Abstract MA Dissertation: "Identity without Conditions"

1989

This thesis is concerned with what it is to be a person, and with what is involved in being the same person over time. I begin by making a survey of the major theories of personal identity, and mark some important divisions and distinctions between them, primarily between Reductionism and Non-Reductionism and, within this former category, between the Physical and Psychological Criteria, and argue that none of these ha5 proved to be satisfactory. I stress the importance of the work of Derek Parfit, and in particular his shifting of the agenda away from the relation of identity to that of 'Relation R', and his claim that it is the holding of this latter relation - namely psychological continuity by any means - that contains 'all that matters' to us regarding the future, and not necessarily whether I survive. I show how this theory avoids the pitfalls that defeated the other theories, and propose various developments of it. A critical eye is then cast over the methodolo...

Philosophical Studies, 1990

On one familiar and very broad view of personal identity, the continued existence of a person over time admits of analysis in terms of relations of non-branching physical and/or psychological continuity. 1 (One version of this view is the Psychological Criterion, according to which A at tl is identical to B at t 2 iff A and B stand to each other in the relation of non-branching psychological continuity.) The need for a non-branching or no-competitors clause is occasioned by the most plausible description of the division or fission of persons, a situation in which one individual stands to each of two later individuals in qualitatively identical relations of physical and psychological continuity. The inclusion of such a clause is necessary in order to avoid the consequence that the earlier person is identical to both resulting persons. The inclusion of a non-branching component in theories of personal identity over time has been thought to incur the charge of absurdity. The charge can be pressed as follows: any best-candidate theory of personal identity, which incorporates a non-branching component, violates a necessary constraint which governs our concept of strict numerical identity and --absurdly --implies, in a sense to be characterised, that the identity of a person over time can be extrinsically determined. Consequently, any best-candidate theory of personal identity over time is untenable. If so, it follows that we must redescribe the transtemporal identities which hold in a case of division, e.g., along the lines suggested by Lewis, Perry and Noonan (according to which the distinct post-division persons both occupy the single pre-division body), 2 or else give up entirely the attempt to analyse the identity of a person over time in

2016

One of the most debated topics in medieval philosophy was the metaphysics of identity—that is, what accounts for the distinctness (non-identity) of different individuals of the same, specific kind and the persistence (self-identity) of the same individuals over time and in different possible situations, especially with regard to individuals of our specific kind, namely, human persons. The first three papers of this volume investigate the comparative development of positions. One problem, considered by William of Auvergne and Albert the Great, deals with Aristotle’s doctrine of the active intellect and its relation to Christian philosophical conceptions of personhood. A larger set of issues on the nature and post-mortem fate of human beings is highlighted as common inquiry among Muslim philosophers and Thomas Aquinas, as well as Aquinas and the modern thinker John Locke. Finally, the last two papers offer a debate over Aquinas’s exact views regarding whether substances persist identically across metaphysical “gaps” (periods of non-existence), either by nature or divine power.

Conscientia, Peer-Reviewed Journal, 2016

Problems of Personal Identity is a metaphysical problem in philosophical world. Personal Identity has always been considered to be an emerging topic. The noted philosophers of past and present times like Aristotle, John Locke, David Hume, Shoemaker, Bernard Williams, Derek Parfit have discussed all about this topic and the researchers and philosophers are still trying to find out the real solutions to the problems of Personal Identity. I have discussed in my article about the different views, debates of philosophers, researchers and others on Personal Identity. I, after having gone through these, have tried to focus on the concerns of both body and mind to draw a conclusion to the problem of identicalness of a person.

In what follows I would like to discuss my PhD research project, which I am pursuing at Freie Universität Berlin under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Dina Emundts. My dissertation is somewhat at crossroads: it tries to bridge what has been termed analytic philosophy and continental philosophy, in particular ontology and phenomenology; equally, while its main aims are systematic it engages critically with the history of philosophy. Overall, it aims to offer an alternative approach to the question of personal identity over time, namely, the question as to what is sufficient and necessary for one to be identical with oneself at different moments in time? It does so by examining the underlying assumptions and the validity of this question, through a temporal approach. In it, I aim to answer two questions: (1) How should we conceptualise time in a way that enables us to put forward an account of the self and of how entities and action gain significance in day-today life? By the self I mean nothing more than that which answers the question of who one is. (2) Does the question of personal identity as outlined above make sense under the account of time formulated in response to question (1)? My hypothesis is that only an account of time wherein this phenomenon is conceived in a more originary way than as a sequence explains the phenomena of the self and of how meaning obtains. Under this account, the Past, Present and Future co-obtain rather than follow one another. Further, I claim that the question of personal identity relies on an account of time that is essentially sequential because it compares the person at different moments in time. I therefore argue that a careful examination of the metaphysics of time dissolves the problem of personal identity over time.

2010

The article is focused on the issue of human being and human identity (both collective and individual one). Two methodilogical approaches – essential and existential – are considered to be so called traditional approaches of the philosophical antropology. An interpretative/narrative approach are the current state in the analysing of the identity issue. The mentioned approaches are used in the special sciences: social and cultural anthropology, psychology, etc., as well. The author emphasizes a cultural dimension of identity reflecting the human situation in globalized, multicultural world (e.g. the conceptions of multiple identity, sliced identity, split identity).

Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica, 2019

Any discussion on a person's right to identity ought to start with a study of the content of a person's identity. While ascertaining the essence of a person's identity, the author was inclined to think that the development of a personal identity as a permanent concept was promoted by the genesis of the human dignity, individuality, autonomy and personality of a person. It is human dignity, the manifestation of which, inter alia, is to be found in the person's identity, which forms the basis of its legal protection, transforming the identity of a person into legal value and, accordingly, creating the right of a person to identity. Thus the article provides a legally philosophical insight into the historical circumstances in which the concept of personal identity arose, and that are essential for a comprehensive modern understanding of the concept.

This paper has two main aims. The first is to propose a new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity. The second is to show that the metaphysical picture that underlies my proposal has important implications for the 3D/4D debate. I start by spelling out several of the old ways of characterizing the problem of personal identity and saying what I think is wrong with each of them. Next I present and motivate some metaphysical principles concerning property instantiations that underlie my proposal. Then I introduce the new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity that I am recommending, and I show that it avoids the difficulties facing the old ways. I also mention several vexing problems that arise in connection with certain popular views about personal identity, and I argue that if we formulate the problem of personal identity in the way that I am proposing, then each of these problems can be handled fairly easily. Finally, I show that there is an additional benefit to adopting my proposal, namely, that several other important problems facing anyone who endorses a 3D view of persistence (as opposed to the 4D, “temporal parts” view of persistence) can all be resolved in a relatively straightforward manner by one who adopts the metaphysical principles concerning property instantiations that underlie the proposal.

This script presents two arguments, an anthropological and a philosophical one. The first thesis claims that the ancient marriage rules led to a strong influence on the split of the archaic proto-identity into an individual and collective identity. The second thesis is concerned with the historic development of the temporal orientation of collective identity: After that split it rooted for millenia in the common ancestral past. However, that changed over time, and today in all occidental societies it is oriented towards the future.