Papers by Joseph Berkovitz

Quantum nonlocality : an analysis of the implications of Bell's Theorem and quantum correlations for nonlocality
Bell's Theorem demonstrates that factorizable theories for the EPR experiment (EPR) cannot re... more Bell's Theorem demonstrates that factorizable theories for the EPR experiment (EPR) cannot reproduce the quantum correlations. Factorizability is motivated by various locality conditions. So to understand the nature of nonlocality in EPR, we first need to understand the conceptual relations between factorizability, these various locality conditions and the nature of the quantum correlations. That is the main focus of my thesis. My main conclusion is that these conceptual relations are more subtle than the literature has usually suggested. Chapter 1 is a general introduction. In Chapter 2, I review the general framework of factorizable stochastic theories for EPR. I argue that factorizability can be motivated by various locality conditions, even in theories that admit time-dependent states and take the measurement interactions to be neither instantaneous, nor simultaneous. In Chapter 3, I focus on Cartwright' s (1989) and Humphreys' (1989) theories of probabilistic causation for singular events, which are based on modifications of traditional causal linear modelling. I argue (against Cartwright) that local models for EPR in the framework of these theories are committed to factorizability; and so they cannot reproduce the EPR correlations. In Chapter 4, I turn to Stochastic-Einstein Locality (SEL). Hellman (1982) proposed that SEL with some provisos characterizes the No-Superluminal-Action (NSA) of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), and he argued that SEL is not violated in EPR. Butterfield (1994) proposed that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) characterizes the lack of superluminal Lewisian causation, and he argued that SEL is violated in EPR. I argue that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) is motivated by NSA and spatiotemporal separability. Thus, the violation of SEL might arise from the failure of spatiotemporal separability. And this failure is compatible with NSA and superluminal Lewisian causation. Accordingly, Hellman's and Butterfield's views need not be in tension. In Chapter 5, I focus on the implicati [...]

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2017
Quantum mechanics portrays the universe as involving non-local influences that are difficult to r... more Quantum mechanics portrays the universe as involving non-local influences that are difficult to reconcile with relativity theory. By postulating backward causation, retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics could circumvent such influences and, accordingly, increase the prospects of reconciling these theories. The postulation of backward causation poses various challenges for retrocausal interpretations of quantum mechanics and for the existing conceptual frameworks for analyzing counterfactual dependence, causation and causal explanation, which are important for studying these interpretations. In this chapter, we consider the nature of time, causation and explanation in a local, deterministic retro-causal interpretation of quantum mechanics that is inspired by Bohmian mechanics. This interpretation, the 'causally symmetric Bohmian model', offers a deterministic, local 'hidden-variables' model of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bohm experiment that presents a new challenge for Reichenbach's principle of the common cause. In this model, the common cause-the 'complete' state of the particles at the emission from the source-screens off the correlation between its effects-the distant measurement outcomes-but nevertheless fails to explain it. 8.1 Introduction: The Background and the Plan of the Chapter The arrow of time and the time-asymmetry of causation are closely related. Yet, the exact relation between them is a matter of ongoing discussion and controversy. Some authors maintain that causal asymmetry is related to temporal asymmetry by definition. They define causation in terms of temporal asymmetry, so that causes
Book review: explaining chaos
Review of: Peter Smith, Explaining chaos. Cambridge: Cambridge univeristy Press, 1998. ISBN 0 521... more Review of: Peter Smith, Explaining chaos. Cambridge: Cambridge univeristy Press, 1998. ISBN 0 521 47747 6
The ergodic hierarchy
The so-called ergodic hierarchy (EH) is a central part of ergodic theory. It is a hierarchy of pr... more The so-called ergodic hierarchy (EH) is a central part of ergodic theory. It is a hierarchy of properties that dynamical systems can possess. Its five levels are egrodicity, weak mixing, strong mixing, Kolomogorov, and Bernoulli. Although EH is a mathematical theory, its concepts have been widely used in the foundations of statistical physics, accounts of randomness, and discussions about the nature of chaos. We introduce EH and discuss its applications in these fields.
Erkenntnis, 2015
Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +B... more Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2001
Explaining Chaos is an informative, original and enjoyable introduction to chaos theory and its a... more Explaining Chaos is an informative, original and enjoyable introduction to chaos theory and its associated philosophical problems. The book does not presuppose any previous background in chaos theory. Nevertheless, the discussion may be as interesting to experienced readers as it is to novices. In particular, several mathematical interludes deepen the discussion of technical issues and provide numerous interesting insights that could further enlighten readers already familiar with the central ideas. The reader will ®nd an accessible discussion striking a good balance between scienti®c and philosophical topics. Unfortunately, the physical and the philosophical parts are uneven in quality. While the treatment of the scienti®c issues is thorough and skilful, the philosophical discussions have signi®cant lacunas. Nevertheless, Smith's enthusiasm for exploring these issues is contagious and the book is a valuable contribution to a ®eld that has, despite its importance, received little attention from philosophers so far. Explaining Chaos consists of ten chapters that could be divided into two main categories: the mathematics and physics of chaos, and the implications of chaos for scienti®c practice and methodology. In Chapters 1 (dynamical systems), 2 (fractals), 6 (universality), 8 (experimental evidence for chaos), and 9 (randomness), Smith introduces the central topics of chaos theory and discusses important results. In Chapter 10, he addresses the question of how chaos could adequately be de®ned. On the whole, these chapters provide a very knowledgeable and skilful presentation of the basics of chaos theory. In Chapters 3 (models and simplicity), 4 (prediction), 5 (approximate truth), and 7 (explanation), Smith considers the methodological implications of chaos theory. Here, he aims at showing that chaos, though an interesting and exciting ®eld of investigation, by no means requires a revision of the basic traits of scienti®c methodology. Smith successfully resists the temptation to be carried away by fancy bold claims and, on the contrary, argues that chaos theory may be considered a respectable tool for decent scienti®c research.
Recent no go theorems by Dickson and Clifton (1998), Arntzenius (1998) and Myrvold (2002) demonst... more Recent no go theorems by Dickson and Clifton (1998), Arntzenius (1998) and Myrvold (2002) demonstrate that current modal interpretations are incompatible with relativity. In this paper we propose strategies for how to circumvent these theorems. We further show how these strategies can be developped into new modal interpretations in which the properties of systems are in general either holistic or relational. We explicitly write down an outline of dynamics for these properties which does not pick out a preferred foliation of spacetime.
The Nature of Causality in Quantum Phenomena
Theoria-revista De Teoria Historia Y Fundamentos De La Ciencia, 2000
The correlations between distant systems in typical quantum situations, such as Einstein-Podolosk... more The correlations between distant systems in typical quantum situations, such as Einstein-Podolosky-Rosen experiments, strongly suggest that the quantum realm involves curious types of non-local influences. In this paper, I study in detail the nature of these non-local influences, as depicted by various quantum theories. I show how different quantum theories realise non-locality in different ways, which reflect different ontogical settings

Some Reflections on “Going Beyond the Consensus View” of the Nature of Science in K–12 Science Education
Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education
Hodson and Wong (2017, this issue) argue that, though the nature of science (NOS) is now an estab... more Hodson and Wong (2017, this issue) argue that, though the nature of science (NOS) is now an established focus of school science education and a key element in defining scientific literacy, “the consensus view” of NOS misrepresents contemporary scientific practice. They then propose a number of alternative approaches to science curriculum building. I agree with Hodson and Wong’s criticism of the consensus view of NOS. I also like many aspects of their proposals and believe that they would enrich the curriculum and present students with a much more realistic picture of science. But I have an important reservation about these proposals. Hodson and Wong’s view of NOS is largely ahistorical in that they seem to focus only on contemporary science. Such a focus may lead to a distorted picture of science and its history, portraying science as little more than a mirror image of contemporary science. In order to understand the nature of science, it is vital to learn its history. I conclude by briefly commenting on the role that the history, philosophy, and sociology of science should play in shaping a vision for science education that would inspire creativity, open-mindedness, critical thinking, and respect for different cultures and conceptions of the world.RésuméHodson et Wong affirment que, bien que la nature des sciences/nature of science (NOS) soitmaintenant un aspect reconnu de l’enseignement des sciences à l’école et un élément clé dans la définition de la culture scientifique, le consensus dominant enNOSdonne une fausse représentation des pratiques scientifiques contemporaines. Les auteurs proposent donc d’autres approches pour le développement des curriculums. Je suis d’accord avec leur critique du consensus. J’apprécie de nombreux éléments de leurs propositions, qui à mon avis pourraient enrichir le curriculum et présenter aux étudiants une vision beaucoup plus réaliste des sciences. Cela dit, j’ai aussi de sérieux doutes, car la conception qu’ont Hodson et Wong de la nature des sciences est en grande partie non-historique, centrée principalement sur les sciences contemporaines. Cela risque de donner une vision déformée des sciences et de l’histoire des sciences, dont le portrait ne serait ici que le miroir des sciences contemporaines. Afin de comprendre la « nature des sciences », il est essentiel d’en connaître l’histoire. Je termine par un bref commentaire sur le rôle que devraient jouer l’histoire, la philosophie et la sociologie des sciences dans une conception de l’enseignement des sciences capable de favoriser la créativité, l’ouverture d’esprit, la pensée critique et le respect des différentes cultures et visions du monde.
The nature of causality in quantum phenomena : Causality in Physics
Theoria, 2000
The correlations between distant systems in typical quantum situations, such as Einstein-Podolosk... more The correlations between distant systems in typical quantum situations, such as Einstein-Podolosky-Rosen experiments, strongly suggest that the quantum realm involves curious types of non-local influences. In this paper, I study in detail the nature of these non-local influences, as depicted by various quantum theories. I show how different quantum theories realise non-locality in different ways, which reflect different ontological settings.

Quantum, Probability, Logic, 2020
The mathematical nature of modern physics suggests that mathematics is bound to play some role in... more The mathematical nature of modern physics suggests that mathematics is bound to play some role in explaining physical reality. Yet, there is an ongoing controversy about the prospects of mathematical explanations of physical facts and their nature. A common view has it that mathematics provides a rich and indispensable language for representing physical reality but that, ontologically, physical facts are not mathematical and, accordingly, mathematical facts cannot really explain physical facts. In what follows, I challenge this common view. I argue that, in addition to its representational role, in modern physics mathematics is constitutive of the physical. Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, I propose an account of explanation in which mathematical frameworks, structures, and facts explain physical facts. In this account, mathematical explanations of physical facts are either species of physical explanations of physical facts in which the mathematical constitution of some physical facts in the explanans are highlighted, or simply explanations in which the mathematical constitution of physical facts are highlighted. In highlighting the mathematical constitution of physical facts, mathematical explanations of physical facts deepen and increase the scope of the understanding of the explained physical facts. I argue that, unlike other accounts of mathematical explanations of physical facts, the proposed account is not subject to the objection that mathematics only represents the physical facts that actually do the explanation. I conclude by briefly considering the implications that the mathematical constitution of the physical has for the question of the unreasonable effectiveness of the use of mathematics in physics. Outline 1 The orthodoxy 2 An alternative perspective 3 On the relationship between mathematics and physics 4 On conceptions of mathematical constitution of the physical 5 On the common view of how mathematical models represent physical reality 6 On the notion of the physical 7 On the scope of the mathematical constitution of the physical 8 A sketch of a new account of mathematical explanation of physical facts 9 On mathematical explanations of physical facts 9.1 On a D-N explanation of the life cycle of 'periodical' cicadas 9.2 On structural explanation of the uncertainty relations 9.3 On abstract explanation of the impossibility of a minimal tour across the bridges of Königsberg 9.4 On explanations by constraints that are more necessary than laws of nature 10 Is the effectiveness of mathematics in physics unreasonable?
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
De Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjective school of probability. He held that p... more De Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjective school of probability. He held that probabilities are subjective, coherent degrees of expectation, and he argued that none of the objective interpretations of probability make sense. While his theory has been influential in science and philosophy, it has encountered various objections. I argue that these objections overlook central aspects of de Finetti's philosophy of probability and are largely unfounded. I propose a new interpretation of de Finetti's theory that highlights these aspects and explains how they are an integral part of de Finetti's instrumentalist philosophy of probability. I conclude by drawing an analogy between misconceptions about de Finetti's philosophy of probability and common misconceptions about instrumentalism.

The World According to De Finetti
Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where ... more Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where probabilities are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. His work on the relation between the theorems of probability and rationality is among the corner stones of modern subjective probability theory. De Finetti maintained that rationality requires that degrees of belief be coherent, and he argued that the whole of probability theory could be derived from these coherence conditions. De Finetti’s interpretation of probability has been highly influential in science. This paper focuses on the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics. We argue that de Finetti held that the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events depend on their verifiability. Accordingly, the standard coherence conditions of degrees of belief that are familiar from the literature on subjective probability only apply to degrees of belief in events which could (in principle) be jointly verified; and the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events that cannot be jointly verified are weaker. While the most obvious explanation of de Finetti’s verificationism is the influence of positivism, we argue that it could be motivated by the radical subjectivist and instrumental nature of probability in his interpretation; for as it turns out, in this interpretation it is difficult to make sense of the idea of coherent degrees of belief in, and accordingly probabilities of unverifiable events. We then consider the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics, concentrating on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and Bell’s theorem.

Quantum mechanics portrays the universe as involving non-local influences that are difficult to r... more Quantum mechanics portrays the universe as involving non-local influences that are difficult to reconcile with relativity theory. By postulating backward causation, retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics could circumvent these influences and accordingly increase the prospects of reconciling quantum mechanics with relativity. The postulation of backward causation poses various challenges for the retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics and for the existing conceptual frameworks for analyzing counterfactual dependence, causation and causal explanation, which are important for studying these interpretations. In this chapter, we consider the nature of time, causation and explanation in a local, deterministic retro-causal interpretation of quantum mechanics that is inspired by Bohmian mechanics. This interpretation, the so-called 'causally symmetric Bohmian model', offers a deterministic, local 'hidden-variables' model of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment that poses a new challenge for Reichenbach's principle of the common cause. In this model, the common cause – the 'complete' state of particles at the emission from the source – screens off the correlation between its effects – the distant measurement outcomes – but nevertheless fails to explain it. Plan of the chapter: 0 Introduction/abstract 1 The background 2 The main idea of retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics 3 Backward causation and causal loops: the complications 4 Arguments for the impossibility of backward causation and causal loops 5 The block universe, time, backward causation and causal loops 6 On prediction and explanation in indeterministic retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics 7 Bohmian Mechanics
The World According to de Finetti: On de Finetti’s Theory of Probability and Its Application to Quantum Mechanics
The Frontiers Collection, 2011
The Ergodic hierarchy, randomness and chaos
Review of Peter Smith: "Explaining Chaos
A common view has it that there is a tension between quantum phenomena and the special theory of ... more A common view has it that there is a tension between quantum phenomena and the special theory of relativity. Yet, an ongoing debate concerning the prospects of relativistic quantum theories persists. In this paper, I consider two recent arguments for the impossibility of certain relativistic quantum theories, due to Arntzenius (1994) and Maudlin (1994). The main idea of both arguments
On Causal Inference in Determinism and Indeterminism
Uploads
Papers by Joseph Berkovitz