New Work on Biosignatures

Biology and Philosophy, 2017

The attempt to define life has gained new momentum in the wake of novel fields such as synthetic biology, astrobiology, and artificial life. In a series of articles, Cleland, Chyba, and Machery claim that definitions of life seek to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of life-something that such definitions cannot, and should not do. We argue that this criticism is largely unwarranted. Cleland, Chyba, and Machery approach definitions of life as classifying devices, thereby neglecting their other epistemic roles. We identify within the discussions of the nature and origin of life three other types of definitions: theoretical, transdisciplinary, and diagnostic definitions. The primary aim of these definitions is not to distinguish life from nonlife, although they can also be used for classificatory purposes. We focus on the definitions of life within the budding field of astrobiology, paying particular attention to transdisciplinary definitions, and diagnostic definitions in the search for biosignatures from other planets.

2010

Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, 2010

The first part of the paper offers philosophical landmarks on the general issue of defining life. §1 defends that the recognition of "life" has always been and remains primarily an intuitive process, for the scientist as for the layperson. However we should not expect, then, to be able to draw a definition from this original experience, because our cognitive apparatus has not been primarily designed for this. §2 is about definitions in general. Two kinds of definition should be carefully distinguished: lexical definitions (based upon current uses of a word), and stipulative or legislative definitions, which deliberately assign a meaning to a word, for the purpose of clarifying scientific or philosophical arguments. The present volume provides examples of these two kinds of definitions. §3 examines three traditional philosophical definitions of life, all of which have been elaborated prior to the emergence of biology as a specific scientific discipline: life as animation (Aristotle), life as mechanism, and life as organization (Kant). All three concepts constitute a common heritage that structures in depth a good deal of our cultural intuitions and vocabulary any time we try to think about "life". The present volume offers examples of these three concepts in contemporary scientific discourse. The second part of the paper proposes a synthesis of the major debates developed in this volume. Three major questions have been discussed. A first issue ( §4) is whether we should define life or not, and why. Most authors are skeptical about the possibility of defining life in a strong way, although all admit that criteria are useful in contexts such as exobiology, artificial life and the origins of life. §5 examines the possible kinds of definitions of life presented in the volume. Those authors who have explicitly defended that a definition of life is needed, can be classified into two categories. The first category (or standard view) refers to two conditions: individual self-maintenance and the open-ended evolution of a collection of similar entities. The other category refuse to include reproduction and evolution, and take a sort of psychic view of the living. §6 examines the relationship between the question of the definition of life and that of the origins of life. There is a close parallel between the general conceptions of the origins of life and the definitions of life.

Representations, 2010

We deliver a "keyword" account of the term life form as it has been used in natural philosophy and biology over the last two hundred years, beginning with its appearance in German as Lebensform. We argue that life form has, since its earliest enunciations, pointed to a space of possibility within which life might take shape, but that the way that space is imagined and theorized in biology has transformed substantially; life form originated as a term referring to idealized, aesthetic possibilities, then transformed to describe biogeographic and evolutionary potentialities, and today, in the age of synthetic biology and astrobiology, has come to signal conjectural and future possibilities.

Biology and Philosophy

Do trees of life have roots? What do these roots look like? In this contribution, I argue that research on the origins of life might offer glimpses on the topology of these very roots. More specifically, I argue (1) that the roots of the tree of life go well below the level of the commonly mentioned ‘ancestral organisms’ down into the level of much simpler, minimally living entities that might be referred to as ‘protoliving systems’, and (2) that further below, a system of roots gradually dissolves into non-living matter along several functional dimensions. In between non-living and living matter, one finds physico-chemical systems that I propose to characterize by a ‘lifeness signature’. In turn, this ‘lifeness signature’ might also account for a diverse range of biochemical entities that are found to be ‘less-than-living’ yet ‘more-than-non-living’.

Astrobiology

Conceptual frameworks are developed for evaluating the ability of different biosignatures to provide evidence for the presence of life in planned missions or observational studies. The focus is on intrinsic characteristics of biosignatures in space environments rather than on their detection, which depends on technology. Evaluation procedures are drawn from extensive studies in decision theory on related problems in business, engineering, medical fields, and the social arena. Three approaches are particularly useful. Two of them, Signal Detection Theory and Bayesian hypothesis testing, are based on probabilities. The third approach is based on utility theory. In all the frameworks, knowledge about a subject matter has to be translated into probabilities and/or utilities in a multistep process called elicitation. We present the first attempt to cover all steps, from acquiring knowledge about biosignatures to assigning probabilities or utilities to global quantities, such as false positives and false negatives. Since elicitation involves human judgment that is always prone to perceptual and cognitive biases, the relevant biases are discussed and illustrated in examples. We further discuss at which stage of elicitation human judgment should be involved to ensure the most reliable outcomes. An example, how evaluating biosignatures might be implemented, is given in the Supplementary Information.

International Journal of Astrobiology, 2021

In this work, we address the difficulty of reliably identifying traces of life on Mars. Several independent lines of evidence are required to build a compelling body of proof. In particular, we underline the importance of correctly interpreting the geological and mineralogical context of the sites to be explored for the presence of biosignatures. We use as examples to illustrate this, ALH84001 (where knowledge of the geological context was very limited) and other terrestrial deposits, for which this could be properly established. We also discuss promising locations and formations to be explored by ongoing and future rover missions, including Oxia Planum, which, dated at 4.0 Ga, is the most ancient Mars location targeted for investigation yet.