European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012

The present work discusses some of the main epistemological views of the later Wittgenstein, as developed in the notes written in the last eighteen months of Wittgenstein’s life and posthumously published in "On Certainty" (1969). Chapter 1 introduces the issues that occupied Wittgenstein in those months. Hence, after presenting a typical radical sceptical argument, I briefly discuss the two articles by G. E. Moore – “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External World” (1939) – which prompted Wittgenstein’s reflections, as well as Norman Malcolm’s (1949) “Defending Common Sense”. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the discussion of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore and to his grammatical investigation on the use of “know”. Here I engage critically with the "framework reading" of "On Certainty" and more specifically with the thesis according to which Wittgenstein maintained that when Moore claimed to know the truisms of common sense, he ended up producing nonsense. In chapter 3 I take issue with another tenet upheld by some members of the framework reading, namely, the idea that Moore’s common-sense propositions (also known as “hinge propositions”) are (and were held by Wittgenstein to be) grammatical proposition. I point out that this thesis has little textual support and is at odds with Wittgenstein’s overall conception of grammar. In chapter 4 and 5 I engage in two debates concerning the relations between Wittgenstein’s reflections in "On Certainty" and some traditional epistemological positions, namely foundationalism (chapter 4) and relativism (chapter 5). In chapter 4 I argue against the idea that "On Certainty" shows Wittgenstein putting forth a sui generis foundationalist theory of knowledge. In chapter 5 I distinguish between conceptual and epistemic relativism, and I endorse the view that Wittgenstein is correctly described as a conceptual relativist. Then I argue that, although the textual evidence is not decisive and different interpretative lines remain possible, the relevant passages in "On Certainty" do not commit Wittgenstein to epistemic relativism.

Philosophical Investigations, 2003

Simply Charly, 2014

The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd Edition Michael Starks, 2019

On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with barely a mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) like all analysis of W, they fall short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advance in describing behavior, suffering from the near universal tunnel vision and failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal form here. After doing this I will give brief comments on each article in this book of varied perspectives on W’s work. Since this review appeared, DMS and Coliva have written brilliant articles on Wittgenstein’s OC which are mandatory reading. Also, a mostly excellent volume by Hamilton “Wittgenstein and On Certainty” (2014) has been published. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019) and ,The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd

Ricerche di Pedagogia e Didattica – Journal of Theories and Research in Education, 9, 1 (2014), pp. 51-68, 2014

This paper offers a philosophical outlook on the subject of the communication of certainty and uncertainty, by focusing on the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s image of “hinges”. Hinges are basic common sense certainties which ordinarily “go without saying”. In a sense, they even require not to be said. Lingering over the debate on the ineffability of hinges which is at the core of the Wittgensteinian secondary literature, but also hinting at some studies in psychopathology, the paper argues that in extraordinary contexts to assert explicitly a hinge-certainty is possible and may be important, while in ordinary contexts certainty can only be communicated through silence: when a certainty which “goes without saying” is explicitly said, the situation paradoxically results in uncertainty.

Philosophy Study , 2019

In this paper, the transformative and critical potential of the groundlessness of praxis–a central issue in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty–is outlined. It argues that the groundlessness of human praxis entails neither a relativistic nor a foundationalistic epistemological position. On the contrary, following Stanley Cavell and a “resolute reading” of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it claims that Wittgenstein’s aim is to let us acknowledge that both epistemological foundationalism and epistemic relativism are apparent needs, so as to invite us to change our practical way of acting. From this perspective, this paper suggests that Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy addresses the readers and involves a transformation of their own practical attitude and way of acting.

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy

Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017)

On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with barely a mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) like all analysis of W, they fall short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advance in describing behavior, suffering from the near universal tunnel vision and failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal form here. After doing this I will give brief comments on each article in this book of varied perspectives on W’s work. Since this review appeared, DMS has written brilliant articles on Wittgenstein’s OC which are mandatory reading. Also, a mostly excellent volume by Hamilton “Wittgenstein and On Certainty” (2014) has been published. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019)

2005

Does Wittgenstein’s On Certainty point to a sustained treatment of philosophical problems about knowledge and justification of the kind that Philosophical Investigations supplies for matters of mind, language and their relation to the world? Some of the reasons for pessimism are systematic. Casting about for why Moore’s pronouncements about the external world and his knowledge thereof, as well as sceptical doubts concerning them, are prone to strike him at one time as nonsense, at another as perfectly intelligible, Wittgenstein acknowledges that ‘it is…difficult to find the beginning. Or better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning’ (OC 471). A little earlier, struggling with the idea that ‘propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts’ (OC 401), he dismisses this way of talking as ‘thoroughly bad’ (OC 402) and complains, ‘I cannot yet say the thing I really want to say’ (OC 400).