Sartre, the Look, and the Cogito

Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy, 2017

Being and Nothingness is extraordinarily rich and highly original. At its core, I argue, lies an insight into the aporetic character of intersubjectivity-«the scandal of the plurality of consciousnesses», as Sartre puts it-which emerges most clearly in his critique of Hegel's theory of intersubjectivity. My aim in this paper is to isolate this thesis of Sartre's and spell out his grounds for it. I argue furthermore that Hegel's conception of intersubjectivity corresponds to that of natural consciousness, such that, in rejecting Hegel, Sartre is also impugning the reality of a conception integral to ordinary thought. I suggest that Sartre's insight also holds the key to his distinctive approach to social and political theory in the Critique of Dialectical Reason.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1986

Continental Philosophy Review, 1996

Human Studies, 1991

2012

" In Sartre’s early consideration of art, are the imaginative universe and reality separate? Does Sartre underemphasize the materiality of artwork? The present paper holds that to answer this question in the affirmative would be a mistake. First, I will contend that Sartre’s notion of “the denial of the existence of the object of aesthetic appreciation” does not mean not to see artwork. Second, by examining the concepts of “pre-willing spontaneity,” “degradation” and “motivation” in Sartre’s theory of the image, I will clarify how the mental image and the voluntary image differ. In the experience of art, the reality of an artwork is held behind the imaginary that is the object of appreciation. Finally, I will address the proximity of the experience of art to reality, compared with the act of dreaming. Naturally, to dream and to experience art are both experiences of the captivated consciousness. Moreover, both involve the imaginary. Sartre too has made mention of the similarity between the two. But, in The Imaginary (1943), Sartre also highlights the differences between the two: the ontological state of the analogon, the awareness of possibility of reflection, and the nature of affectivity. In Sartre’s philosophy, the reality of artwork plays an effective role in the act of appreciation."

Ontological Landscapes, 2011

In Being and Nothingness (1943) Sartre includes a grounding-breaking chapter on 'the body' which treats of the body under three headings: 'the body as being for-itself: facticity', 'the body-for-others', and 'the third ontological dimension of the body'. Sartre's phenomenology of the body has, in general, been neglected. In this essay, I want to revisit Sartre's conception of embodiment. I shall argue that Sartre, even more than Merleau-Ponty, is the phenomenologist par excellence of the flesh (Ia chair) and of intersubjective intercorporeity while emphasising that touching oneself is a merely contingent feature and not 'the foundation for a study of corporeality'.

Penultimate Draft. To appear in Matthew Eshleman, Christophe Perrin and Constance Mui eds., The Sartrean Mind (New York: Routledge)

This paper examines the ideas of consciousness, intentionality and pre-reflective awareness as they feature in Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Consciousness is nothingness in the sense that no intentional object of awareness can ever be part of consciousness. Intentional directedness towards an object is a form of revealing activity in which an object is presented as being a certain way. This activity is underwritten by a mastery of the relations between environmental and bodily contingencies and the resulting consequences for appearance of the intentional object. Pre-reflective awareness is built in to intentional directedness towards the world in virtue of the fact that many, perhaps all, of the contingencies that underwrite such directedness are ones in which the conscious subject is implicated. All three of these ideas are offered both as interpretations Sartre’s view, and also as claims in their own right which, I suspect, stand a very good chance of being true.