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Title
Abstract
FAQs
Figures
Introduction
Scope of Ec Corporate Law
Conclusions
Conclusion
References

EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial are They?

Profile image of Luca EnriquesLuca Enriques

2000, SSRN Electronic Journal

https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.730388
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78 pages

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Abstract

What role does European Community ("EC") legislation in the corporate law area play within the European Union ("EU")? How much does it shape Member States' corporate laws? And how relevant is it for the corporate governance of EU companies and their management? At first sight, the EC appears to have played and to be playing a central role in shaping EC corporate law, with the high number of directives and regulations covering a wide range of corporate law issues. One might then think that EC institutions have a strong influence upon Member States' corporate laws, whether because they have intervened in the area or because they may do so. Quite to the opposite, EC company law directives and regulations appear to have had very little impact on national

FAQs

sparkles

AI

What explains the triviality of EC corporate law directives?add

The study demonstrates that EC corporate law largely ignores core areas like fiduciary duties, under-enforced rules, and varies by Member State, resulting in optional and unimportant regulations.

How do Member State implementations of EC directives vary?add

The findings indicate that local legal cultures dramatically influence how EC directives are interpreted and implemented, often leading to inconsistent applications across Member States.

When did the EC's corporate law legislation begin to grow significantly?add

After a slow start, the output of EC corporate law began to increase significantly around 2001, focusing on directives affecting corporate governance and market practices.

What role does lobbying play in EC corporate law production?add

The research highlights that interest groups, including professionals and lobbyists, significantly impact EC corporate law output by promoting legislation that preserves their market interests.

What impacts do EC corporate law rules have on national laws?add

EC corporate law has prompted Member States to preemptively amend their company laws, shaping outcomes in ways that reflect both domestic interests and EC legislative frameworks.

Figures (3)
HOW TRIVIAL IS EC COMPANY LAW?
HOW TRIVIAL IS EC COMPANY LAW?
NUMBER OF EC COMPANY LAW DIRECTIVES AND REGULATIONS PER YEAR Updated to December 31, 2004. Years in which no directives or regulations were adopted are omitted. TABLE 1. tions!8 in the area of corporate law,!9 and its output, after a decade or so of deep crisis,29 has been growing significantly since 2001 (Table 1). HOW TRIVIAL IS EC COMPANY LAW?
NUMBER OF EC COMPANY LAW DIRECTIVES AND REGULATIONS PER YEAR Updated to December 31, 2004. Years in which no directives or regulations were adopted are omitted. TABLE 1. tions!8 in the area of corporate law,!9 and its output, after a decade or so of deep crisis,29 has been growing significantly since 2001 (Table 1). HOW TRIVIAL IS EC COMPANY LAW?

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