CHINA'S NPC: WHAT TO EXPECT

MERICS China Monitor , 2017

In the tradition of the socialist councils of people’s deputies, China’s people’s congresses are supposed to be supreme state organs where the legislative, executive, and judicial functions converge. In contrast to parliaments in western democracies, socialist states practice concentration of power instead of separation of power. Before 1978, the NPC was a feeble legislature without decisive influence on China’s national law making. After this critical year for China’s opening-up and reform, the CCP repeatedly called for a stronger role for the legislature in upgrading China’s legal system to accommodate the new economic conditions. In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the importance of following legal rules. Jiang Zemin advocated “ruling the country by law” in the 1990s. And Xi Jinping’s immediate predecessor at the helm of the CCP, Hu Jintao, insisted that all state and private entities abide by the constitution. On the organizational side, the number of permanent staff has increased considerably, benefiting the law-making capacities of the legislature. However, there had always been clear constraints on the NPC, as the focus of its activities was more to support China’s economic regulation than to supervise government activities. After Xi Jinping took the helm of the CCP in November 2012, this situation was bound to change. Xi Jinping identified wide-spread corruption and arbitrary measures by government units as major threats to the CCP’s legitimacy and China’s overall political stability. By pledging to “constrain power within a cage,” Xi emphasized the role of law in curbing the ineffectiveness of executive bodies in implementing the will of the CCP’s top leadership and bypassing bureaucratic turf wars among State Council organs. This agenda aims to appease widespread discontent about corruption and social injustice and ultimately uphold the authority of the CCP as the governing party. Presumably, the NPC will take over some of these responsibilities as mandated by the CCP Central Committee. The goal is to au- thorize the NPC and its Standing Committee as the law-making body acting on behalf of the Party’s top leadership and its priority agendas.

2013

University of Nottingham, China Policy …, 2008

The China Policy Institute, part of the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at The University of Nottingham, was set up to analyse critical policy challenges faced by China in its rapid development. Its goals are to help expand the knowledge and understanding of contemporary China in Britain, Europe and worldwide, to help build a more informed dialogue between China and the UK and Europe, and to contribute to government and business strategies.

Briefing Series, 2007

The China Policy Institute was set up to analyse critical policy challenges faced by China in its rapid development. Its goals are to help expand the knowledge and understanding of contemporary China in Britain, Europe and worldwide, to help build a more informed dialogue between China and the UK and Europe, and to contribute to government and business strategies.

The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 2003

The urbanization and the structural and institutional changes that have taken place in China in the past two decades have resulted in the collapse of the old system and the germination of a tremendous number of irregularities. To redress the malfeasance brought about by the new decentralization of economic resources, the People's Congresses (PCs) are taking the lead in another round of incremental political reforms. The combination of specialization and centralization of leadership has led to an augmentation of legislative oversight. Measures developed by the legislative institutions, such as pingyi (evaluation) and zhifa jiancha (inspection of implementation of laws), have enlivened a lethargic local political scene and given rise to the committee autonomy. These political reforms have transformed local politics forever, forcing the central government to follow suit. The urgent need for institutional mechanisms to counter the vices associated with socialist market reform has pr...

China Perspectives, 2003

MERICS China Monitor , 2017

The decisions presented at the 19th Party Congress will define China’s future path. When meeting in Beijing in late autumn 2017, the 2,300 delegates will have to fulfill two key tasks: they will endorse the political report comprising the CCP’s strategic goals for the time until 2022, and they will elect a new Central Com- mittee. More importantly for power politics at the center, the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee will change as a result of the party congress and a “successor-in-training” might be elevated to a top position so as to take over from Xi in 2022. The party congress thus will be an occasion at which to assess the state of China’s political system. On the eve of the most important event in China’s five- year political calendar, Xi seems to stand at the height of his power. But how far does this power reach? The upcoming personnel decisions during and in the wake of the party congress and the content of the political report will provide hints concerning the real extent of Xi’s power and his ability to shape China’s political agenda for the next five years and beyond.

2021

Every five years, the most senior members of the Chinese Communist Party gather to make important decisions on leadership succession and the direction of the country. The 19th Party Congress has just concluded in Beijing, leaving spectators with some new Communist Party buzzwords and much speculation about the future of Xi Jinping’s leadership. We asked four China experts what they see as the key takeaways from this historic event.