Trusted Computing and DRM
2015, International series on intelligent systems, control and automation: science and engineering
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18302-2_13Abstract
Trusted Computing is a special branch of computer security. One branch of computer security involves protection of systems against external attacks. In that branch we include all methods that are used by system owners against external attackers, for example Firewalls, IDS, IPS etc. In all those cases the system owner installs software that uses its own means to determine if a remote user is malicious and terminates the attack. (Such means can be very simple such as detecting signatures of attacks or very complex such as machine learning and detecting anomalies in the usage pattern of the remote user). Another branch of attacks requires protection by the system owner against internal users. Such attacks include prevention of users to read each other's data, use more than their allotted share of resources etc. To some extent anti-virus/anti-spam software is also included here. All password protection and used management software are included in this branch. The third branch, Trusted Computing, involves the verification of a remote host that the user machine will behave in a certain predictable way, i.e. protection against the current owner of the machine. The most common example for this kind of requirement is distribution of digital media. Digital media is distributed in some conditional access mode (rented, pay per view, sold for personal use, etc.). Obtaining digital media usually does not entitle the user to unlimited rights. The user usually may not redistribute or edit the digital media and may not even be allowed to consume it himself after a certain date. (Media rentals, pay per view) However, as the user is consuming media on his private machine. How can the media provider assure himself that a malicious user does not tamper with the machine so that contents are not replicated? The problem of security against the owner of the machine is the problem region of Trusted Computing. In trusted computing as opposed to other branches of security the "attacker" is not limited to some attack surface that was exposed to him but can also use a soldering iron to tap into busses, replace chips and other system parts etc. Trusted computing also includes other protection tools against the current owner (or possessor of the machine if not the legal owner). For example protection of
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