Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain

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The nature of self awareness and the origin and persistence of personal identity still loom large in contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers have been wooed by the computational approach to consciousness, and they attempt to find the self amidst the phenomenon of neo-cortical information processing. Affective neuroscience offers another pathway to understanding the evolution and nature of self. This paper explores how affective neuroscience acts as a positive game-changer in the philosophical pursuit of self. In particular, I will focus on connecting "mammalian agency" to (a) subjective awareness, and (b) identity through time.

Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 2020

We review neuroimaging research investigating self-referential processing (SRP), that is, how we respond to stimuli that reference ourselves, prefaced by a lexical-thematic analysis of words indicative of "self-feelings". We consider SRP as occurring verbally (V-SRP) and non-verbally (NV-SRP), both in the controlled, "top-down" form of introspective and interoceptive tasks, respectively, as well as in the "bottom-up" spontaneous or automatic form of "mind wandering" and "body wandering" that occurs during resting state. Our review leads us to outline a conceptual and methodological framework for future SRP research that we briefly apply toward understanding certain psychological and neurological disorders symptomatically associated with abnormal SRP. Our discussion is partly guided by William James' original writings on the consciousness of self.

theory of consciousness, nerve impulses, neural networks the brain constructs representations of what is sensed and thought about in the form of nerve impulses that propagate in circuits and network assemblies (circuit impulse Patterns, ciPs). ciP representations of which humans are consciously aware occur in the context of a sense of self. thus, research on mechanisms of consciousness might benefit from a focus on how a conscious sense of self is represented in brain. like all senses, the sense of self must be contained in patterns of nerve impulses. Unlike the traditional senses that are registered by impulse flow in relatively simple, pauci-synaptic projection pathways, the sense of self is a system-level phenomenon that may be generated by impulse patterns in widely distributed complex and interacting circuits. the problem for researchers then is to identify the ciPs that are unique to conscious experience. Also likely to be of great relevance to constructing the representation of self are the coherence shifts in activity timing relations among the circuits. consider that an embodied sense of self is generated and contained as unique combinatorial temporal patterns across multiple neurons in each circuit that contributes to constructing the sense of self. As with other kinds of ciPs, those representing the sense of self can be learned from experience, stored in memory, modified by subsequent experiences, and expressed in the form of decisions, choices, and commands. these ciPs are proposed here to be the actual physical basis for conscious thought and the sense of self. when active in wakefulness or dream states, the ciP representations of self act as an agent of the brain, metaphorically as an avatar. Because the selfhood ciP patterns may only have to represent the self and not directly represent the inner and outer worlds of embodied brain, the self representation should have more degrees of freedom than subconscious mind and may therefore have some capacity for a free-will mind of its own. several lines of evidence for this theory are reviewed. suggested new research includes identifying distinct combinatorially coded impulse patterns and their temporal coherence shifts in defined circuitry, such as neocortical microcolumns. this task might be facilitated by identifying the microtopography of field-potential oscillatory coherences among various regions and between different frequencies associated with specific conscious mentation. other approaches can include identifying the changes in discrete conscious operations produced by focal trans-cranial magnetic stimulation.

Concepts of "the self" and "self-awareness", and aspects of the experience of types of consciousness, are explored in terms of "cognitive" systems and their interactions. Some roles of the cerebrum, the cerebellum, and their interactions are considered in relation to sentient consciousness, the sense of self, and conscious regulation of behavior. This 'introductory paper' is composed of modified selected extracts from: totalBRAINtotalMIND Vol.1 : An Integrated Brain/Mind Architecture Part 2: A Cognitive Architecture (pp16 -136) Part 3. Total Brain: structure, development, function, and an integrated neurocognitive architecture (pp137-321). tBtM Vol.1 is now available as an e-book from: http://totalbraintotalmind.co.uk/

Mark Solms's hypothesis holds that two main body representations are housed in the brain: the sensorimotor body and the autonomic body. These two body representations would be associated with two different types of consciousness: cognitive consciousness and affective consciousness, respectively. According to Solms, cognitive consciousness is secondary and depends on the primary, brainstem-located, affective consciousness. The consequence of this is that Freud's id would be conscious, while the ego would be unconscious. In my commentary, while praising Solms for his emphasis on the inseparable relation between affect and consciousness, I challenge his rigidly dichotomous account of consciousness. In so doing, I vindicate the role played by the cortex and, in particular, the cortical motor system in generating the varieties of phenomenal self-awareness we entertain.

2016

Abstract: Self-consciousness is considered in a framework comprising four dimensions which are theoretically defined and supported by clinical neuropsychological evidence. Self-monitoring is defined as the ability to reflect on one’s own behaviour, with supporting evidence for deficits in this capacity noted in anosognosia syndrome. Self-feeling is defined as the capacity to feel all sensations related to one’s own body (interoception and exteroception), with supporting evidence from deficiencies occurring in alexithymia, psychosomatic states and Cotard’s delusion. Identity refers to the capacity to recognize an object as identical to oneself, based on autobiographic memory; pathological conditions related to this dimension include delusions of identity and the Zelig syndrome. Ownership is the capacity to perceive the status of ones’ own body, and is clinically altered in somatoparaphrenia. All four dimensions are related to specific brain networks. Keywords: Self-Monitoring; Self-F...

The New School psychology bulletin, 2008

Neuroscientific research methods, such as brain imaging techniques, have increasingly been applied to social cognitive research efforts and, in particular, to the study of the self. In this essay we discuss the ability of such research to shed light on the emergent, dynamic psychological phenomenon of self. Although neuroscientific tools can be useful for gaining general knowledge about associated underlying structures, a careful consideration of the methodological and theoretical issues discussed herein is necessary to avoid simplifying or reifying the self.

2011

I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception." These famous words of David Hume, on his inability to perceive the self, set the stage for JeeLoo Liu and John Perry's collection of essays on self-awareness and self-knowledge. This volume connects recent scientific studies on consciousness with the traditional issues about the self explored by Descartes, Locke, and Hume. Experts in the field offer contrasting perspectives on matters such as the relation between consciousness and self-awareness, the notion of personhood, and the epistemic access to one's own thoughts, desires, or attitudes. The volume will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and others working on the central topics of consciousness and the self.

We will discuss neurophysiological mechanisms of bodily self and others distinction in the parieto-premotor network. Integration of efference copy and sensory feedback is an essential factor for agency recognition. The parietal cortex may have a crucial role for these mechanisms. We also discuss shared representation of self and others in the brain.