Term Limits and Political Dynasties: Unpacking the Links

Philippine Political Science Journal, 2012

Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philippines, 2018

This chapter discusses the strategies of elite reproduction in the Philippine legislature. It identifies the traditional, new, emerging clans in the post- Marcos House of Representatives. Specifically, it elaborates the mechanisms by which political clans acquire, sustain, and reproduce power. Moreover, the chapter also underscores the persistence of political dynasties and failed attempts to regulate them.

Signifikan: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi, 2019

The purpose of this study is to investigate the phenomena of political dynasties in Indonesia and its effect on local government performance. Moreover, this study also examines the moderating role of good public governance on the relationship between political dynasties and local government performance. Political dynasties define as the condition where local government head/vice head has a family connection with the head/vice head from the previous period or in other local government or with the legislative member. We use paired matched sample from local government in Indonesia during 2010-2015. The result shows that political dynasties negatively affect local government performance. Good public governance is proven to weaken the negative effect of political dynasties on the local government performance. Indonesia's central government need to regulate the practice of political dynasty as it is proved to decrease local government performance and encourage implementation of good public governance to reduce the adverse effects of political dynasties.

2015

PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS researchers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking. The authors are, respectively, senior research fellow at PIDS, executive director of the Asian Institute of Management Rizalino S. Navarro Policy Center for Competitiveness (AIM-RSN-PCC), economist at the AIM-RSN-PCC, and research associate at the AIM-RSN-PCC. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of PIDS or any of the study’s sponsors. Policy Notes

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013

Political dynasties-members of the same family occupying elected positions sequentially for the same position or simultaneously across different positions-have become a common feature in many developing countries with democratic political systems. In the Philippines, for instance, political dynasties are prevalent in poorer regions, which lead to the following query: does poverty bring about political dynasties, or do political dynasties engender poverty? Using an instrumental variable technique to analyze metrics on political dynasties, we find strong evidence that poverty entrenches political dynasties but weak evidence that political dynasties reduce or exacerbate poverty.

The results of the 2013 Philippine mid-term elections highlighted the dominance of political dynasties in the country. With all 80 provinces littered with political families, 74 percent of the elected members of the House of Representatives came from such dynastic groups. Despite overwhelming recognition that political dynasties breed patronage politics and corruption, no substantial steps have been undertaken to address this issue. This article examines the general nature of Philippine political dynasties, the reasons for their continuing existence and their adverse impact on the country. This problem emanates basically from three factors: (1) the political and socioeconomic foundations upon which political dynasties are built; 2) the inability to effectively implement Philippine constitutional provisions by enacting an enabling law; and 3) the weakness of potential countervailing forces that would challenge political dynasties.

2007

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

Though no systematic cross-national data exist political dynasties seem common in some countries yet almost completely absent in others. Dynasties might be important because if dynastic politics is common it may prevent meritocratic access to position of political power, thus denying the political system talent. But what explains the existence and variation in the extent of political dynasties? The popular literature seems to point to culture, but we develop a theory based on the electoral system and party organisation. In short we expect dynasties to be more common where the electoral system is candidate based and where party organisations are personalised rather than institutionalised. Using a number of cases, Argentina, the US, the UK, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands and Israel we find support for our hypothesis.