Douglas Porch

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French Military Rule in Morocco: Colonialism and Its Consequences

The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 2001

Page 1. French Military Rule in Morocco Colonialism and its Consequences MOSHE GERSHOVICH Page 2.... more

Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life (review)

The Journal of Military History, 2003

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Book Review of Early Trench Tactics in the French Army written by Jonathan Krause, reviewed by Douglas Porch

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At the Edge of the World. The Heroic Century of the French Foreign Legion

History: Reviews of New Books, 2018

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5. Cultural Legacies of French Intelligence

Reforming Intelligence, 2007

Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkage and Future Prospects as Modified by Trends in Globalization

The study extends the analysis of the economic benefits of naval forward presence undertaken by t... more The study extends the analysis of the economic benefits of naval forward presence undertaken by the Naval Postgraduate School in two previous studies: QDR97 and FY2000. The first of those studies developed an operational methodology for quantifying these benefits. Drawing on that methodology, significant economic benefits were found associated with naval operations in the Arabian Gulf The second study expanded the QDR97 effort in several important directions. First, event analysis was introduced to link naval activity with price movements in key commodity, exchange, and share markets. Second, several additional cases, one not directly involving oil, were developed to assess the generality of our findings. The findings of the first study were confirmed with naval forward presence/crisis response shown to produce extensive economic benefits for the US economy in each of the cases examined. The current study places the two previous ones in a larger context. Here the linkages between naval forward presence/crisis response and oil prices are examint!d in the context of changes in the global economy and the various dimensions of globalization. An operational procedure is developed to measure the various facets of globalization and track their movements over time. The magnitude of oil price shocks' effect on domestic economies is shown to depend critically on the global environment in which they occur. In all, the three studies paint a similar picture-that of naval forward presence playing an increasingly important role in stabilizing the economies of the advanced industrial nations. Other parts of the world benefit also, although trends in globalization suggest the economic gains that accrue from naval forward presence are of a lower magnitude. 14. SUBJECT TERMS naval forward presence, globalization, economic benefits, econometrics 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT OFffiiSPAGE Unclassified Unclassified

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Terminating America's wars : the Gulf War and Kosovo

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per res... more Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports,

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French war plans, 1914: The ‘Balance of Power Paradox’

Journal of Strategic Studies, 2006

Abstract Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to... more Abstract Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot.

Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life (review)

The Journal of Military History, 2003

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The Bloody Road to Tunis: Destruction of the Axis Forces in North Africa, November 1942-May 1943

The Journal of Military History, 2001

French spies and counter‐spies

Intelligence and National Security, 1987

Paul Paillole, Notre espion chez Hitler (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1985). Pp. 287 Ff.85.Jean Rochet,... more

Strategic Insights, Volume 3, Issue 4, April 2004, Europe, America and the War on Terror

... Indeed, Zinni asks why the US military keeps getting &quot;stuck&quot; in places like... more ... Indeed, Zinni asks why the US military keeps getting &quot;stuck&quot; in places like Somalia and Iraq without the force structure to carry out post-conflict reconstruction. ... &quot;The transmission of the Europeanmiracle to the rest of the world has become Europe&#x27;s new mission civilisatrice ...

How Bush Was' Churchilled'in Iraq

Rather than the cakewalk assault allegedly promised by Iraqi exiles and echoed in Pentagon circle... more Rather than the cakewalk assault allegedly promised by Iraqi exiles and echoed in Pentagon circles on the "central front in the War on Terror," increasingly Iraq appears to have become a distracting detour into a debilitating sideshow war. It may have been, as Walter Russell Mead argues, that the invasion of Iraq was a good case badly made by the Bush administration. Since it took office, the Bush administration has argued that the United States should return to strategies of preemption, unilateralism and hegemony that characterized American national security strategy in the nineteenth century, rather than rely on the passé Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence.[1] These strategies offer an offensive posture that signals to potential terrorists, and their state sponsors, that they face a first strike or subsequent retaliation from overwhelming U.S. power anywhere in the world. The logic for such a strategy seems infallible: "Therapy will not work on these kinds of people," the American President declared of terrorists. "Treaties make no sense. There's only one thing: Get them before they get us, stay on the offensive." Furthermore, the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) available to the West's enemies make a strategy of retaliation for violence done a luxury that no nation, least of all the United States, can afford. The ways of deliberative multilateral consultation are out of date, even dangerous. The U.S. message is that, "old-fashioned power politics in an era of weapons of mass destruction is a sure road to ruin," writes Mead.[2] Furthermore, preemption, the Siamese twin of unilateralism, is as American as apple pie.

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Europe, America and the 'War on Terror

Strategic Insights, 2004

... Even conservative commentator David Brooks has noted that the &amp;quot;War on Terror&amp... more ... Even conservative commentator David Brooks has noted that the &amp;quot;War on Terror&amp;quot; has allowed George W. Bush to offer, at least in his estimation, an &amp;quot;idealistic&amp;quot; and forceful international vision in part to mask a &amp;quot;prosaic&amp;quot; domestic agenda.[53] The American President has become ...

The Other Gulf War: British Intervention in Iraq, 1941

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The Road to Sedan: The French Army, 1866-70

The American Historical Review, 1985

JEAN-FRANCOIS CHANET. Vers l'armee nouvelle: Republique conservatrice et reforme militaire 1871-1879. (Histoire.) Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. 2006. Pp. 320. 22.00

The American Historical Review, 2007

The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN

Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2011

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The Other 'Gulf War' -- The British Invasion of Iraq in 1941

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict, Dec 2, 2002

The present debate over "regime change" in Iraq conceals a little known irony-it offers a cast of... more The present debate over "regime change" in Iraq conceals a little known irony-it offers a cast of characters and a reprise of arguments that shaped an earlier invasion of that country. The invasion in question was not the Gulf War of 1991-rather, it was the British invasion of 1941. In May 1941, in the midst of a World War, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered his reluctant Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, to march on Baghdad to effect a "regime change." The British Prime Minister's arguments reflected many of those same concerns expressed today by members of the George W. Bush administration: British intervention would "pre-empt" Axis support for Rachid Ali, a violently anti-British Arab nationalist whose government threatened Britain's strategic position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It would strike a blow at a terrorist challenge orchestrated by a charismatic Islamic cleric. British intervention also would protect oil reserves vital to the British war effort. Furthermore, Churchill was willing to wave aside offers of third-party mediation in favor of a "unilateralist" approach. Conversely, Wavell's arguments against an invasion of Iraq mirrored contemporary objections-he simply lacked the resources to add Iraq to an impossibly extensive list of military commitments. A military attack, Wavell believed, would make Britain's position in the Middle East less, not more, secure. Better let sleeping dogs lie and take care of pressing business elsewhere.

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Surprise and Intelligence Failure

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict, Sep 6, 2002

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