This paper studies costly conflict in a world of complete information, in which society can commi... more This paper studies costly conflict in a world of complete information, in which society can commit to divisible transfers among all potentially warring groups. The difficulty in preventing conflict arises from the possibility that there may be several conflictual divisions of society, each based on a different marker, such as class, geography, religion, or ethnicity. It is shown that this diversity of societal markers is particularly conducive to social instability when potential conflict is over private, divisible resources. In contrast, when conflict is over public goods, such diversity promotes social stability.
On the existence of Markov-consistent plans under production uncertainty
The Review of Economic Studies, Jan 1, 1986
Abstract Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968) were among the first to study the behaviour of an econom... more Abstract Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968) were among the first to study the behaviour of an economic agent whose preferences change over time. They suggested that such an agent would choose a consistent plan which they described as the best plan that he would ...
... Extensions of a Measure of Polarization, (1999). Download: http://www.econ.nyu. edu/user/debr... more ... Extensions of a Measure of Polarization, (1999). Download: http://www.econ.nyu. edu/user/debraj/Papers/99egr.p CACHED: Download as a PDF. by Joan Esteban , Carlos Gradín , Debraj Ray , Carlos Gradín. Add To MetaCart. ...
We study inter-group conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group inc... more We study inter-group conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are "low", increasing group incomes raises violence against that group, and lowers violence generated by it. These correlations are tests for group aggression or victimization, which we apply to Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per-capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict, an increase in Hindu well-being has no significant effect. This robust empirical finding, combined with the theory, suggests that Hindu groups have been primarily responsible for Hindu-Muslim violence in post-Independence India.
This paper studies networks of informal insurance, and builds a model of risksharing which captur... more This paper studies networks of informal insurance, and builds a model of risksharing which captures two basic characteristics. First, informal insurance is fundamentally bilateral, and rarely consists of an explicit arrangement across several people. Second, insurance is often based on norms. In the model studied here, only directly linked agents make transfers to each other, though they are aware of the (aggregate) transfers each makes to others. A bilateral transfer arrangement between two linked agents is viewed as a norm determining agent consumptions given their income realizations and the transfers made to or received from other agents. Based on these bilateral transfer arrangements between all pairs of agents, a bilateral insurance scheme is viewed as a fixed point of the resulting mapping.
We model slack season wages in a village economy, in the presence of involuntary unemployment. Ou... more We model slack season wages in a village economy, in the presence of involuntary unemployment. Our model draws its inspiration from sociological notions of 'everyday peasant resistance'. In particular, labourers can react to employers who pay low slack wages by refusing to work for them in the relatively tight peak season. Such refusals, however, are not automatic and are modelled endogenously. A continuum of equilibrium wage configurations is obtained. These configurations, barring one, involve wages exceeding reservation wages, despite the presence of involuntary unemployment. Several qualitative observations follow. These are examined with respect to available empirical data, in particular, the village survey of Palanpur.
We model political parties as adaptive decision-makers who compete in a sequence of elections. Th... more We model political parties as adaptive decision-makers who compete in a sequence of elections. The key assumptions are that winners satisfice (the winning party in period t keeps its platform in t + 1) while losers search. Under fairly mild assumptions about losers' search rules, we show that the sequence of winning platforms is absorbed into the top cycle of the (finite) set of feasible platforms with probability one. This implies that if there is a majority rule winner then ultimately the incumbent party will espouse it. However, our model, unlike Downs-Hotelling or Kollman-Miller-Page, does not predict full convergence: we show, under weak assumptions about the out-party's search, that losing parties do not stabilize at the majority rule winner (should it exist). We also establish, both analytically and computationally, that the adaptive process is robust: if a majority rule winner "nearly" exists then the trajectory of winning platforms tends to be "close" to the trajectory of a process which actually has such a winner. -for their work on the computational model.
If we are to learn the right lessons from the tragedy of Nandigram, then we must ensure that the ... more If we are to learn the right lessons from the tragedy of Nandigram, then we must ensure that the government is involved in the land acquisition process and that we correctly deal with three sets of issues: the size and form of compensation, the eligibility for compensation and the credibility of the process.
Adapting to undernourishment: the clinical evidence and its implications
WIDER Working Papers, Jan 1, 1987
-Evidence for a recommended dietary allowance for vitamin C from pharmacokinetics: a comment and ... more -Evidence for a recommended dietary allowance for vitamin C from pharmacokinetics: a comment and analysis by Young, VR (Clinical Research Center Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.)(10 Dec 1996) in English
This paper examines the steady states of an overlapping generations economy with a given distribu... more This paper examines the steady states of an overlapping generations economy with a given distribution of household locations over a one-dimensional interval. Parents decide whether or not to educate their children. Educational decisions are affected by location: There are local complementarities in investment incentives stemming from aspirations formation, learning spillovers, or local public goods. At the same time, economy-wide wages endogenously adjust to bring factor supplies into line with demand. The model therefore combines local social interaction with global market interaction. The paper studies steady-state configurations of skill acquisition, both with and without segregation. The model is used to compare macroeconomic and welfare properties of segregated and unsegregated steady states. (JEL: D31, O15, D85) ment, Boston University, for hosting his visit for half a year, during which parts of this research project were carried out.
Uploads
Papers by Debraj Ray