A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF CRITO

Areté, 2022

Much recent scholarship on Plato’ Crito has revolved around the controversy about the relationship and possible compatibility between the arguments Socrates gives in his own person (SocratesS) and those he gives in the person of the Laws (SocratesL). By contrast, the relation between the arguments given by SocratesL and those given by Crito continues to be seen as uncontroversial: by the end of the dialogue, commentators agree, Crito has no choice but to concede to the force of SocratesL’s arguments. Against this traditional reading, this paper will argue not only that SocratesL’s arguments fail to secure Crito’s agreement, but also that two characters’ attempts to communicate end at an impasse that seems to leave little room for meaningful shared discourse –and may even undermine Crito’s belief in the possibility of meaningful speech. My interpretation is informed by Socrates’ account (at 49c9-e3) of the need for and nature of a “common ground” as a requisite for genuine dialogue. ...

PLato Journal, 2024

In this article, I propose novel answers to three longstanding questions in the scholarship on Plato's Crito: (1) Why does Socrates choose to respond to Crito in the second part of the conversation by using a speech?; (2) Why does this speech employ personification?; and (3) Why are the Laws, specifically, personified ? The answers to these questions will reveal Socrates' method of treating Crito and his worldview. The latter considers himself to be a good man for a twofold reason, namely, he is concerned not only about helping a friend but also about the possible negative consequences of doing so. Crito takes care not to harm anyone while saving his friend and wishes to use only legitimate means. But Socrates will ultimately show Crito how, in fact, he uses violence to achieve his

The Classical Journal, 2023

Crito cites his motivations to smuggle Socrates out of prison as concern for his friend and concern for his own reputation among the Many. Socrates, in his reply, refers only to the latter reason. The selectivity of this response does not draw comment from Crito, opening the door to an understanding that it is his reputation among the Many that is his primary— or even sole—concern. Taking a different approach, I suggest that Socrates’ response reflects a complex relationship between Crito’s two motives. This relationship, I argue, may remain relevant to law-breakers today. It can also shed light on wider questions concerning the dialogue as a work of philosophical literature from the early fourth century, on ancient Athenian democracy and the law-abiding, and eventually concerning the way to read such a treatise.

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 1999

My paper has two aims. The first is to challenge the widespread assumption that the personified Laws of Athens, whom Socrates gives voice to during the second half of the Crito express Socrates' own views. 1 (By "Socrates" I shall always mean Plato's Socrates, not the historical Socrates.) I shall argue that the principles which the Laws espouse not only differ from those which Socrates sets out in his own person within the dialogue, but are in fact in conflict with Socrates' stated principles. This view has the consequence that no-one in the Crito spells out Socrates' own reasons for refusing Crito's urgent appeal that he escape from prison. If the personified Laws do not do so, nobody does. But it might be thought that the goal of the dialogue, the Crito, is to do just this: to show why Socrates did not escape. Hence the second aim of my paper, which is to give an alternative account of what the dialogue does instead. First, then, let me set out the case for taking the arguments of the Laws to be in conflict with the principles which Socrates states in his own person. 2 Cf. Linforth (1946) p. 136, in particular for his argument in favour of taking ol κορυβαντιώντες as a reference to people who have some direct connection to Corybantic rites, as opposed to a general term for being mad or hallucinated. 3 R. Kraut (1984) p. 4 and elsewhere in the same work. 4 I. M. Linforth (1946).

This paper examines Crito's motives for wanting to help Socrates escape, and Socrates' rhetorical strategy for handling Crito's concerns, particularly Crito's fear of the many. It concludes that Socrates' admitted concern for his reputation provides the only adequate explanation for his obedience to the court, an explanation which does not rely on his explicit arguments for obligation, but which helps explain why he is concerned to come to the law's defence. Joining others in suggesting that Socrates' case for obligation be taken as rhetoric, the examination of the text reveals that not only are Socrates' arguments too problematic to be an adequate defence of obligation, but these same arguments point to a criticism of punitive law that makes it unlikely that Socrates is philosophically invested in the defence he offers to Crito.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2011

Philosophy, 2021

Dominant interpretations of Plato's Crito attempt to reconstruct the text deductively, taking the arguments in the famous Laws' speech as consisting solely in the application of general principles to facts. It is thus conceived that the principles and facts are grasped independently of each other, and then the former are applied to the latter, subsequently reaching the conclusion that Socrates must not escape. Following the lead of Cora Diamond, who argues against this 'generalist interpretation', I argue that the Laws' speech essentially involves an exercise of our moral imagination through which both principles and the facts to which they apply are grasped. This is not to say that a deductive argument is absent from the Laws' speech. Rather, for the first time, we understand how the deductive arguments in the Laws' speech can function through imagining a life in which these arguments make sense. The Crito is an attempt to exercise the readers' imagination, thereby presenting ethics that is both personal and objective. Understanding the Laws' arguments essentially requires the readers' imaginative involvement with Socrates' personal story, but they still have objective import.

Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought, 2015

This essay is an analysis of the central arguments in Plato’s Crito. The dialogue shows, in a variety of ways, that the opinion of another person can have practical relevance in one’s deliberations about what to do – e.g. as an argument, as a piece of expert advice, as a threat. Especially important among these forms of practical relevance is the relevance of authoritative commands. In the dialogue, the Laws of Athens argue that Socrates must accept his sentence of death, because he must regard the court’s verdict as a command from a practical authority – the city. The Laws’ arguments rely on special features of authority-reasons that many commentators have overlooked. This article explains why the Law’s arguments are unsuccessful. Finally, it is argued that Socrates’ description of ‘the many’ suggests that the city lacks the deliberative capacity necessary for possessing practical authority.1

In the Crito, one of Socrates two major arguments that it would be wrong for him to escape is that he would be retaliating against Athens for having reached the wrong verdict at his trial. The second of the two arguments against escape -that he would be breaking an agreement between himself and the state -has received extensive critical investigation. That has occurred because the issues it raises are clearly issues for us, specifically the issues of the source and extent of political obligation. The retaliation argument, on the other hand, has not received any where near the same amount of critical examination. My aim here is to remedy that deficiency, to provide a detailed account of how Socrates goes about arguing concerning retaliation. The upshot of my investigation is that Socrates' argument on this score is deeply flawed on virtually every count.

International Journal of Arts and Humanities, 2021

In the Crito, Socrates is presented an offer by his friends to escape from prison before his execution. To the surprise of his interlocutor Crito, he rejects the offer, making the startling claim that fleeing would breach an unconditional obligation to obey the law. In a famous speech, Socrates personifies The Laws of Athens and speaks in its voice, advancing three arguments justifying why one should always obey the law even to one's injury or disadvantage. These may be referred to as the Argument from Gratitude, the Argument from the Social Contract, and the Argument from the Destruction of the Laws. The objective of this article is to provide a conceptual analysis of legal obligation as presented by Socrates using the resources of contemporary legal and political philosophy, and to argue that each argument falls short of justifying an unconditional obligation to obey the law. The article concludes that with an examination of the apparent contradiction between Socrates' arguments in the Crito and his speech in the Apology where he openly defies the court by explaining that he will continue doing philosophy even if he will be found guilty of corrupting the youth and failing to worship the gods of Athens. It is hoped that a closer and critical look at the arguments presented in the Crito will elucidate the nature of law and legal obligation.