Responses to Shapiro and Silber
1988, Psychiatry MMC
https://doi.org/10.1080/00332747.1988.11024420…
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Abstract
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This response analyzes arguments made by Roger Shapiro and Earle Silber regarding the role of free association in psychoanalysis. It clarifies the distinction between 'free association' as a method and 'freedom of association' as a psychological state. The author discusses the importance of free associations in understanding the unconscious and addresses concerns about the necessity of therapeutic intent in psychoanalysis, ultimately seeking to establish the core psychoanalytic activities that enable analysts to interpret the dynamics of transference and resistance.
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