Papers by Takashi Matsuhisa
Ieej Transactions on Power and Energy, 1992
and Test Method of Circuit-Breaker on Multi-Lightning Strokes Iwao Miyachi, Honorary Member (Aich... more and Test Method of Circuit-Breaker on Multi-Lightning Strokes Iwao Miyachi, Honorary Member (Aichi Institute of Technology) Tetsuo Uemura, Member (CRIEPI), Takashi Matsuhisa, Member (Takoka Mfg. Co.) Recently, research and inverstigation of multi-lightning strokes have been advanced. Making good use of their information, we have studied the interruption performance of SF6 gas circuit breaker (GCB) on multi-lightning strokes. In the case of GCB interruption on the trouble by multi-lightning strokes, we illustrate the phenomena occurring in GCB against time, and show the countermove, test method, test equipment and test result on model GCB in the case of most severe phenomenon of them, which is that lightning voltage is imposed on GCB just after interruption.
ロバストなメッセージによるナッシュ均衡に導くコミュニケーション-S5-知識モデルのケース
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2007
Adjustment of the Small Pig Alone Abdicating in a Mathematical System of Rational Pigs
Journal of Advanced Computing, 2014
In order to generalize the class rational pigs, called also boxed pigs, and research abdication i... more In order to generalize the class rational pigs, called also boxed pigs, and research abdication in a deep-going way, a mathematical system of rational pigs is introduced and the axiomatic method is applied. In the new system, the small pig alone abdicating can be changed to the case that each pig can abdicate by shortening the distance between the trough and the panel (DTP), or increasing the quantity of food into the trough (QFT), or both. An example shows that the system and theory can be applied in a lot of fields in management science economics.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2004
A pre-play communication-process is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic fo... more A pre-play communication-process is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game. In the communication process each player predicts the other players' actions, and he/she communicates privately his/her conjecture through message according to a protocol. All the players receiving the messages learn and revise their conjectures. We show that after a long round of the communication the profile of players' conjectures in the revision process leads a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
数理解析研究所講究録, Jun 1, 2007
A communication model in the p-belief system is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a ... more A communication model in the p-belief system is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game through robust messages. In the communication process each player predicts the
数理解析研究所講究録, Jul 1, 2001
We present communication process according to aprotocol which is associated with an awareness and... more We present communication process according to aprotocol which is associated with an awareness and belief model. In the model we impose none of the requirements for player's knowledge as those in the standard model with partitional information structure. We show that consensus on the posteriors for an event among all players can still be guaranteed in the communication if the protocol contains no cycle. Key words and phrases. Awareness, belief, communication process, consensus, protocol, agreeing to disagree, no trade theorem. This article is apreliminary version and the final form will be published elsewhere. 'Corresponding author. tSupported by the Grand-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)(2)(N0.12640145
Tsukuba journal of mathematics, Jun 1, 1990
This concept generalizes that of sharply multiply-transitive permutation groups, where a rich the... more This concept generalizes that of sharply multiply-transitive permutation groups, where a rich theory of sharp pairs has been developed and many examples are known ([2], [3], [6]). Moreover, F.
Communication Leading to Nash Equilibrium without Acyclic Condition (S4-Knowledge Model Case)
International Conference on Computational Science, 2004
In this paper the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is introduced, an... more In this paper the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is introduced, and it is shown that a communication among the players in a coalition leads to the equilibrium through messages. A coalition Nash equilibrium for a strategic game consists of (1) a subset S of players, (2) independent mixed strategies for each member of S, (3) the conjecture of the actions for the other players not in S with the condition that each member of S maximises his/her expected payoff according to the product of all mixed strategies for S and the other players' conjecture. However, this paper stands on the Bayesian point of view as follows: The players start with the same prior distribution on a state-space. In addition they have private information which is given by a reflexive and transitive binary relation on the state space. Each player in a coalition S predicts the other players' actions as the posterior of the others' actions given his/her information. He/she communicates privately their beliefs about the other players' actions through messages among all members in S according to the communication network in S, which message is information about his/her individual conjecture about the others' actions. The recipients update their belief by the messages. Precisely, at every stage each player communicates privately not only his/her belief about the others' actions but also his/her rationality as messages according to a protocol and then the recipient updates their private information and revises her/his prediction. In this circumstance, we show that the conjectures of the players in a coalition S regarding the future beliefs converge in the long run communication, which lead to a coalition Nash equilibrium for the strategic game.
given in terms of game theory. It is shown for the models that two utility maximizing players mus... more given in terms of game theory. It is shown for the models that two utility maximizing players must take the same actions if they mutually believe that each takes a dominant action, even when they have different informations. We remark that the logic $L^{um}$ have the finite model property. 1. INTRODUCTION Recently researchers in such diverse fields as Economics, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, and Computer Sciences have become interested in reasoning about knowledge. There are pragmatic concerns about the relationship between knowledge and actions, and there are also concerns about the complexity of computing knowledge. Of most interested is the emphasis on considering situation involving the knowledge of a group of players rather than that of a single player. The purpose of this talk is to develop a theory of decision making among a group of players under uncertainty based on modal logic rather than on probability measures (as in the standard theory.) It is the theory of ' maximizing utility' in which all players are utility maximizers; that is, each player takes the actions being best response to his utility. In the theory there is a 'logic of belief' in which a given proposition is either believed, or disbelieved, or neither believed nor disbelieved.
In this paper the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is introduced, an... more In this paper the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is introduced, and it is shown that a communication among the players in a coalition leads to the equilibrium through messages. A coalition Nash equilibrium for a strategic game consists of (1) a subset S of players, (2) independent mixed strategies for each member of S, (3) the conjecture of the actions for the other players not in S with the condition that each member of S maximises his/her expected payoff according to the product of all mixed strategies for S and the other players' conjecture. However, this paper stands on the Bayesian point of view as follows: The players start with the same prior distribution on a state-space. In addition they have private information which is given by a reflexive and transitive binary relation on the state space. Each player in a coalition S predicts the other players' actions as the posterior of the others' actions given his/her information. He/she communicates privately their beliefs about the other players' actions through messages among all members in S according to the communication network in S, which message is information about his/her individual conjecture about the others' actions. The recipients update their belief by the messages. Precisely, at every stage each player communicates privately not only his/her belief about the others' actions but also his/her rationality as messages according to a protocol and then the recipient updates their private information and revises her/his prediction. In this circumstance, we show that the conjectures of the players in a coalition S regarding the future beliefs converge in the long run communication, which lead to a coalition Nash equilibrium for the strategic game.
数理解析研究所講究録, Aug 1, 1999
problem of a mixd stratey Nash equilibrium has been known to be important and a number of the int... more problem of a mixd stratey Nash equilibrium has been known to be important and a number of the interpretations has been proposed. Aumann and Brandenburger [Econometrica, $\mathrm{V}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}.63(1995)$ , No.5, 1161-1180] has succaedd in giving an epistemic interpretation of a mixed strategy Naeh equilibrium as conjectures on the part of other $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\epsilon$ : When there is a common-prior, mutual knowledge of the payoff-functions and of rationality, and common-knowledge of the conjecturae, imply that the conjecturae form a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Where common-knowledge of something is the infinite $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\epsilon \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ of mutual knowledge of it; that is, all players know it and they know that they know it and they know that they know that they know it and so on. In the standard model of knowledge as like ae the Aumann and Brandenburger model, the players are implicitly assumed to have $lo\dot{\varphi}\mathrm{c}ally$ omniscient abihty; that is, they know every tautoloy and know all the implications of their knowledge. The assumptions about common-knowledge and about logicaly omniscient ability are evidently problematic in the sense that thaee are not realistic at all.
KES-AMSTA, 2013, 2013
This paper is to introduce the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game, and... more This paper is to introduce the new concept of coalition Nash equilibrium of a strategic game, and to show that a communication among the players in a coalition leads to the equilibrium through messages. A coalition Nash equilibrium for a strategic game consists of (1) a subset S of players,(2) independent mixed strategies for each member of S,(3) the conjecture of the actions for the other players not in S with the condition that each member of S maximises his/her expected payoff according to the product of all mixed strategies for S and the other players’ conjecture. However, this paper stands on the Bayesian point of view as follows: The players start with the same prior distribution on a state-space. In addition they have private information which is given by a partition of the state space. Each player in a coalition S predicts the other players’ actions as the posterior of the others’ actions given his/her information. He/she communicates privately their beliefs about the other players’ actions through messages among all members in S according to the communication network in S, which message is information about his/her individual conjecture about the others’ actions. The recipients update their belief by the messages. Precisely, at every stage each player communicates privately not only his/her belief about the others’ actions but also his/her rationality as messages according to a protocol and then the recipient updates their private information and revises her/his prediction. In this circumstance, we show that the conjectures of the players in a coalition S regarding the future beliefs converge in the long run communication, which lead to a coalition
We investigate a pure exchange economy under uncertainty with emphasis on the logical point of vi... more We investigate a pure exchange economy under uncertainty with emphasis on the logical point of view; the traders are assumed to have nonpartitional information structures corresponding to a multi-modal logic. We propose a pure exchange economy for the multi-modal logic KT, and give the generalized notion of rational expectations equilibrium for the economy. We establish the finite model property for the logic KT and the existence of the generalized rational expectation equilibrium. Further, we characterize welfare under the generalized rational expectations equilibrium in an economy EKT for logic KT.
数理解析研究所講究録, 2002
We present the notion of robust models for amixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a strategic form g... more We present the notion of robust models for amixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game and to introduce a group structure on the class of these models. Prom the algebraic point of view we give $\mathrm{a}$ characterization of the class of robust models by the class of epistemic models with common-knowledge of conjectures about the other players' actions.
When Moral Hazard between Principal and Agents Disappear? On Role of Common-Knowledge in a Principal-Agent Model
Issues of moral hazard and adverse selection abound in each and every contract where one has a se... more Issues of moral hazard and adverse selection abound in each and every contract where one has a self interest and information that the other party does not possess. While this is a fertile research area, there is still need for more information on how you handle a party to a contract with more information than you. The Global Financial Crisis is an epitome of the moral hazard: managers and employees (as agents) and shareholders as principals. In fact, still perplexes bankers and shareholders alike: shareholders are still having problems with how they can handle their agents (management), while on the other hand insurers and bankers are struggling to structure products that will reduce the impact of moral hazard. This article re-examines a principal-agent model with moral hazard from the epistemic point of view. It highlights hidden conditions for a possible resolution of the moral hazard between the principal and the agents. In this paper we point out the sharing information as above...
Quarterly Journal of Operations Research (4OR) Vol. 10 No.1, 2012
This article characterises stable sets in preordered sets. We show that every stable subset of a ... more This article characterises stable sets in preordered sets. We show that every stable subset of a preordered set is characterised as a fixed point of the mapping assigning the set of all its maximal elements to each upper bounded subset of the preordered set. This result gives a characterisation of stable sets in strategic games with transitive preferences.
Discussion Paper #2002-12 CORE EQUIVALENCE IN ECONOMY UNDER GENERALIZED INFORMATION by
Abstract. We investigate a pure exchange atomless economy under uncertainty with emphasis on an e... more Abstract. We investigate a pure exchange atomless economy under uncertainty with emphasis on an epistemic point of view, where the traders are assumed to have a non-partitional information structure. We propose a generalized notion of rational expectations equilibrium for the economy and we show the core equivalence theorem: The ex-post core for the economy coincides with the set of all its rational expectations equilibria.
Communication Reaching Consensus through Robust Messages (Algorithmic and Computational Theory in Algebra and Languages)
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Papers by Takashi Matsuhisa