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Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions

Profile image of Xizhi TanXizhi Tan

2022, arXiv (Cornell University)

Abstract

In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, Nisan and Ronen [27] studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrelated machines aiming to minimize the makespan. They provided a strategyproof mechanism that achieves an n-approximation and they made the bold conjecture that this is the best approximation achievable by any deterministic strategyproof scheduling mechanism. After more than two decades and several efforts, n remains the best known approximation and very recent work by Christodoulou et al. [13] has been able to prove an Ω(√ n) approximation lower bound for all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. This strong negative result, however, heavily depends on the fact that the performance of these mechanisms is evaluated using worst-case analysis. To overcome such overly pessimistic, and often uninformative, worst-case bounds, a surge of recent work has focused on the "learning-augmented framework", whose goal is to leverage machine-learned predictions to obtain improved approximations when these predictions are accurate (consistency), while also achieving near-optimal worst-case approximations even when the predictions are arbitrarily wrong (robustness). In this work, we study the classic strategic scheduling problem of Nisan and Ronen [27] using the learning-augmented framework and give a deterministic polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism that is 6-consistent and 2n-robust. We thus achieve the "best of both worlds": an O(1) consistency and an O(n) robustness that asymptotically matches the best-known approximation. We then extend this result to provide more general worst-case approximation guarantees as a function of the prediction error. Finally, we complement our positive results by showing that any 1-consistent deterministic strategyproof mechanism has unbounded robustness.

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