Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts
1978
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Abstract
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This article explores the complexities surrounding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, which are standard form agreements where one party has significantly more bargaining power than the other. While arbitration is ideally a voluntary process between equal parties, the imposition of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts raises critical issues regarding consent and fairness. The paper examines the factors courts consider when deciding to enforce such clauses, weighing the public policy favoring arbitration against the principles of voluntary agreement and equality in bargaining power.
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