Robin Dillon

Georgetown University, MSB, Department Member

Followers

Following

Public Views

Interests

Uploads

Papers by Robin Dillon

Organizational Correctives for Improving Recognition of Near-Miss Events

Journal of Management, 2013

Despite decades of research on organizational disasters, such events remain too common. Scholars ... more Despite decades of research on organizational disasters, such events remain too common. Scholars across a wide range of disciplines agree that one of the most viable approaches to preventing such catastrophes is to observe near-misses and use them to identify and eliminate problems before they produce large failures. Unfortunately, these important warning signals are too often ignored because they are perceived as successes rather than near-misses (or near-failures). In this article, we explore the effect of a climate for safety on improving near-miss recognition by observers, hypothesizing that safety climate increases the level of attention that observers pay to the underlying processes that generate an apparently successful outcome. Using a database of anomaly reports for unmanned NASA missions, we show that organizational safety climate and project stakes increase reporting rates of near-misses, both independently and interactively. In follow-up laboratory experiments, we confir...

Download

Faster-Better-Cheaper Projects: Too Much Risk or Overreaction to Perceived Failure?

IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 2015

From 1992 until 1999, NASA adopted a Faster-Better-Cheaper (FBC) paradigm-i.e., smaller low-cost ... more From 1992 until 1999, NASA adopted a Faster-Better-Cheaper (FBC) paradigm-i.e., smaller low-cost spacecraft-for its unmanned missions. When many early missions met their objectives at much lower cost than traditional flagship missions, the FBC approach seemed successful. However, after the failures of two Mars spacecraft in 1999, the FBC paradigm was viewed as a failed experiment. We reflect on the legacy of FBC. In particular, we focus on the organizational learning literature to explore whether FBC, a stretch goal, was a good step for NASA. Previous examinations of FBC have focused on failure rates rather than on cost effectiveness. We revisit the question of FBC by examining all unmanned NASA missions launched between 1974 and 2007. We find that FBC missions resulted in more scientific publications per dollar of mission cost than other types of missions. From our analysis, we perceive lasting benefits to current projects from the adoption of the stretch goals, and perceive that NASA suffers from a bias against learning from the FBC experiment because of the stigma of the high-profile failed projects. We conclude with the recommendation that NASA should challenge itself with stretch goals, but with science goals rather than human exploration goals.

Download

Integrating risk management with homeland security and antiterrorism resource allocation decision-making

The McGraw-Hill Handbook of Homeland Security, 2005

How Near-Miss Events Amplify or Attenuate Risky Decision Making

Management Science, 2012

I n the aftermath of many natural and man-made disasters, people often wonder why those affected ... more I n the aftermath of many natural and man-made disasters, people often wonder why those affected were underprepared, especially when the disaster was the result of known or regularly occurring hazards (e.g., hurricanes). We study one contributing factor: prior near-miss experiences. Near misses are events that have some nontrivial expectation of ending in disaster but, by chance, do not. We demonstrate that when near misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions (e.g., choosing not to engage in mitigation activities for the potential hazard). On the other hand, if near misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened, this will counter the basic "near-miss" effect and encourage more mitigation. We illustrate the robustness of this pattern across populations with varying levels of real expertise with hazards and different hazard contexts (household evacuation for a hurricane, Caribbean cruises during hurricane season, and deep-water oil drilling). We conclude with ideas to help people manage and communicate about risk.

Download

The Respective Roles of Risk and Decision Analyses in Decision Support

Decision Analysis, 2006

D ecision support models help structure and inform complex choices under uncertainty. Two classic... more D ecision support models help structure and inform complex choices under uncertainty. Two classic models are risk analysis and decision analysis. Risk analysis is understood here as risk characterization, and in some cases, the identification and benefit assessment of some risk management options. It is based on systems analysis and probability, and it excludes the actual decision phase, which requires the preferences, e.g., the utility function, of the decision maker(s). Risk analysis and decision analysis have some similarities and are often complementary. To model uncertainties, both rely on probability, generally a subjective Bayesian degree of belief. A decision analysis can include a risk analysis component, and the design of a risk management plan may require decision analysis support. The challenge for risk analysts is to characterize potential failure problems before decision options have been identified, and when there is no single decision maker, or group of decision makers, who can provide preference functions and degrees of belief. Yet, a correct and complete model of uncertainties in the probabilistic risk analysis phase is important if the results are to be used later for decision support, especially when the number of systems involved and the duration of their operations is unknown. In this paper, we explore some of the challenges inherent to probabilistic risk analysis that should be of interest to the decision analysts who intend to use risk analysis results.

Download

Programmatic Risk Analysis for Critical Engineering Systems Under Tight Resource Constraints

Operations Research, 2003

Page 1. ARTICLES PROGRAMMATIC RISK ANALYSIS FOR CRITICAL ENGINEERING SYSTEMS UNDER TIGHT RESOURCE... more

On the Limitations of Redundancies in the Improvement of System Reliability

Risk Analysis, 2004

Some program managers share a common belief that adding a redundant component to a system reduces... more Some program managers share a common belief that adding a redundant component to a system reduces the probability of failure by half. This is true only if the failures of the redundant components are independent events, which is rarely the case. For example, the redundant components may be subjected to the same external loads. There is, however, in general a decrease in the failure probability of the system. Nonetheless, the redundant element comes at a cost, even if it is less than that of developing the first one when both are based on the same design. Identical parts save the most in terms of design costs, but are subjected to common failure modes from possible design errors that limit the effectiveness of the redundancy. In the development of critical systems, managers thus need to decide if the costs of a parallel system are justified by the increase in the system&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s reliability. NASA, for example, has used redundant spacecraft to increase the chances of mission success, which worked well in the cases of the Viking and Voyager missions. These two successes, however, do not guarantee future ones. We present here a risk analysis framework accounting for dependencies to support the decision to launch at the same time a twin mission of identical spacecraft, given incremental costs and risk-reduction benefits of the second one. We illustrate this analytical approach with the case of the Mars Exploration Rovers launched by NASA in 2003, for which we had performed this assessment in 2001.

APRAM: an advanced programmatic risk analysis method

International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management, 2001

Optimal Use of Budget Reserves to Minimize Technical and Management Failure Risks During Complex Project Development

IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 2005

Project managers are recognizing that adequate resource reserves are a critical success factor in... more Project managers are recognizing that adequate resource reserves are a critical success factor in a project development environment that is complex and uncertain. Yet, justifying the need for project reserves is still a challenge, as is the optimal allocation of any available resources to minimize development uncertainties. This paper presents a multiperiod decision model designed to support the management of reserves considering the risks of failures including technical, managerial, i.e., exceeding budget and schedule, or strategic, i.e., meeting budget, schedule, and technical specifications but not achieving the full strategic value of the project. In this paper, we examine the tradeoffs among these risks and their implications for resource allocation during a project's development phase. This decision support model is referred to as Dynamic Advanced Probabilistic Risk Analysis Model. It provides decision makers with a quantitative tool to allocate reserves (beyond the bare-bone minimum project costs) among project reserves, technical reinforcements of the engineered system, and product enhancements, with the advantage of flexibility over time. The model yields first, coarse estimates of the value of deferring some commitments about the product's design until critical uncertainties are resolved and second, an estimate of the optimal amount to be invested in testing and reviews. We show that the greater the uncertainties at the onset of the development phase, the greater the value of this information.

Download

Risk Assessment Based on Financial Data: Market Response to Airline Accidents

Risk Analysis, 1999

The risk of catastrophic failures, for example in the aviation and aerospace industries, can be a... more The risk of catastrophic failures, for example in the aviation and aerospace industries, can be approached from different angles (e.g., statistics when they exist, or a detailed probabilistic analysis of the system). Each new accident carries information that has already been included in the experience base or constitutes new evidence that can be used to update a previous assessment of the risk. In this paper, we take a different approach and consider the risk and the updating from the investor's point of view. Based on the market response to past airplane accidents, we examine which ones have created a “surprise response” and which ones are considered part of the risk of the airline business as previously assessed. To do so, we quantify the magnitude and the timing of the observed market response to catastrophic accidents, and we compare it to an estimate of the response that would be expected based on the true actual cost of the accident including direct and indirect costs (“full-cost information” response). First, we develop a method based on stock market data to measure the actual market response to an accident and we construct an estimate of the “full-cost information” response to such an event. We then compare the two figures for the immediate and the long-term response of the market for the affected firm, as well as for the whole industry group to which the firm belongs. As an illustration, we analyze a sample of ten fatal accidents experienced by major US domestic airlines during the last seven years. In four cases, we observed an abnormal market response. In these instances, it seems that the shareholders may have updated their estimates of the probability of a future accident in the affected airlines or more generally of the firm's future business prospects. This market reaction is not always easy to explain much less to anticipate, a fact which management should bear in mind when planning a firm's response to such an event.

Download

Assessment of Cost Uncertainties for Large Technology Projects: A Methodology and an Application

Interfaces, 2002

Page 1. Assessment of Cost Uncertainties for Large Technology Projects: A Methodology and an Appl... more

An Analysis of the Implications of a Magnetic Field Threshold Limit Value on Utility Work Practices

Aiha Journal, 2000

This article examines the implications of a 10 gauss (G) occupational threshold limit value (TLV)... more This article examines the implications of a 10 gauss (G) occupational threshold limit value (TLV) on the work practices of a utility that must maintain and repair 500 and 230 kV transmission lines. Three work practices are compared: bare-handed work with live lines (the current practice at the example utility), use of hot sticks, and de-energizing lines prior to work. Bare-handed work with live lines leads to occasional exceedances of the 10 G TLV. Use of hot sticks and de-energizing lines eliminate these exceedances, but they do so at a price. Both practices increase the job duration and, as a result, may increase occupational injury risks. The annual costs for the current live-line, bare-handed practice is approximately $175,000. Use of hot sticks increases this annual cost of maintenance and repair by 30 to 55%. De-energizing lines can increase annual costs by $4 million to $14 million, due to the need for adding additional electricity generation during the planned outages. De-energizing lines also increases the risk to service reliability slightly.

How Near-Misses Influence Decision Making Under Risk: A Missed Opportunity for Learning

Management Science, 2008

Page 1. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Articles in Advance, pp. 116 issn 0025-1909eissn 1526-5501 informs® d... more

Success factors and future challenges in the management of faster-better-cheaper projects: lessons learned from NASA

IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 2001

In the last few years, NASA has shifted its mode of management of unmanned space missions from "f... more In the last few years, NASA has shifted its mode of management of unmanned space missions from "flagship" missions to faster-better-cheaper (FBC) projects with reduced scope, budget, and schedule. In order to examine the successful attributes and potential weaknesses of this new management style, we prepared four case studies at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Pasadena, CA) in 1997 and 1998. Based on these case studies, (Cassini, Mars Pathfinder, Mars Global Surveyor, and Deep Space 1), we identified a number of management features that seem to have contributed to the success of the early FBC projects. These features generally involve simplification, standardization, and the use of commercially available components and talents. We also pointed out that most of these features had potential downsides, and we expressed some concerns about the long-term viability of some of these features. The recent failures of two Mars missions have also shown the limitations of this mode of operations. Therefore, in the future, some of these features may have to be revisited to account better for risks and uncertainties. In this paper, we describe these management factors, some of the challenges that remain, and a set of recommendations based on our observations, many of which apply to other industries subjected to similar constraints.

Download

Analytical tools for the management of faster-better-cheaper space missions

Absrruct-The faster-better-cheaper (FBC) mode of operation of NASA's unmanned space program ... more

Challenges in the management of faster-better-cheaper space missions

NASA has recently changed the management style of its unmanned space program to a faster-better-c... more NASA has recently changed the management style of its unmanned space program to a faster-better-cheaper (FBC) mode of operation. FBC projects have focused scopes and are developed in three years for about two hundred million dollars. A current study of four missions (Cassini as a base case, Mars Global Surveyor, Mars Pathfinder, and Deep Space Probe 1) allows us to compare the new management formula in its current transition phase to the traditional “flagship” projects, and to examine what this formula may yield in the long run. In this paper, we examine the short-term features of the current missions that may require some review and consideration before applying the same formula to future projects

Probabilistic risk analysis for the NASA space shuttle: a brief history and current work

Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2001

While NASA managers have always relied on risk analysis tools for the development and maintenance... more

Robin Dillon

Uploads

Papers by Robin Dillon

Log In