Papers by Daniel Angel Alvarez Greco
Journal of Philosophy, 2016
How slack are requirements of rationality? Given a body of evidence, is there just one perfectly ... more How slack are requirements of rationality? Given a body of evidence, is there just one perfectly rational doxastic state to be in given that evidence? Defenders of Uniqueness answer 'yes' while defenders of Permissivism answer 'no.' For Permissivists, rationality gives you a certain amount of leeway in what to believe, with the result that rational people with the same evidence can nonetheless disagree with each other. By contrast, Uniqueness theorists hold that if two agents share the same total evidence and are rational in evaluating that evidence, they must have the same beliefs in response to that evidence. 1 The debate over Uniqueness and Permissivism is important in its own right, but it also has implications for a number of other epistemological disputes. First, it has taken on a central role in debates about the epistemology of disagreement and the role of higher-order evidence. 2 Second, it bears on whether requirements of rationality are diachronic, concerning how your beliefs at different times ought to be related to each other, or only synchronic, concerning only how your beliefs are at particular times, and 1 Uniqueness and Permissivism are compatible with any number of views about how to conceive of rational doxastic states-they could be sets of binary (on/off) beliefs, or credence functions, or pairs consisting of a credence function and a set of binary beliefs, or all manner of other possibilities. What Uniqueness says is that given a body of total evidence, there's a unique doxastic state (whatever structure that might have) that it's rational to be in, while Permissivism denies this.
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4, 2013
I present a straightforward objection to the view that what we know has epistemic probability 1: ... more I present a straightforward objection to the view that what we know has epistemic probability 1: when combined with Bayesian decision theory, the view seems to entail implausible conclusions concerning rational choice. I consider and reject three responses. The first holds that the fault is with decision theory, rather than the view that knowledge has probability 1. The second two try to reconcile the claim that knowledge has probability 1 with decision theory by appealing to contextualism and sensitive invariantism, respectively. I argue that each response fails, and that we can hold on to much of what was attractive in the responses while denying that what we know has probability 1. For helpful comments and discussion, thanks to Alan Hájek, Agustin Rayo, Robert Stalnaker, Roger White, two anonymous referees for Oxford Studies in Epistemology as well as the editors thereof, and audiences at MIT and the ANU.
The idea that certain philosophical debates are "merely verbal" has historically been raised as a... more The idea that certain philosophical debates are "merely verbal" has historically been raised as a challenge against (large parts of) metaphysics. In this paper, I explore an analogous challenge to large parts of epistemology, which is motivated by recent arguments in experimental philosophy. I argue that, while this challenge may have some limited success, it cannot serve as a wedge case for wide-ranging skepticism about the substantiveness of epistemological debates; most epistemological debates are immune to the worries it raises.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2014
That our mental lives are not transparent to us is one of the few Freudian doctrines that has bee... more That our mental lives are not transparent to us is one of the few Freudian doctrines that has been robustly confirmed by subsequent psychological research. Nevertheless, much work in the philosophy of language, as well as formal work in economics and computer science, assumes various "iteration principles" that can seem to conflict with this psychological truism. By "iteration principles" I have in mind principles like the following: (KK) If S knows that P , then S knows that S knows that P . (BB) If S believes that P , then S believes that S believes that P . 1 These principles tell us that certain epistemic and doxastic operators (knowledge and belief, in these cases) automatically iterate. While KK and BB are probably the most well known iteration principles of interest to philosophers, I hope that my discussion For helpful comments and discussion, thanks to Adam Elga and Augstín Rayo (as well as the participants in their fall 2011 seminar on "Representation and Fragmentation"), Damien Rochford, Miriam Schoenfield, Robert Stalnaker, Jonathan Vogel, Roger White, three anonymous referees for the 2013 Young Epistemologist Prize, and audiences at the Universities of Birmingham and Leeds. 1 Many writers find the unqualified versions of iteration principles listed above extremely implausible, on the grounds that they lead to infinite regresses-if S knows that P , and an unqualified version of KK holds, then S knows that S knows that S knows...ad infintum. I do not find this consequence nearly as implausible as do many philosophers, but for those who do, there are available readings of the principles that don't imply actual regresses (but merely potential ones). For example, KK can be formulated so that it merely implies that one is always in a position to know that one knows that P whenever one knows that P , and BB can be formulated so that it merely implies that one is always disposed to come to believe that one believes that P , whenever one believes that P . In this paper I'll discuss a pair of paradigmatic examples of the opacity of the mental. Both can be seen as counterexamples to iteration principles like KK and BB. However, I'll distinguish two strategies for making sense of the examples, and only on one of these strategies, which I'll call the "anti-iteration" strategy, are the examples straightforward counterexamples to iteration principles. On the other strategy, which I'll call the "fragmentation" strategy, matters are more complicated, and there is the possibility of defending versions of iteration principles like KK and BB while acknowledging that our mental lives are not transparent to us. While the anti-iteration and fragmentation strategies are not strictly speaking inconsistent with one another, they do compete, since they do similar explanatory work. That they compete is significant, as I suspect many philosophers have been sympathetic to both strategies, and have failed to notice that adopting the fragmentation strategy undercuts much of the motivation for adopting the anti-iteration strategy. After introducing the examples and the two different strategies for making sense of them, I'll ultimately offer one argument in favor of the fragmentation strategy and against the anti-iteration strategy. I'll argue that the fragmentation strategy provides a satisfying way of making sense of the opacity of the mental, while also saving what's attractive about iteration principles.
The epistemology of ‘just is’-statements
Philosophical Studies, 2014
Agustín Rayo’s The Construction of Logical Space offers an exciting and ambitious defense of a br... more Agustín Rayo’s The Construction of Logical Space offers an exciting and ambitious defense of a broadly Carnapian approach to metaphysics. This essay will focus on one of the main differences between Rayo’s and Carnap’s approaches. Carnap distinguished between analytic, a priori “meaning postulates”, and empirical claims, which were both synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. Like meaning postulates, they determine the boundaries of logical space. But Rayo is skeptical that the a priori/a posteriori or analytic/synthetic distinctions can do the work Carnap wanted them to, so unlike meaning postulates, ‘just is’-statements aren’t assumed to be analytic or knowable a priori. This essay will concern the epistemology of ‘just is’-statements in Rayo’s picture. If not by a priori reflection, how can we determine which ones to accept? I’ll distinguish two competing strands in Rayo’s work. The less radical, Lewisian strand holds that the question of whether to accept a ‘just is’-statement can be addressed in a neutral, non-question-begging way, by a kind of cost-benefit analysis. The more radical, Kuhnian strand holds that there can be no ‘just is’-statement-independent, rational choice of which ‘just is’-statements to accept. I argue that Rayo faces strong internal pressure to adopt the Kuhnian picture. While it is possible for Rayo to resist these Kuhnian pressures, natural strategies for doing so leave his view more similar to Carnap’s than the above gloss suggested.
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Papers by Daniel Angel Alvarez Greco