Formal Analysis of a Model For Electronic Payment Systems

Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 1994

In the paper on the example of the cryptosystem DES, the successful method of a cryptanalysis is presented. As a result, it is offered as a criterion of the cryptographic security to use a complexity of building and solving the system of Boolean functions, describing the cipher construction procedure. MSC2000: 94A60, 68P25.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003

iKP (i-Key-Protocol, i = 1, 2, 3) is a family of electronic payment protocols, developed in early 1995 by a group of researchers at the IBM Research labs in Yorktown Heights and Zurich, and one of the ancestors of well-known SET standard. In this paper, we analyze iKP with respect that they have a property that buyer and seller always agreed on the payment whenever acquirer authorizes it. As the designers of the iKP protocols point out, the 1KP protocol does not possess the property. We found out, however, that there exists a counter example to the 2KP and 3KP protocols. Threfore we propose modification of the 2KP and 3KP protocols so that they can possess the property. We have formally verified that the modified 2KP and 3KP protocols possess the property. In this paper, we describe the verification that the modified 3KP protocol possesses the property.

In order to make secure transactions over computer networks, various cryptographic protocols have been pro- posed but, because of subtleties involved in their design, many of them have been shown to have flaws, even a long time after their publication. For this reason, severa l automatic verification methods for analyzing these protocols have been devised. The aim of this paper is to present a methodology for verifying security require- ments of electronic payment protocols by means of NuSMV, a symbolic model checker. Our work principally focus on formal representation of security requirements. I ndeed, we propose an extension of the correspon- dence property, so far used only for authentication, to othe r requirements as confidentiality and integrity. These are the basic security requirements of payment protocols fo r electronic commerce. We illustrate as case study a variant of the SET protocol proposed by Lu & Smolka. This variant has been formally verified by Ly & Smolka and con...

Proceedings of the 2006 …, 2006

To provide card holder authentication while they are conducting an electronic transaction using mobile devices, VISA and MasterCard independently pro-posed two electronic payment protocols: Visa 3D Secure and MasterCard Secure Code. The protocols use ...

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1988

In this paper &,.-,,(text) is used to denote text encrypted using the key key-name. Similarly, D,.,,,-M.Jtext) is used to denote text decrypted using key key-name. Since terminal keys never change, this table is constant for the lifetime of the system. Unlike the terminal key table, the session key ruble is a dynamic structure. This table is updated each time a new terminal session is started: there is one current session key per terminal. Each entry in the table contains the current session key for the corresponding terminal encrypted using a second secret master key KMHO. The session key table looks as follows: I &,,,,(Session Key( 1)) I E,,,,(SeSSiOn Key(2)) &,,,,(Session Key(i)) N o terminal key, session key, nor either master key is in the clear in the host. To store the two masters keys a Cryptographic facility is connected to the host. This facility may be accessed only through the limited cryptographic operations that are provided. In addition, the facility is assumed to be housed in a tamper-sensing container, such as the one described by Simmons [Sim 851, so that the vital information it contains is physically protected. The operations provided

Proceedings 1993 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 1993

Security and Privacy in the Age of Uncertainty, 2003

This paper describes a formalism for cryptographic protocol simulation and analysis that integrates logic and process calculus components. Novel features include the comprehensive modeling of encrypted and unencrypted messages, an expressive message passing semantics and sophisticated constructs for modeling principals. Moreover, the seamless integration of inference rules for communication, reduction and information analysis supports formal proofs about the knowledge and behavior of principals, and about the properties of protocols.

… , Analysis and Simulation of Computer and …, 2002

Jsac, 1989

Encryption algorithm converts clear text into cipher text or cipher text into clear text Encryption protocol A set of rules or procedures for using an encryption algorithm to send and receive messages in a secure manner over a network 4 Analysis of Encryption Protocols GCMPSC 266 March 13, Approach Formally specify-components of the facility-cryptographic operations Express desired properties of the protocol as state invariants Verification system automatically generates the necessary proof obligations to guarantee that the desired properties are preserved 5 Analysis of Encryption Protocols GCMPSC