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Outline

Title
Abstract
Figures
Overview
Geographic Scope
Thematic Scope
Methodology and Assessment Process
Questionnaires
Specifying Objective and Designing Methodology
Formulating Recommendations
Arctic Trends and Their Implications
Online Questionnaires
Scope and Pace of Climate Change in the Arctic
Economic and Social Benefits: Snøhvit Case
Sámi Perspective on Mining -Case of Gállok
Recommendations to the Eu
Introduction
Main Implications of Socio-Cultural Changes
Recommendations
References
All Topics
Political Science
Comparative Politics

The European Union and the Arctic Region

Profile image of Adam StepienAdam StepienProfile image of Timo KoivurovaTimo Koivurova

2014, The Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic: An assessment conducted for the European Union Report

Abstract
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The paper discusses the implications of increasing human activities in the Arctic region, primarily driven by climate change, and how these changes impact local economies, indigenous peoples, and the environment. It highlights the shift from traditional subsistence activities to wage labor and international influence, while raising concerns about food security, health risks, and infrastructure vulnerability. The analysis seeks to inform EU policymakers on effective strategies for sustainable development in the Arctic.

Figures (83)
Factsheets
Factsheets
Figure ES1: E?APERIAFIE Ammiabl HPI] PIE 2014. Executive Summary
Figure ES1: E?APERIAFIE Ammiabl HPI] PIE 2014. Executive Summary
In the context of the globalised world economy, the demand for the region’s renewable and non-renewable resources is currently the main factor affecting economic activities in the Arctic. Significant fluctuations of resource prices have a critical influence on development trends, especially in the case of extractive industries. Enhancing dialogue between Arctic actors, experts and EU policy-makers was a focus. Therefore, involving Arctic stakeholders through workshops, an online questionnaire and direct outreach comprised a key component of the study. The authors developed recommendations by building on ideas proposed by stakeholders. The influence of markets and climate change impacts may be sometimes outmatched by the role of regulatory frameworks and administrative or political decisions, such as the opening of new areas for oil and gas exploration and legislation pertaining to reindeer herding or nature protection.
In the context of the globalised world economy, the demand for the region’s renewable and non-renewable resources is currently the main factor affecting economic activities in the Arctic. Significant fluctuations of resource prices have a critical influence on development trends, especially in the case of extractive industries. Enhancing dialogue between Arctic actors, experts and EU policy-makers was a focus. Therefore, involving Arctic stakeholders through workshops, an online questionnaire and direct outreach comprised a key component of the study. The authors developed recommendations by building on ideas proposed by stakeholders. The influence of markets and climate change impacts may be sometimes outmatched by the role of regulatory frameworks and administrative or political decisions, such as the opening of new areas for oil and gas exploration and legislation pertaining to reindeer herding or nature protection.
Numerous uncertainties and the dynamic nature of the social-environmental systems in the Arctic require an in-depth understanding of the physical, biological and social processes at play. The findings of EU-funded research should be better communicated to EU decision-makers, Arctic stakeholders and the EU public at large in formats that are adjusted to the needs and capacities of particular audiences. In addition, integrated assessments are among the key elements of a more comprehensive understanding of Arctic change is to carry out, which bring together environmental, social and economic issues and bridge the knowledge gap between science, policy-makers and stakeholders. The gradual opening of Arctic sea routes will be important for European transport and shipbuilding industries. The region’s fisheries are a significant food source. The EU imports Arctic oil and natural gas to meet its energy needs. Northern Fennoscandia is one of the main regions for EU domestic production of minerals. The cultures of European Arctic peoples, especially the Sami — the EU’s only recognised indigenous group — are an indispensable part of Europe’s cultural diversity.
Numerous uncertainties and the dynamic nature of the social-environmental systems in the Arctic require an in-depth understanding of the physical, biological and social processes at play. The findings of EU-funded research should be better communicated to EU decision-makers, Arctic stakeholders and the EU public at large in formats that are adjusted to the needs and capacities of particular audiences. In addition, integrated assessments are among the key elements of a more comprehensive understanding of Arctic change is to carry out, which bring together environmental, social and economic issues and bridge the knowledge gap between science, policy-makers and stakeholders. The gradual opening of Arctic sea routes will be important for European transport and shipbuilding industries. The region’s fisheries are a significant food source. The EU imports Arctic oil and natural gas to meet its energy needs. Northern Fennoscandia is one of the main regions for EU domestic production of minerals. The cultures of European Arctic peoples, especially the Sami — the EU’s only recognised indigenous group — are an indispensable part of Europe’s cultural diversity.
The EU should contribute to improved regulation of Arctic shipping by supporting high standards in the Polar Code, supplemented by additional measures to address invasive species, heavy fuel oil and emissions to air. The European Commission should follow the current discussions on heavy fuel oil within the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment working group of the Arctic Council.
The EU should contribute to improved regulation of Arctic shipping by supporting high standards in the Polar Code, supplemented by additional measures to address invasive species, heavy fuel oil and emissions to air. The European Commission should follow the current discussions on heavy fuel oil within the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment working group of the Arctic Council.
The EU can improve management in the light of the Common Fisheries Policy reform and contribute to enhanced co- operation, information sharing and research, with inclusion of local and traditional knowledge. EU efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing should be further strengthened. The EU should address the need to reduce fishing capacity by decreasing incentives for economically unsustainable fisheries.
The EU can improve management in the light of the Common Fisheries Policy reform and contribute to enhanced co- operation, information sharing and research, with inclusion of local and traditional knowledge. EU efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing should be further strengthened. The EU should address the need to reduce fishing capacity by decreasing incentives for economically unsustainable fisheries.
There is a need for enhanced information exchange between Arctic local and regional actors and EU institutions. Stronger inclusion of social aspects and challenges in the EU frameworks for impact assessment as well as in dialogue with Arctic partners including Russia is advised.
There is a need for enhanced information exchange between Arctic local and regional actors and EU institutions. Stronger inclusion of social aspects and challenges in the EU frameworks for impact assessment as well as in dialogue with Arctic partners including Russia is advised.
An EU focus on entrepreneurship and innovation within co-operation and cohesion programmes should be continued and strengthened, with greater attention to gender issues and indigenous peoples. In particular, the activism of dynamic indigenous youth should be supported. Intra-regional accessibility and connectivity, including challenging cross-border projects, must not be neglected in the light of a focus on core-periphery connections within frameworks such as the Trans-European Transport network. The special characteristics and needs of Arctic cities and their importance for regional development need to be taken into account in EU policies and programmes.
An EU focus on entrepreneurship and innovation within co-operation and cohesion programmes should be continued and strengthened, with greater attention to gender issues and indigenous peoples. In particular, the activism of dynamic indigenous youth should be supported. Intra-regional accessibility and connectivity, including challenging cross-border projects, must not be neglected in the light of a focus on core-periphery connections within frameworks such as the Trans-European Transport network. The special characteristics and needs of Arctic cities and their importance for regional development need to be taken into account in EU policies and programmes.
Figure 3.1: Climate Change in the Arctic: Drivers and Impacts 1. IPCC (2013), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribu- tion of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmen- tal Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M., Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. & Midgley, P.M. (eds.)]. Uncertainties regarding various driving mechanisms, evolution and specific impacts of Arctic climate change remain. More long-term observations are needed to improve climate-related predictions in the Arctic.
Figure 3.1: Climate Change in the Arctic: Drivers and Impacts 1. IPCC (2013), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribu- tion of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmen- tal Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M., Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. & Midgley, P.M. (eds.)]. Uncertainties regarding various driving mechanisms, evolution and specific impacts of Arctic climate change remain. More long-term observations are needed to improve climate-related predictions in the Arctic.
Figure 3.2: Al&# ii2ice Ele: B) 013. Note: Alat fbcean with at least 15% sea-ice. The dark grey shows the average fol 1981 — 2010; light grey shading represents standard deviations. Source: US National Snow and Ice Data Center, 2013.
Figure 3.2: Al&# ii2ice Ele: B) 013. Note: Alat fbcean with at least 15% sea-ice. The dark grey shows the average fol 1981 — 2010; light grey shading represents standard deviations. Source: US National Snow and Ice Data Center, 2013.
Figure 3.4: Gi: Eltetilae Ice Mass Loss and Sea Level Equivalent 3.3 Drivers
Figure 3.4: Gi: Eltetilae Ice Mass Loss and Sea Level Equivalent 3.3 Drivers
Figure 3.5: Flaliigiiate System and Main Forcing Mechanisms on Our Atmosphere Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, 2001. (Downloaded from www.windows2universe.org).
Figure 3.5: Flaliigiiate System and Main Forcing Mechanisms on Our Atmosphere Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, 2001. (Downloaded from www.windows2universe.org).
Picture 3.1: Polar Bears Depend on Sea Ice Photo: NOAA National Ocean Service. Picture 3.1: Polar Bears Depend on Sea Ice 7. ACIA (2004). Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment.
Picture 3.1: Polar Bears Depend on Sea Ice Photo: NOAA National Ocean Service. Picture 3.1: Polar Bears Depend on Sea Ice 7. ACIA (2004). Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment.
Picture 3.2: Ice Road and Skiing Trails on GRIBERIRPRO- vaniemi, Finland. Ice and winter roads are an element of the transport network. Due to mild winters and changes in hydro- power systems, it has not been possible to establish ice roads in some locations in Lapland during the past decade. Photo: Ilona Mettidinen, Arctic Centre.
Picture 3.2: Ice Road and Skiing Trails on GRIBERIRPRO- vaniemi, Finland. Ice and winter roads are an element of the transport network. Due to mild winters and changes in hydro- power systems, it has not been possible to establish ice roads in some locations in Lapland during the past decade. Photo: Ilona Mettidinen, Arctic Centre.
Notes: in thousands tonnes of CO2 equivalent. The data does not include land use, land use change and forestry, which for the EU constitute negative emissions (-304 mln t). Sources: European Environment Agency 2014; Arctic Portal. (Figure modified in February 2015).
Notes: in thousands tonnes of CO2 equivalent. The data does not include land use, land use change and forestry, which for the EU constitute negative emissions (-304 mln t). Sources: European Environment Agency 2014; Arctic Portal. (Figure modified in February 2015).
Figure 4.2: Total Annual Cargo Volumes on the Northern Sea Route. Data include intra, destinational and transit traffic. Source: NSR Information Centre, 2013.
Figure 4.2: Total Annual Cargo Volumes on the Northern Sea Route. Data include intra, destinational and transit traffic. Source: NSR Information Centre, 2013.
HOWE! CHG JUF INOIN SITICE INEF 16 UW IUlIGe! VUYUYE (FIiguic 2.1}, Sources: Midgard M, et al. (2009 - 2011); NSR Information Centre (2012, 2013). Numbers of NSR transits are lower than in original source because destinational voyages have been excluded.
HOWE! CHG JUF INOIN SITICE INEF 16 UW IUlIGe! VUYUYE (FIiguic 2.1}, Sources: Midgard M, et al. (2009 - 2011); NSR Information Centre (2012, 2013). Numbers of NSR transits are lower than in original source because destinational voyages have been excluded.
4.3.2 Trans-Arctic Shipping is Emerging 4.3.3 Uneven Regional Developments of Cruise Tourism
4.3.2 Trans-Arctic Shipping is Emerging 4.3.3 Uneven Regional Developments of Cruise Tourism
Figure 4.4: Trends and Shaping Factors for Arctic Shipping
Figure 4.4: Trends and Shaping Factors for Arctic Shipping
Figure 4.6: Modelled Routes Physically Accessible for Ships Sailing in September Between the Bering Strait and St. Croix in Canada or Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Current conditions are on the left, mid-century conditions under a modest climate scenario (RCP 4.5) on the right. Red routes are for moderately ice-strengthened ships, blue routes for ordinary vessels. The lines do not indicate traffic levels, just physical accessibility. Source: Smith and Stephenson, 2013.
Figure 4.6: Modelled Routes Physically Accessible for Ships Sailing in September Between the Bering Strait and St. Croix in Canada or Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Current conditions are on the left, mid-century conditions under a modest climate scenario (RCP 4.5) on the right. Red routes are for moderately ice-strengthened ships, blue routes for ordinary vessels. The lines do not indicate traffic levels, just physical accessibility. Source: Smith and Stephenson, 2013.
Picture 4.1: Double-acting Cargo Vessel Used for Shuttle Transport between Murmansk and Dudinka me +. bs. ww ae Shipping technology for ice conditions has evolved, with advances in areas such as new propulsion systems, winterisation of equipment and workplaces, and concepts for oblique icebreakers. For example, the double-acting
Picture 4.1: Double-acting Cargo Vessel Used for Shuttle Transport between Murmansk and Dudinka me +. bs. ww ae Shipping technology for ice conditions has evolved, with advances in areas such as new propulsion systems, winterisation of equipment and workplaces, and concepts for oblique icebreakers. For example, the double-acting
Figure 4.7: Distance Savings for Voyages along the Northeast Passage Compared with the Suez Canal Source: Arctic Portal, based on DNV GL. Figure 4.7: Distance Savings for Voyages along the Northeast Passage Compared with the Suez Canal
Figure 4.7: Distance Savings for Voyages along the Northeast Passage Compared with the Suez Canal Source: Arctic Portal, based on DNV GL. Figure 4.7: Distance Savings for Voyages along the Northeast Passage Compared with the Suez Canal
Shipping Emissions and Climate Change Figure 4.8: Shipping EatamPeliaitite Change Source: Second IMO GHG Stuady.*®
Shipping Emissions and Climate Change Figure 4.8: Shipping EatamPeliaitite Change Source: Second IMO GHG Stuady.*®
Figure 4.9: Maritime Zones. The right to regulate navigation of ships varies between the maritime zones, as defined in the UN Law of the Sea Convention. Source: Norwegian Polar Institute.
Figure 4.9: Maritime Zones. The right to regulate navigation of ships varies between the maritime zones, as defined in the UN Law of the Sea Convention. Source: Norwegian Polar Institute.
Picture 4.2: Vladimir Tikhonov (160 000 DW tons) is the largest vessel so far to transverse the NSR. It established a new sea lan outside the New Siberian Islands in 2011. Photo: Maritime Executive.
Picture 4.2: Vladimir Tikhonov (160 000 DW tons) is the largest vessel so far to transverse the NSR. It established a new sea lan outside the New Siberian Islands in 2011. Photo: Maritime Executive.
Picture 4.3: Icing of Vessels Due to Sea Spray is a Seriou. Challenge. Photo: William Mowitt, NOAA. The Arctic is a frontier region for shipping. Sea-ice and environmental conditions such as polar lows, temperatures and darkness are challenging. There is scant infrastructure to service maritime transport. Vast areas must be covered by search and rescue capacities and preparedness to cope with accidents and incidents. Seafarers with sufficient training are scarce. Discharges of oil and the introduction of alien species are environmental risks of particular concern. These additional risks must be overcome for Arctic shipping to become safe and secure.
Picture 4.3: Icing of Vessels Due to Sea Spray is a Seriou. Challenge. Photo: William Mowitt, NOAA. The Arctic is a frontier region for shipping. Sea-ice and environmental conditions such as polar lows, temperatures and darkness are challenging. There is scant infrastructure to service maritime transport. Vast areas must be covered by search and rescue capacities and preparedness to cope with accidents and incidents. Seafarers with sufficient training are scarce. Discharges of oil and the introduction of alien species are environmental risks of particular concern. These additional risks must be overcome for Arctic shipping to become safe and secure.
Picture 4.4: H@ififlss cruise tourism, Magdalenefjord, Spitz - bergen, Svalbard. Photo: Peter Prokosh. Gad-Arendal 20127.
Picture 4.4: H@ififlss cruise tourism, Magdalenefjord, Spitz - bergen, Svalbard. Photo: Peter Prokosh. Gad-Arendal 20127.
Picture 4.5: Sinking Maksim Gea The cruise ship Maksim Gorkij hit an ice floe SW of Svalbard in perfect weather 19 June 1989 and sprang a leak. A Norwegian coast guard vessel happened to be just 4 hours away. When arriving, almost 400 passengers had been evacuated, some of them waiting for rescue on ice floes. Due to a series of fortunate circumstances, all 954 passengers, the crew and the ship were salvaged. Maksim Gorkij Accident in 1989
Picture 4.5: Sinking Maksim Gea The cruise ship Maksim Gorkij hit an ice floe SW of Svalbard in perfect weather 19 June 1989 and sprang a leak. A Norwegian coast guard vessel happened to be just 4 hours away. When arriving, almost 400 passengers had been evacuated, some of them waiting for rescue on ice floes. Due to a series of fortunate circumstances, all 954 passengers, the crew and the ship were salvaged. Maksim Gorkij Accident in 1989
Picture 4.6: Maskim Giiplag&&engers waiting for the rescue on an ice floe. Photo: Odd Mydland. 4.11.3 Better Knowledge Through Research, Monitoring and Assessment The EU and its member states have long-standing
Picture 4.6: Maskim Giiplag&&engers waiting for the rescue on an ice floe. Photo: Odd Mydland. 4.11.3 Better Knowledge Through Research, Monitoring and Assessment The EU and its member states have long-standing
Figure 5.3: Variability of Northeast Adiii#iR@cruitment (three-year-old cod), 1946-2010 Source: ICES, 2012.
Figure 5.3: Variability of Northeast Adiii#iR@cruitment (three-year-old cod), 1946-2010 Source: ICES, 2012.
Picture 5.1: Aquaculture Site for Salmon in Troms County, Norway Do 8 RE ET eee ee REG can be relative ly well anucipatead, but the uncertainty iiagarding how these parameters will change is high. The y~eesilience of the aquaculture industry to climate change is higher than control of prod that of capture fisheries thanks to the uction, location, population density and food availability."” Impacts will depend on the industry’s capacity to ada pt to new circumstances, accessibility to new production areas, existing regulations and markets. Significant envi displacement of ronmental changes may lead to spatial aquaculture production, thereby posing other challenges and opening up new opportunities. Increased tem peratures could lead to more activity in peripheral areas, such as in Arctic Russia, but could also lead to increased disease risk related to higher temperatures in the southern periphery of aquaculture in the Arctic, along with lower growth rates for cold and temperate water species like salmon.
Picture 5.1: Aquaculture Site for Salmon in Troms County, Norway Do 8 RE ET eee ee REG can be relative ly well anucipatead, but the uncertainty iiagarding how these parameters will change is high. The y~eesilience of the aquaculture industry to climate change is higher than control of prod that of capture fisheries thanks to the uction, location, population density and food availability."” Impacts will depend on the industry’s capacity to ada pt to new circumstances, accessibility to new production areas, existing regulations and markets. Significant envi displacement of ronmental changes may lead to spatial aquaculture production, thereby posing other challenges and opening up new opportunities. Increased tem peratures could lead to more activity in peripheral areas, such as in Arctic Russia, but could also lead to increased disease risk related to higher temperatures in the southern periphery of aquaculture in the Arctic, along with lower growth rates for cold and temperate water species like salmon.
Table 5.1: Fisheries Management Systems in the Arctic (+ = yes; - = no) Source: Valtysson, Szevaldsson and Bjérnsson, 2014.
Table 5.1: Fisheries Management Systems in the Arctic (+ = yes; - = no) Source: Valtysson, Szevaldsson and Bjérnsson, 2014.
Figure 5.4: North E@QEREIRGBHes Commission Convention (Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeasi Atlantic Fisheries) (dark blue) and Regulatory Area (orange, international waters beyond EEZs). 22. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 20. Cavalieri et al., (2010). EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment: Mole- naar, E. Status and Reform of International Arctic Fisheries Law. PRERARAtlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) is the regional fisheries management organisation for the northeast Atlantic, one of the most abundant fishing areas in the world. The aim is to manage the high seas, and straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The regulatory area of NEAFC is outside of the 200-mile EEZs (Figure 5.4). It is the only fisheries convention that extends to the North Pole and covers about 8% of the high seas in the central Arctic Ocean. Its aim is to ensure the long-term conservation and optimum use of the regional fishery resources to provide sustainable economic, environmental and social benefits. It adopts management measures for various fish stocks and control measures to ensure that they are properly The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the world’s oldest inter-governmental science organisation, is the leading forum for the exchange of scientific information, stock assessment and management advice for the north Atlantic fisheries. ICES provides member states (as well as NEAFC) with advice based on an ecosystem management approach. This implies a higher focus on uncertainty than in the former single species management scheme. Harvest control rules have been developed for the fish stocks assessed by ICES, which incorporate an ecosystem perspective even though full knowledge of the dynamics of these systems is lacking.”
Figure 5.4: North E@QEREIRGBHes Commission Convention (Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeasi Atlantic Fisheries) (dark blue) and Regulatory Area (orange, international waters beyond EEZs). 22. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 20. Cavalieri et al., (2010). EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment: Mole- naar, E. Status and Reform of International Arctic Fisheries Law. PRERARAtlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) is the regional fisheries management organisation for the northeast Atlantic, one of the most abundant fishing areas in the world. The aim is to manage the high seas, and straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The regulatory area of NEAFC is outside of the 200-mile EEZs (Figure 5.4). It is the only fisheries convention that extends to the North Pole and covers about 8% of the high seas in the central Arctic Ocean. Its aim is to ensure the long-term conservation and optimum use of the regional fishery resources to provide sustainable economic, environmental and social benefits. It adopts management measures for various fish stocks and control measures to ensure that they are properly The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the world’s oldest inter-governmental science organisation, is the leading forum for the exchange of scientific information, stock assessment and management advice for the north Atlantic fisheries. ICES provides member states (as well as NEAFC) with advice based on an ecosystem management approach. This implies a higher focus on uncertainty than in the former single species management scheme. Harvest control rules have been developed for the fish stocks assessed by ICES, which incorporate an ecosystem perspective even though full knowledge of the dynamics of these systems is lacking.”
Picture 5.2: Pelagic Trawlers in Iceland
Picture 5.2: Pelagic Trawlers in Iceland
Picture 6.1: EiaipfariziziRolar Pioneer’ in Tromsg, Norway. 4. Arctic Council, (2009). Sustainable Development Working Group Report 6. Hong, N. (2012). The energy factor in the Arctic dispute: a pathway to con- flict or cooperation? Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 5 (1), 13-26. 3. Harsem, ©. et al. (2013). Oil exploration and sea-ice projections in the Arc tic. Polar Record, DOI: 10.1017/S0032247413000624 5. Harsem, @., Eide, A. & Heen, K. (2011). Factors influencing future oil and gas prospects in the Arctic. Energy Policy. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.058 2. Koivurova, T. & Hossain, K. (2008). Offshore Hydrocarbon: Current Policy Context in the Marine Arctic. Arctic TRANSFORM. www.arctic-transform. org/download/OffHydBP.pdf. Accessed 10 March 2013.
Picture 6.1: EiaipfariziziRolar Pioneer’ in Tromsg, Norway. 4. Arctic Council, (2009). Sustainable Development Working Group Report 6. Hong, N. (2012). The energy factor in the Arctic dispute: a pathway to con- flict or cooperation? Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 5 (1), 13-26. 3. Harsem, ©. et al. (2013). Oil exploration and sea-ice projections in the Arc tic. Polar Record, DOI: 10.1017/S0032247413000624 5. Harsem, @., Eide, A. & Heen, K. (2011). Factors influencing future oil and gas prospects in the Arctic. Energy Policy. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.058 2. Koivurova, T. & Hossain, K. (2008). Offshore Hydrocarbon: Current Policy Context in the Marine Arctic. Arctic TRANSFORM. www.arctic-transform. org/download/OffHydBP.pdf. Accessed 10 March 2013.
Figure 6.2: Potential AP@illtind GPResources. Total assessed resources: 412 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe). NGBP Natural Gillfquids. Source: Abid Oil. FRARDMAnd GRervnort. Mav 2013 (hased on data from USGaynd the US Denartment of Enerav).
Figure 6.2: Potential AP@illtind GPResources. Total assessed resources: 412 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe). NGBP Natural Gillfquids. Source: Abid Oil. FRARDMAnd GRervnort. Mav 2013 (hased on data from USGaynd the US Denartment of Enerav).
icture 6.2: State-of-A@léchnology in Aliiilitions: Melkgya LNG Productior redit: Helge Hansen, Statoil. Picture 6.2: State-of-A@léchnology in Aaifitilitions: Melkgya LNG Production. NGEPRIS80 million of the overall deliveries to the field came from companies registered in north Norway. Assessments show that the development of Snghvit reversed declining population and employment trends in the Hammerfest area. New companies were established in the area, housing construction expanded and municipal revenues increased substantially. Significant investments have been made in upgrading schools and infrastructure and in developing cultural facilities.”
icture 6.2: State-of-A@léchnology in Aliiilitions: Melkgya LNG Productior redit: Helge Hansen, Statoil. Picture 6.2: State-of-A@léchnology in Aaifitilitions: Melkgya LNG Production. NGEPRIS80 million of the overall deliveries to the field came from companies registered in north Norway. Assessments show that the development of Snghvit reversed declining population and employment trends in the Hammerfest area. New companies were established in the area, housing construction expanded and municipal revenues increased substantially. Significant investments have been made in upgrading schools and infrastructure and in developing cultural facilities.”
Figure 6.3: AlaDifland GaBevelopment: Significance for the EU
Figure 6.3: AlaDifland GaBevelopment: Significance for the EU
Figure 7.1: Increase in A@M@ifiting ADIREKEGEd Impacts
Figure 7.1: Increase in A@M@ifiting ADIREKEGEd Impacts
Mining activities in Northern Fennoscandia and Greenland
Mining activities in Northern Fennoscandia and Greenland
Picture 7.1: Testing prior to the possible reopening of the Hala FMRI d. Photo: YLE, yle.fi
Picture 7.1: Testing prior to the possible reopening of the Hala FMRI d. Photo: YLE, yle.fi
PIGUPO FoDe IVITTICT UE LICCTICCS TE OA ALL 2, Note: A prospecting licence is non-exclusive permission to explore in a given area, and thus permits more than one company to conduct exploration activities. Alxploration licence has an exclusive character. Source: APRiata!, based on Baisfaditherals and Petroleum, Gs
PIGUPO FoDe IVITTICT UE LICCTICCS TE OA ALL 2, Note: A prospecting licence is non-exclusive permission to explore in a given area, and thus permits more than one company to conduct exploration activities. Alxploration licence has an exclusive character. Source: APRiata!, based on Baisfaditherals and Petroleum, Gs
Picture 7.2: AawlbkeizzPyramiden, Svalbard. Photo: Frits Steenhuisen, Arctic Centre, University of Groningen. should continue after a mine closes, in particular with regard to minimising the impact of job losses. Many mining companies have adopted a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda as part of their strategy to acquire their social licence to operate (trust, acceptance and support of communities). In addition, there are also general company and government investments, such as education, infrastructure and healthcare.” Royalties, fees or taxes can generate significant revenue for regional and national budgets. Royalties as such have not been introduced in Nordic countries and mining-specific fees or taxes are comparatively low. As a result, the main budget income is from general tax systems or (e.g. in the case of LKAB) profits generated by state-owned companies. However, the economic benefits from tax revenues depend on associated increases in government expenditure.
Picture 7.2: AawlbkeizzPyramiden, Svalbard. Photo: Frits Steenhuisen, Arctic Centre, University of Groningen. should continue after a mine closes, in particular with regard to minimising the impact of job losses. Many mining companies have adopted a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda as part of their strategy to acquire their social licence to operate (trust, acceptance and support of communities). In addition, there are also general company and government investments, such as education, infrastructure and healthcare.” Royalties, fees or taxes can generate significant revenue for regional and national budgets. Royalties as such have not been introduced in Nordic countries and mining-specific fees or taxes are comparatively low. As a result, the main budget income is from general tax systems or (e.g. in the case of LKAB) profits generated by state-owned companies. However, the economic benefits from tax revenues depend on associated increases in government expenditure.
Picture 7.3: Pidgarla@entre with the LAABron ore mine in the background, Sweden. Alfmining activities are planned to be extended under the town’s centre, the decision has been made to construct a new centre in a different location. Photo: AiPpien, Aire, University of Lapland
Picture 7.3: Pidgarla@entre with the LAABron ore mine in the background, Sweden. Alfmining activities are planned to be extended under the town’s centre, the decision has been made to construct a new centre in a different location. Photo: AiPpien, Aire, University of Lapland
Picture 8.1: Allaitiiscape — “EiaPlffifsit sight, but full of human activities. Photo: Paul@la Hag niversity of Lapland. Picture 8.1: A@iaitiiscape — “EWaPi2ffifait sight, but full of human activities.
Picture 8.1: Allaitiiscape — “EiaPlffifsit sight, but full of human activities. Photo: Paul@la Hag niversity of Lapland. Picture 8.1: A@iaitiiscape — “EWaPi2ffifait sight, but full of human activities.
Picture 8.2: H@MAREEIFEid Near-by Yilds Ski Resort Photo: Northland Mine Ltd. Picture 8.2: H@@biie&ifelaind Near-by Yilds Ski Resort. The main concern arising from the Hannukainen mine development is that it may impair the image of the area as attractive for nature-based recreation. One problem is the plan to pipe treated process water from the mine to the Muonio River, one of the last major free salmon rivers in Finland and an EU Natura 2000 protected area. Secondly the municipality of Kolari relies on tourism for 50% of its revenue and thirdly, reindeer herders are concerned about disruption from mining noise and activities, and the loss or fragmentation of grazing areas.
Picture 8.2: H@MAREEIFEid Near-by Yilds Ski Resort Photo: Northland Mine Ltd. Picture 8.2: H@@biie&ifelaind Near-by Yilds Ski Resort. The main concern arising from the Hannukainen mine development is that it may impair the image of the area as attractive for nature-based recreation. One problem is the plan to pipe treated process water from the mine to the Muonio River, one of the last major free salmon rivers in Finland and an EU Natura 2000 protected area. Secondly the municipality of Kolari relies on tourism for 50% of its revenue and thirdly, reindeer herders are concerned about disruption from mining noise and activities, and the loss or fragmentation of grazing areas.
Picture 8.3: Traditional Sami Reindeer H@siaivizher Camp, Skuolla, Sweden Photo: Carl-lohan Utsj. herding districts where the animals graze and migrate between winter and summer pastures. Mining, oil and gas extraction and large-scale forestry have reduced the size of available pasturelands for reindeer husbandry. In Sweden and Norway reindeer herding is strongly connected to Sami culture and practiced exclusively by the Sami (in Finland it is practised by both Finns and the Sami). Reindeer herders use traditional summer and (critically important) winter pastures that the family/ village have used for generations (Picture 8.3.). Land- use changes can result in the fragmentation of pastures or disturbance to calving and culling areas and reindeer migration corridors.
Picture 8.3: Traditional Sami Reindeer H@siaivizher Camp, Skuolla, Sweden Photo: Carl-lohan Utsj. herding districts where the animals graze and migrate between winter and summer pastures. Mining, oil and gas extraction and large-scale forestry have reduced the size of available pasturelands for reindeer husbandry. In Sweden and Norway reindeer herding is strongly connected to Sami culture and practiced exclusively by the Sami (in Finland it is practised by both Finns and the Sami). Reindeer herders use traditional summer and (critically important) winter pastures that the family/ village have used for generations (Picture 8.3.). Land- use changes can result in the fragmentation of pastures or disturbance to calving and culling areas and reindeer migration corridors.
Picture 8.4: Local People and Sami Demonstrating against the Planned Mining Activities at Gallok in Summer 2013. Photo: Carl-Johan Utsi. 8.3.5 Nature Conservation species distribution and abundance, as well as nature- based livelihoods.
Picture 8.4: Local People and Sami Demonstrating against the Planned Mining Activities at Gallok in Summer 2013. Photo: Carl-Johan Utsi. 8.3.5 Nature Conservation species distribution and abundance, as well as nature- based livelihoods.
18. Definition of ecosystem services by the United Nations 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA): ecosystem services are grouped into four broad cate- gories: provisioning, such as the production of food and water; regulating, such as the control of climate and disease; supporting, such as nutrient cycles and crop pollination; and cultural, such as spiritual and recreational benefits.
18. Definition of ecosystem services by the United Nations 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA): ecosystem services are grouped into four broad cate- gories: provisioning, such as the production of food and water; regulating, such as the control of climate and disease; supporting, such as nutrient cycles and crop pollination; and cultural, such as spiritual and recreational benefits.
2. Rasmussen, R. et al. (2011). Megatrends. Nordic Council of Ministers AHDR (2004). 7. Rasmussen et al. (2011); AHDR (2004); NPP (2013); Janson, M. (2012). Northern Sparsely Populated Areas. Working Uniquely Together. Presentation at the Committee of Regions, 19 January 2012. Figure 9.1: Main Socio-cultural Drivers and Trends and Their Implications for the European Arctic 1. Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) 2004. Arctic Stefansson In- stitute, Akureyri, Iceland; ArcticStat, 2010 Census for Russian Federation, at http://www.arcticstat.org. Accessed 10 January 2014. ). In Finland, over 70% of Sami children live outside of the Sami Homeland Area in the north of Lapland, where the Sami enjoy access to Sami-language schooling.
2. Rasmussen, R. et al. (2011). Megatrends. Nordic Council of Ministers AHDR (2004). 7. Rasmussen et al. (2011); AHDR (2004); NPP (2013); Janson, M. (2012). Northern Sparsely Populated Areas. Working Uniquely Together. Presentation at the Committee of Regions, 19 January 2012. Figure 9.1: Main Socio-cultural Drivers and Trends and Their Implications for the European Arctic 1. Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) 2004. Arctic Stefansson In- stitute, Akureyri, Iceland; ArcticStat, 2010 Census for Russian Federation, at http://www.arcticstat.org. Accessed 10 January 2014. ). In Finland, over 70% of Sami children live outside of the Sami Homeland Area in the north of Lapland, where the Sami enjoy access to Sami-language schooling.
Figure 9.2. Aam@gwiation.: (nQigenous And NON-iINaIgenous. Note: @ARTHR RAR BIEIle PR Pe AP PREM GIRPSARE BREESE. Batallion people live in the Arctic regions of the Nordic countries (in cluding Greenland. According to the AHDR boundary: the three northernmost counties of Norway, Norrbotten county in Lappi (Lapland) in Finland, whole territory of Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland). The Barents region (which exter of the AHDR boundary) has a population of six million. Arctic areas in Russia, according to AHDR (2004) include: the NV Oblast, the Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Taimyr, and Chukotka autonomus okrugs, Vorkuta City in the Komi Republic, Norilsk a in Krasnoyarsky Kray, and those parts of the Sakha Republic whose boundaries lie closest to the Arctic Circle. Source: Arctic Portal and Arctic Centre, 2014, based on data from: Statistics Sweden 2011, Tilastokeskus 2013, Statistics Norway 2012 Statistics 2014 (Statistics Norway), Statistics Iceland 2012, Faroe Statistics 2013, Statistics Greenland 2013 (for Greenland indigenot refers to persons born in Greenland), Barents Euro-Arctic Council, US Census 2010, (Russian) Federal State Statistics Service 2013-20: (Russian Federation) 2010, Statistics Canada 2006-2011, US Census Bureau 2010, Statistics Alaska 2012, Arctic Centre, University « estimates (data based on estimates with discrepancies between available sources). Numbers for Sakha Republic (municipalities on or Arctic Circle) based on estimates only. All numbers, although based on statistics, are illustrative, estimate and approximate, often due t of specifying exact number of indigenous peoples living in the particular region.
Figure 9.2. Aam@gwiation.: (nQigenous And NON-iINaIgenous. Note: @ARTHR RAR BIEIle PR Pe AP PREM GIRPSARE BREESE. Batallion people live in the Arctic regions of the Nordic countries (in cluding Greenland. According to the AHDR boundary: the three northernmost counties of Norway, Norrbotten county in Lappi (Lapland) in Finland, whole territory of Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland). The Barents region (which exter of the AHDR boundary) has a population of six million. Arctic areas in Russia, according to AHDR (2004) include: the NV Oblast, the Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Taimyr, and Chukotka autonomus okrugs, Vorkuta City in the Komi Republic, Norilsk a in Krasnoyarsky Kray, and those parts of the Sakha Republic whose boundaries lie closest to the Arctic Circle. Source: Arctic Portal and Arctic Centre, 2014, based on data from: Statistics Sweden 2011, Tilastokeskus 2013, Statistics Norway 2012 Statistics 2014 (Statistics Norway), Statistics Iceland 2012, Faroe Statistics 2013, Statistics Greenland 2013 (for Greenland indigenot refers to persons born in Greenland), Barents Euro-Arctic Council, US Census 2010, (Russian) Federal State Statistics Service 2013-20: (Russian Federation) 2010, Statistics Canada 2006-2011, US Census Bureau 2010, Statistics Alaska 2012, Arctic Centre, University « estimates (data based on estimates with discrepancies between available sources). Numbers for Sakha Republic (municipalities on or Arctic Circle) based on estimates only. All numbers, although based on statistics, are illustrative, estimate and approximate, often due t of specifying exact number of indigenous peoples living in the particular region.
Figure 9.4: Public and Private FUAAEIA: Source: Johanna Roto, Nordregio, 2010, modified. Source: Johanna Roto, Nordregio, 2010, modified.
Figure 9.4: Public and Private FUAAEIA: Source: Johanna Roto, Nordregio, 2010, modified. Source: Johanna Roto, Nordregio, 2010, modified.
Picture 9.1: Inuit Villagers Ga@PBPlce after Successful Whale H
Picture 9.1: Inuit Villagers Ga@PBPlce after Successful Whale H
Picture 9.2: Sami Parliament in Norway in session GWiAziz7| Photo: Denis Caviglia, 2013.
Picture 9.2: Sami Parliament in Norway in session GWiAziz7| Photo: Denis Caviglia, 2013.
Figure 9.5: ENorthern Periphery and Aiaigramme AGH 4-2020 Source: Alfiaifa!, based on Northern Periphery Programme and Nordregio 2013
Figure 9.5: ENorthern Periphery and Aiaigramme AGH 4-2020 Source: Alfiaifa!, based on Northern Periphery Programme and Nordregio 2013
Picture 9.3: Social Hffiei#irictiie 1970s in Nuuk, GBI Rimlen, Aldttttre.
Picture 9.3: Social Hffiei#irictiie 1970s in Nuuk, GBI Rimlen, Aldttttre.

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  1. 7 Chapter 5 -Changing Nature of Arctic Fisheries .........................................................
  2. 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................
  3. 2 Arctic Fisheries Sector .....................................................................................................................................
  4. 3 Arctic Fisheries Ecosystems ..........................................................................................................................
  5. 4 Aquaculture ........................................................................................................................................................
  6. 5 Fisheries Resource Management ..............................................................................................................
  7. 6 Governance ........................................................................................................................................................
  8. 7 Drivers ....................................................................................................................................................................
  9. 8 Impacts of Fisheries .........................................................................................................................................
  10. 9 Outlook to 2030 ............................................................................................................................................... 5.10 Implications of Arctic Fisheries Developments for the European Union ............................
  11. 11 How Does the European Union Influence Arctic Fisheries? ...................................................
  12. 12 Critical Factors for EU Decision-making ..............................................................................................
  13. 13 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ Chapter 6 -Developing Oil and Gas Resources in Arctic Waters ............................
  14. 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................
  15. 2 Overview of Offshore Oil and Gas Trends -Hopes and Doubts .............................................
  16. 3 Primary Drivers of Arctic Oil and Gas Exploitation ..........................................................................
  17. 4 Overview of the Implications of Arctic Offshore Exploitation ......................................................
  18. 5 Governance and Best Practice for Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Extraction ..........................
  19. 6 How Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic May Affect the European Union? .............
  20. 7 Outlook to 2030 ...............................................................................................................................................
  21. 8 Relevant EU Policies.........................................................................................................................................
  22. 9 Critical Factors for EU Decision-making ................................................................................................
  23. 10 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ Chapter 7 -Mining in the European Arctic ...................................................................
  24. 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................
  25. 2 Current Upsurge in Mining Activity ........................................................................................................
  26. 3 Drivers ....................................................................................................................................................................
  27. 4 Impacts ..................................................................................................................................................................
  28. 5 Implications of Arctic Mining for the European Union ..................................................................
  29. 6 Outlook to 2030 ...............................................................................................................................................
  30. 7 EU Influence on Arctic Mining: Assessing EU Policies ...................................................................
  31. 8 Critical Factors for EU Decision-making .................................................................................................
  32. 9 Recommendations ...........................................................................................................................................
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  69. This is the primary example, including the conflict over logging in Inari before 2010/2011. See the Sami Council's position on the issue at: http://www. saamicouncil.net/files/20051116181056.pdf. Accessed 7 February 2014.
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