for debt undermines the capital adequacy efforts that have been central to the post-crisis reform agenda. Yet this result is not inevitable.By repurposing tax tools used elsewhere in the world, we show how the safety-undermining impact of the current corporate tax can be ended or even reversed. The best trade-off of goals and practical potential is, first, to reduce the corporate income tax burden on bank equity levels above the required minimum, by according an imputed deduction for the cost of equity capital above the regulatory-required amount. This tax benefit can then...

2014

We study the relation between leverage and corporate tax rates using an extensive data set constructed from all corporate income tax returns filed with the IRS from 1926 to 2009. This data set includes financial statement data from millions of private and public corporations of all sizes. We show that corporate leverage has increased significantly over the past century. We find strong evidence that changes in corporate leverage are directly related to changes in corporate tax rates for all but the smallest firms. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables for the costs of financial distress, corporate liquidity, and capital market and macroeconomic conditions. The adjustment of leverage to changes in corporate tax rates is slower for smaller firms facing financial constraints. We find that the capital structures of the smallest firms are driven much more by external shocks than is the case for larger firms.

1988

A new empirical method and data set are used to study the effects of tax policy on corporate financing choices. Clear evidence emerges that non-debt tax shields "crowd out" interest deductibility, thus decreasing the desirability of debt issues at the margin. Previous studies which failed to find tax effects examined debt-equity ratios rather than individual, well-specified financing choices. This paper also demonstrates the importance of controlling for confounding effects which other papers ignored. Results on other (asymmetric information) effects on financing decisions are also presented.

In this study, we use cross-sectional regressions to estimate the value of the debt tax shield. Recognizing that debt is correlated with the value of operations along nontax dimensions, we estimate reverse regressions in which we regress future profitability on firm value and debt rather than regressing firm value on debt and profitability. Reversing the regressions mitigates bias and facilitates the use of market information to control for differences in risk and expected growth. Our estimated value for the debt tax shield is approximately 40 percent~10 percent! of debt balances~firm value!, net of the personal tax disadvantage of debt.

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980

A model of corporate financial policy (debt-equity ratios and dividend payout rates) is included in the Harberger general equilibrium model of incidence of the corporate income tax. Illustrative calcultions of the distortions of financial policy and increases in risk premiums induced by the corporate tax are provided. Because risk premiums on corporate securities would be reduced, eliminating the corporate tax or integrating it into the personal tax would increase the income of noncorporate investors relatively more than that of investors in corporate securities, and is therefore less regressive than is commonly thought.

Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 2020

We examine the impact of aggregate tax policy uncertainty on firm-level default risk. Due to uncertainties associated with tax policies, firms could have difficulties in determining their optimal debt level and use too much debt to increase their values. This can increase firms’ financial risk and default probabilities. At the same time, tax policy uncertainty may lead some firms to take less risk which could lower their use of debt and in turn lower the probability of default. We find that tax policy uncertainty is positively associated with firms’ expected default probabilities. In terms of economic significance, our findings show an increase of 14.83% in expected default probability, on a relative basis. Our results are robust to controlling for conditions of the economy, conditions of the stock market, financial constraints of firms, and credit quality of firms. Our evidence adds to two strands of research: research on taxation and firms’ risk profiles and the impact of policy u...

IMF Working Papers, 2013

This paper explores whether corporate tax bias toward debt finance differs between banks and nonbanks, using a large panel of micro data. On average, it finds that there is no significant difference. The marginal tax effect for both banks and non-banks is close to 0.2. However, the responsiveness differs considerably across the size distribution and the conditional leverage distribution. For nonbanks, we find a U-shaped relationship between asset size and tax responsiveness, although this pattern does not hold universally across the conditional leverage distribution. For banks, in contrast, the tax responsiveness declines linearly in asset size. Quantile regressions show further that capitaltight banks are significantly less responsive than are capital-abundant banks; the same pattern holds for the largest non-banks. Still, even the largest banks with high conditional leverage ratios feature a significant, positive tax response.

2013

That most corporate tax systems favor debt over equity finance is now widely recognized as, potentially, amplifying risks to financial stability. This paper makes a first attempt to explore, empirically, the link between this tax bias and the probability of financial crisis. It finds that greater tax bias is associated with significantly higher aggregate bank leverage, and that this in turn is associated with a significantly greater chance of crisis. The implication is that tax bias makes crises much more likely, and, conversely, that the welfare gains from policies to alleviate it can be substantial-far greater than previous studies, which have ignored financial stability considerations, suggest.

IMF Working Papers

This paper investigates the role of tax incentives towards debt finance in the buildup of leverage in the nonfinancial corporate (NFC) sector, using a large firm-level dataset. We find that so-called debt bias is a significant driver of leverage, for both small and medium-sized enterprises and larger firms, with its effect accounting for about a quarter of leverage. The strength of this effect differs with firm size, the availability of collateral, income and income volatility, cash flow, and capital intensity. We conclude that leveling the playing field between debt and equity finance through tax policy reform would decrease NFC leverage, reducing economic risks posited by leverage

The Journal of Finance, 1984

This paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the question, "What magnitude tax advantage to debt s consistent with the range of observed corporate debt ratios?" We incorporate into the model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. We conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. When it is possible for the value of the underlying assets to junip discretely to zero, differences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. Moreover, if the tax advantage to debt is small, the annual rate of return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of debt-to-firm value ratios.